Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 Control (Germany)/12–1845

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Dunn)⁸⁸

[Washington,] December 18, 1945.

It seems to me that we should work out some arrangement by which the State Department assumes full extent of its responsibility with regard to policy to be carried out in Germany. This is a matter of working out some arrangement for close collaboration between the State and War Departments with perhaps final authority and responsibility being taken by the State Department for policy in Germany.

As far as transfer of control in Germany from military to civilian authority, it seems to me that the following considerations should be taken into account:

(1) The present agreement on the part of the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R., and France is that there shall be military government in Germany with the Central Control Council composed of the military commanders of the four different zones. There was a great deal of discussion which took place between the four governments as to the form of control which would be set up in Germany. The reasoning upon which the final decision was based included the situation which we faced as we came near the final defeat of Germany. It was obvious that no German Government could be recognized or dealt with as there could be no other government set up than one composed of Germans more or less identified with the Nazi regime. As that was repugnant to all the Allied governments concerned, it was decided that the four governments would constitute a military government for at least a considerable period. It was further decided that there would be no German Government created for some time. This decision was further confirmed at Potsdam last summer.⁸⁹ It was obvious that if military government were to be exercised by the different governments in the different zones, it was essential that the central military control in the form of a quadripartite control council must be composed of the military commanders of the various zones. You could not have more than one type of authority operating in Germany. It either had to be all military or all civilian and, of course, the situation required that it be military. It was also considered that it would take at least two years to re-establish order and provide for the revival of the most meager economic existence in Germany. As this requires a vast organization it is not possible to accomplish these objectives with other than the military organization which was already in existence when we went into Germany. This military authority, composed of the commanders of the different zones, was directed to operate on the basis of agreed-upon policy decisions which have been entered into between the four governments, after full discussion of each point of the general policy as to the treatment to be accorded defeated Germany. These headings included demilitarization, de-nazification, reparations, restoration of the most meager requirements of life on a basis of a standard of living to be no higher than that of any other European country. The general objectives of the Allied policy in Germany were further discussed and agreed to at the Potsdam Conference. The U.S. Government is committed to carry on in Germany in accordance with these agreements until and unless these basic agreements are modified by supplemental agreements after full discussion among the four Allied Powers concerned. A further reason for establishing military authority in Germany was that the very fact that the authority was military in character was considered to assist in the application of foreign rule in Germany as far as the Germans were concerned, and it was obvious that military commanders, even though of different nationalities, would, by reason of the fact that they are all in the military service, facilitate their dealings with each other and their carrying out of the governmental agreements above referred to. It was also obvious that the discipline and chain of command which exists in military organization was the best possible atmosphere in which to carry forward the difficult task of dealing with a defeated and disintegrated Germany.

(2) In setting up the American participation in the control of Germany both for the U.S. zone and the U.S. participation in the Quadri-partite Control Council, there was never at any time any consideration given to the use of civilians other than the small group headed by Ambassador Murphy, who was attached to the U.S. Military Commander in Germany for the purpose of contributing to him for use in carrying out his duties such political advice and assistance as he might wish to seek or accept from the U.S. Political Advisor. It was expected that as time went on it would be possible to add civilian personnel in the various subsections of the central Allied control machinery, particularly in those positions where technical civilian knowledge and experience was needed and where the Army might not have on hand the persons particularly qualified for specialized work, such as finance, foreign trade, agriculture, rationing, education, and public information. This has been done and there is a considerable number of civilian assistants in the central control machinery now.

(3) The core of the actual operational assistance in dealing with Germany at the present time is, as far as the U.S. zone is concerned, the military government section of the U.S. Forces. This military government organization deals directly with the German problems from the level of small municipals and rural districts, up through the townships and including the provinces or Laender. This is a vast machinery which deals with problems of food transportation, sanitation, public utilities, communication, public order, and executes on the spot the policy determined by the Control Council. It would be impossible to substitute for this existing government system a civilian organization which would be capable of carrying out the responsibilities now being carried on by military government.

Of course, it was always assumed that at some later time, possibly after a couple of years of military government, it would be possible to have created decentralized local German administrative bodies which would be capable of carrying out the responsibilities of civic administration under general directives given by the occupying authorities to the German provincial authorities. It would not seem advisable, however, to press forward too fast the creation of local administrative bodies any more than it would be advisable to retard the creation of such bodies. It was always considered that the creation and setting up of the local German administration authorities should begin as soon as it seemed possible to find sufficient responsible non-Nazi Germans to take over these responsibilities, but in any event, it would not be wise to remove the system of surveillance by military government authorities until it became certain that the local German administrations were in fact carrying out their responsibilities along lines of the policies decided upon for dealing with the defeated German nation. We have at present an extremely satisfactory governmental machinery operating in Germany, certainly as far as the U.S. zone is concerned, and it would seem very risky to remove that system and attempt to substitute for it inexperienced administrators, at least before we have had a chance to observe the manner in which the German administrations are carrying out their duties and responsibilities. Certainly, the time which has been heard mentioned of pulling out the military government system in the U.S. zone, about six months from now, would seem to be entirely too short to be sure that the German authorities were properly carrying on their work.

A further difficulty in transfer from military to civilian control is the question of dealing with the food requirements for the population in the U.S. zone. It is obvious that the U.S. would have to finance the import of food perhaps for the first several years, although this may be taken care of later by the first charge upon German exports. As the U.S. Forces now have the responsibility for dealing with the German situation in the form of occupation troops in Germany and the responsibilities connected with dealing with civilian population are already established as lying with the Army and thus the War Department, it would seem advisable to continue the appropriation for funds necessary to deal with the German population in the War Department budget, as it has been carried in that Department’s budget from the beginning of the occupation of Germany; and as this is a continuing responsibility of the War Department, it would be sound logic to continue the appropriations in that Department’s budget. It would certainly be very difficult for any civilian agency of this government, including the State Department, to take up with Congress anew the obtaining of appropriations for dealing with the German population.

The Department of State is a policy organism of the Government and has never had operational responsibility and is, therefore, not equipped to carry out operations, certainly not on such large scales as would be required in dealing with the German problem. We have an existing system which is working well and it seems to be highly impractical to change it, certainly within a shorter time than six months from now. We need more time to see how the German problem is working out.

One more thought on the matter of dealing with our other Allies on the Central Control Council in Germany: If we were to change the character of the representation on the Allied Control Council at this time or in the reasonably near future from military to civilian, we would very likely bring into the dealings of the representatives on the Control Council the political background of relationship with the other governments represented there. At present, the military commanders can deal with each other on a straight military basis and on the sole basis of the responsibilities for carrying out the occupation and achieving the objectives of our agreed policies in Germany. When we change from military commanders to civilian commanders dealing with each other in Germany, they will undoubtedly, as political representatives of their governments, find themselves working against the background of perhaps many other situations in the relations of the different governments than strictly and exclusively those problems having to do with our objectives in Germany itself. It would seem advisable for all accounts therefore to go very slowly on the change-over from military representation and authority in Germany to civilian representation.

James Clement Dunn

88. Addressed to Under Secretary of State Acheson and to Assistant Secretary of State Russell.
89. See chapter II–A, section 9(iv) of the “Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference,” Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, p. 1483.