Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 control (Germany)/1–246

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (Russell) to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] January 2, 1946.

1. Problem

The Department of State and War Department have not been able to agree on the organization required in Washington to give policy guidance for the administration of the German occupied area. Likewise there is a difference of opinion on how and when civilian control will be established to replace military government.

2. Background

(a) The War Department in a letter of November 26 from the Director of the Civil Affairs Division to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration proposed that an inter-departmental agency to be known as the Occupied Areas Authority under the guidance of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee be established in Washington.

(b) The State Department in a letter of December 5 from the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division⁴ agreed to the general features of the War Department’s plan but suggested certain changes.

(c) The War Department then materially altered its position and urged that the State Department take over the complete responsibility for the administration of Germany by expanding its departmental organization in Washington and by creating the necessary field organization in Germany. This view was expressed by Secretary Patterson in a conference in his office on December 18, attended by Messrs. Acheson, Dunn, Riddleberger, Collado,⁵ Schneider and Russell, and was followed up by a letter from Secretary Patterson to Mr. Acheson of December 22.

(d) On December 19, following the meeting in Judge Patterson’s office, Mr. Acheson explained to the President our position, emphasizing the impracticability of the State Department taking over the administrative functions now performed by the Army in Germany. The President agreed heartily and subsequently, in a Cabinet meeting, he expressed himself accordingly. This provoked a loud protest from Secretary Patterson. It was thereupon agreed that a decision should be delayed until your return.

(e) Judge Patterson in his letter of December 29, 1945, to the Secretary of State (attached as Tab A)⁶ restates his position that the Department of State should accept responsibility and make the necessary organizational changes to supervise the government of Germany when placed on a civilianized basis. An early decision is urged.

3. Discussion

(a) The memorandum of August 30, 1945 (Tab B)⁷ which the President approved established a sensible basis for the control of Germany which should not be hastily changed and which was predicated upon two sound principles:

1) “The War Department by reason of the military responsibility for control of Germany and Austria would deal primarily with the executive and administrative aspects of the questions which will arise.” This means that within Germany there must be centralization of administrative responsibility and for the present this must be with the Army.

2) “The Department of State by reason of its responsibility to the President for carrying out the foreign policy of the United States would deal primarily with the policy aspects of the questions which would arise … The Department of State would consult with other civilian departments and agencies on matters of appropriate concern to them”. This means the use of machinery such as or very similar to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for the development of policy direction for German control.

(b) The War Department now proposes that these principles be abandoned and that the decision shall be made now that on June 1, 1946, the State Department shall assume responsibility for administration in Germany. This proposal is based on the doubtful assumption that effective German local government machinery will be established by June 1, 1946. Irrespective of whether such machinery is so established it must be conceded that a considerable period of time must elapse before we will know that such machinery may be relied upon and that Army supply and transportation facilities are no longer necessary.

(c) Control of Germany at the present and for an indefinite and uncertain future period involves considerably more than mere policy direction of a political character. Until effective German governmental responsibility can be established and can prove itself, German control involves specialized operating functions requiring highly technical skills in the fields of health, sanitation, transportation etc. Moreover, all admit that for some considerable period imports are essential to our operations in Germany and this presupposes a supply organization equipped to procure, transport and distribute the imports. For the State Department to undertake the complex and diverse operating responsibilities inherent in German control would require the assumption of operating responsibilities entirely alien to its previous operations and for which it has little experience. On the contrary, few of these responsibilities are new to the Army. The Army has a supply organization; it has experienced organizations to handle health, sanitation, transportation, supply and other problems. It has accumulated experience of decades in directing such operations. It now has a large administrative organization and rapidly shrinking volume of business. Until conditions in Germany become normal the occupation forces are an essential part of German control. There must be unity of control in the field and so long as the occupation forces are needed the control of Germany in the field should be centralized in the Army.

(d) The plain fact is that the Army became panicky over the idea that military government in Germany was becoming a liability. This is the basis for the War Department’s desire to unload the job on the State Department—and not the various rationalizations which have been offered in Secretary Patterson’s letter. The job is temporary, we hope; the Army now has it in hand, it has the organization and experience to do a better job than any other agency, and fear of criticism should not be allowed to throw the job into less competent hands. Former Assistant Secretary of War McCloy who headed the supervision of military government while he was in the War Department shares this view.

(e) While Secretary Patterson holds that the War Department must be divorced quickly and completely from the control of Germany, he makes no similar demand with regard to Japan. Military government there under the policy direction of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the State Department apparently can operate without objection. And now the Moscow agreements provide that policy for the control of Japan shall be set by an Allied Commission and that administration shall be by the supreme military commander on a strictly U.S. Army basis.

(f) The crux of the problem is the phasing of appropriate control machinery which will reflect the improvements and changes in the internal situation in Germany. The following time table is suggested:

Situation	Policy Guidance Organization in Washington	Organization in Germany for administration amp; supervision of occupied areas
First Stage: Invasion and occupation of Germany	War Department (with political and foreign policy decisions made by State Department)	Military government under military commander
Second Stage: Resuscitation of German economy requiring supervision and participation of Army supply, transportation, sanitation, and law enforcing facilities	Interdepartmental organization for policy guidance under leadership of representatives of Department of State and with participation of State, War, Navy and other departments and organizations such as Treasury in matters requiring expert knowledge and experience.	Military government will train civilians to replace gradually military personnel in control positions. Administration continues under Army control.
Third Stage: German government reestablished with decreasing need for U.S. military forces and facilities to supplement German economic system and local law enforcement agencies.	Same as Stage 2.	High Commissioner with civilians in principal administrative roles; considerable reliance on Army participation continues but military commander and forces are subordinate to High Commissioner and his civilian control organization.
Fourth Stage: German government and economic system reestablished sufficiently to make U.S. Army supply, transportation and law enforcement facilities unnecessary.	State Department (normal and existing organization machinery)	High Commissioner will have civilian staff sufficient for supervision of German methods and policies. Need for U.S. Army neglible.

4. Recommendations:

(a) That you support the phasing and organizational arrangements for control of Germany as outlined in paragraph 3, (f), above.

(b) That you secure acceptance of the understanding that the present situation is that of Stage 2 and that Stage 3 may start on June 1, 1946, and will last at least through the winter of 1946/1947.

(c) That the attached letter⁸ be sent to the President as a basis for a decision.

Donald Russell

4. Not printed, but see footnote 69, p. 1007.
5. Emilio G. Collado, Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy.
6. Not found in Department files.
7. Not printed.
8. Not printed.