500.CC/5–745
Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, of Conversation Held at San Francisco, May 7, 1945
| Present: | Mr. Molotov80 | Mr. Pauley |
| Ambassador Harriman | Mr. Bohlen | |
| Ambassador Gromyko81 | Mr. Pavlov82 |
Mr. Molotov After an exchange of amenities, Mr. Molotov inquired whether Mr. Pauley expected to leave for Moscow. He added that his Government attached the greatest importance to the work of the Reparation Commission and hoped it would soon get started.
Mr. Pauley replied that he hoped it would be soon and that studies were being made in the State Department and elsewhere and a report had been submitted to the President on the subject of Reparations.83
Mr. Molotov remarked that the British had not yet appointed their representative.
Mr. Pauley then said there were a number of current pressing problems involving reparations which were facing us at this time. He said that because of our decision to have a world reparation policy for Germany in our zones of occupation, all demands and requests for [Page 1209] German material or equipment which our Commanders were receiving from other European countries had been refused since we felt it would be a mistake to pursue separate policies in the different zones of occupation.
Mr. Molotov replied that a good overall basis had been established in the Yalta Agreement and all that was necessary was for the Commission to get to work.
Mr. Pauley replied that he was familiar with the discussions at Yalta.
Mr. Molotov then said in that case Mr. Pauley was aware of the fact that the Soviet and American representatives at Yalta found it easy to agree but that there had been difficulties with the British.
Mr. Pauley said that he hoped that the Commission in Moscow could come to a complete agreement very quickly and then possibly move into Germany because there were a number of practical questions which could be best examined on the spot such as the problem of evaluation and the consideration of the minimum needs of the German civilian population. He, therefore, hoped that the meeting in Moscow could be completed quickly and the Commission adjourned to some mutually acceptable place in Germany.
Mr. Molotov said that he felt they should start in Moscow and get on with the implementation of the Crimea decision but that if the Commission then considered it desirable to proceed to Germany there would be no serious objection. He added, however, that he must again point out that the Commission had not even started its work in Moscow and inquired whether Mr. Pauley saw any difficulties in the way of the Commission getting to work.
Mr. Pauley replied that in so far as the U.S. Government was concerned there were no difficulties and he hoped that soon he could start for Moscow.
Ambassador Harriman mentioned the desire of the British and American Governments to have France represented on the Moscow Commission. He said that this was not only logical since France was to be a member of the Control Council for Germany, but he felt it would also speed the work very much since in Germany itself France would be involved as a member of the Control Council. If France was not represented at the first phase it would only mean that long explanations of what had happened in Moscow would have to be given to the French Government.
Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet Government was not against French participation but felt that Poland and Yalta [Yugoslavia] had no less right to be represented than France. He added that in his opinion, it would be best to go forward on the original Crimea provision which provided for the three powers on the Moscow Commission.
[Page 1210]Mr. Pauley then said that while in our zones we were adopting the principle of not allowing any German material which might fall in the category of reparations to be transferred from Germany, we had reports that in the Soviet Zone, German material and equipment were being moved to Russia.
Mr. Molotov said that he assumed that whatever was needed for the prosecution of the war was being taken.
Mr. Pauley said that now that the war in Europe was over he presumed that the need to remove this material and equipment would no longer be present.
Mr. Molotov said he did not think the need would stop as quickly as that and inquired whether the U.S. Government did not think it was important to the Soviet Union to keep up its war production. He added that the Soviet industry had suffered very greatly during this war.
Mr. Pauley replied that the U.S. also had great need since it still had the war in the Pacific to win but nevertheless for the sake of unified policy we had refrained from allowing any German material to be moved from our zone of occupation to other countries. He said he assumed from Mr. Molotov’s remarks that there would be no objection, however, if the Commanders in our zone desired to remove material which could be used for the war.
Mr. Molotov said he assumed the U.S. Commanders were taking what they needed for war. He added that in regard to removal in the Soviet zone, he had no detailed information and, therefore, could not give any concrete answers on the subject. He added that he felt if the Commission could get to work quickly they could work out an agreed policy on this question of present removals which he personally felt was a very small matter.
Mr. Pauley in conclusion said that he hoped to leave as soon as he could complete the final work of preparation.
- Mr. Molotov was Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization.↩
- Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, was a member of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization.↩
- Vladimir Nikolayevich Pavlov, Personal Secretary and Interpreter to Marshal Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union.↩
- See instructions for the U.S. Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations, May 18, p. 1222.↩