Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 EW/5–1445: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 14, 1945—noon.
[Received 1:07 p.m.]

1563. Personal for Ambassador Harriman. There are several matters connected with our work which are causing me some concern. I am not wiring about them officially for fear that I might unwittingly put statements on record which are counter to your views. I hope you will not mind, however, if I put my thoughts frankly before you in this manner for whatever use you can make of them.

1 Preparations for arrival of Reparations Commission. In accordance with your message, Department’s 1057, May 12, 6 p.m.⁸⁵ I will endeavor to see Maiski at once. I will also press the visa applications mentioned in Department’s 1060, May 12, 7 p.m.⁸⁶ and will take up the proposed visit to Germany. I am afraid, however, that this will lead the Russians to think that we will give way on the admission of Poland to the Commission if they just hold tight. I believe our best chance of getting Russian concurrence to our views on the composition of the Commission would be to show no further interest in plans for the movement to Moscow and housing of our delegation until they come around on the question of participation.

2 Increase in size of reparations delegation. The increase in the size of this delegation to 30 people seems to me to indicate a certain misunderstanding as to the realities of this question. I gather from this that we are still proceeding on the expectation that we are going to sit down at a table with the Russians and work out a settlement on the basis of careful study and consideration of the various factors involved; and that out of this will arise detailed, realistic decisions which we can jointly put into effect. If Mr. Pauley comes over here with such expectations, his visit, in my opinion, will be dogged with frustration, will cause trouble for this mission, and will constitute a further burden on Soviet-American relations.

I strongly doubt that there can be any detailed joint study here of the real factors involved in the reparations settlement. The Russians are going to advance global demand, probably in staggering figures, for payment and service to the Soviet Union, and they will ask that the lion’s share of this come from the other zone [s] of occupation. Their demands will be formulated backstage among themselves, on the basis of considerations which will never be revealed to us, but which will certainly be political rather than economic. Any efforts on the part of foreign delegations to pull discussion down to a basis of economic equalities will be met with repetitious orations about what the Germans did to Russia. In the end, it will come down to a simple horse trade. How much are we going to make available to the Russians from our zones, and what price are we going to demand for it? These are points which we and the British ought to make up our minds about before we come here. Once we get here we shouldn’t need any 30 people to drive the bargain with the Russians.⁸⁷

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 3 and 4. Paragraph 3, dealing with the establishment of a government of national unity in Poland, is printed in volume V, page 295; paragraph 4, concerning the Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary, is printed in volume IV, page 814.]

Kennan

85. Not printed; this telegram dealt with transport arrangements and living accommodations for the United States Delegation to the Reparations Conference.
86. Not printed.
87. Ambassador Harriman sent his reply via Department telegram 1111, May 20, 11 p.m., to Moscow. The pertinent portions are here quoted: “The following are my brief comments on your numbered points. I will expand upon them when I return to Moscow: 1. As you now know, it has been decided to conduct the initial reparations discussion on the original tripartite basis in accordance with the agreement at Yalta and therefore there is no question of admitting Poland to these discussions. 2. I feel we have nothing to worry about in regard to the size of the reparations delegation. The principal point is that Mr. Pauley’s instructions are very firm and while we may not reach any agreement I have no fears about us giving in.” (740.00119 EW/5–1445)