The survey party, headed by Mr. Lewis Douglas and Major General O. P.
Echols, had excellent facilities placed at its disposal and received the
fullest cooperation from the Military Government detachments in the
field. It spent eight days, with morning, afternoon, and evening
sessions on the survey and discussed Military Government problems with
approximately one hundred officers, both in group meetings and in
individual conferences.
Upon the conclusion of its fieldwork the survey party reported directly
to Lt. General L. D. Clay, Commanding General of the US Group CC and
Deputy Chief of Staff of SHAEF. It recommended that Military Government
be freed from tactical interference below the Army level at the earliest
possible time, that experts be sent to make a detailed study of the
financial situation, that a commission be sent to Bavaria to oversee and
coordinate the denazification program, and that greater effort should be
made to acquaint the Military Government detachments with American
policies in regard to various aspects of Military Government.
I believe that the attached memorandum may serve to furnish considerable
information on a number of problems now confronting Military Government
which are of concern to the Department.
[Enclosure]
Extracts From a Memorandum From Major Harold Zink
to Donald R. Heath, Reporting on a Survey of Military Government
in Bavaria, 27 May–3 June 1945
[Versailles
?] 10
June 1945.
. . . . . . .
Generally speaking the party encountered a most cooperative attitude.
Some reference was made to the time consumed in receiving
Congressional parties, with the implication that visitors in general
[Page 946] were becoming a
nuisance, but the reception accorded this particular party was such
that it seemed that the visit was welcomed as being of real
assistance. A certain reticence on the part of the Military
Government detachments was noticeable; thus when the offer was made
by Mr. Douglas of the loan of specialists from the US Group CC to
assist the detachments in meeting their problems, little or no
response was forthcoming, despite the reiterated pleas for
additional personnel.
2. General. The general impression made by the
several Military Government detachments in Bavaria was favorable;
indeed it was my own feeling in the light of contact with the
personnel of the detachments in the past that they are doing a
remarkably good job, having recovered more than could be reasonably
expected from the low morale occasioned by the long delay in using
their services and other factors. The level of the various
detachments varies somewhat as is to be expected, with the RB52 detachment at
Augsburg perhaps least effective and the Land detachment at Munich
probably the outstanding group. More than the variation among the
various detachments is the degree of difference among the members of
a single detachment. Some of the individual members impressed the
survey party on the basis of their grasp of the problems they are
charged with handling, their able leadership, their sound judgment,
and their general personal qualities. Others, on the other hand,
seemed to have a very slight idea of what they were trying to do,
lacked force, and in general seemed inadequate. It is obviously
difficult and unfair to judge on the basis of the comparatively
brief contact which the survey party had, but some strengthening of
the detachments is probably desirable. On the whole, the members of
the detachments have little knowledge of German institutions and
culture beyond what they have acquired during their training and
that is not especially impressive. It would be very valuable if some
members at least could possess such background, but the supply of
such persons is not large anywhere and particularly limited in the
Army. It would be unrealistic to expect any considerable change in
this particular, though it might be feasible to see what could be
done about securing a single officer with such background for the
larger detachments. Col. Chamberlain of the US Group CC, who is at
present assisting the Munich Stadtkreis detachment in meeting a more
or less acute public safety problem, remarked on the difficulty of
proceeding without knowledge of the general political picture in
Bavaria over a period of ten years or more and asked for the names
of Germans who could be relied on for such information. If we have
no officers of our own available with such knowledge, such sources
will have to be depended on, but a few experts in our own services
to check any such [Page 947]
information would be exceedingly valuable. Most of the detachments
are distinctly understaffed at least for this initial period when so
much is required in the way of organization and additional personnel
would be helpful. Some headway is being made in meeting this lack by
attaching surplus officers from tactical units to the
detachments.
The detachments in the Third Army are confronted with a partial
failure on the part of the tactical units to recognize the role of
Military Government. The result is that tactical commanders, even
down to company level, go so far as to remove Bürgermeisters or
order the appointment of German officials. The new directive53 setting up technical
channels for Military Government below the Army level, if put into
effect shortly, should correct this situation. The Seventh Army is
already distinctly Military Government conscious, offers full
cooperation to Military Government detachments, and has already put
the above directive into effect.
3. Establishment of German Governmental
Machinery. It is probable that Military Government has
proceeded more rapidly than was generally expected. At least in many
quarters there was an opinion that the operations of Military
Government, insofar as they involved setting up German governmental
agencies, would be limited to the Landkreise and Stadtkreise during
the first few months. However, a few weeks saw the Regierungsbezirk
coming into the foreground more or less everywhere and at present
the Land Bavaria is in the process of being organized. The opinion
has been expressed that due caution should be used in going ahead
too rapidly. Moreover, some have interpreted the recent activity in
the direction of establishing RB and Land governmental machinery as
dictated more by the impatience of Military Government personnel
than by actual necessity or prudence. It was the unanimous judgment
of the survey party that there is real justification for setting up
the German governmental system as far as the Land level, at least to
the extent that machinery for handling food, finance,
transportation, and probably health, welfare, labor, education, and
public safety is concerned. Both food and finance are very serious
problems which cannot possibly be handled with any degree of
adequacy on the Kreis level. The survey party found that the initial
steps in setting up RB governments are being undertaken throughout
Bavaria. A Minister President has been named for Land Bavaria54 together with a
Food Director; it is expected that heads of the ministries of
Interior, Finance, Education and Religious Affairs, and Economics
will be chosen shortly—in the meantime the Minister President is
handling the affairs of some of these. A Vice Regierungspräsident
has been named at Regensburg [Page 948] and a Regierungspräsident at Ansbach; at Augsburg such a
selection was expected within a few days. A great deal remains to be
done before any effective German governmental machinery on the RB
and Land levels can be expected. Virtually all of the key
administrative posts remain to be filled, since their former
occupants were Nazis and hence are not available. A certain number
of lower and intermediate civil servants are either already
functioning or available, but much remains to be done before
anything like full staffs can be operating with vetted personnel.
The survey party had the opportunity of talking to the Minister
President and Food Director of Land Bavaria, the Regierungspräsident
of Ansbach, and the Oberbürgermeister of Regensburg. It is obviously
difficult to appraise officials on the basis of such contacts, even
when a common language is used; the use of an interpreter adds
considerably to the hazard. In general these German officials are
advanced in age and consequently lack the vigor and resilience that
are to be expected at an earlier age. It may be wondered how they
will stand up under the terrifically difficult problems which they
will be called upon to handle. Yet it is almost inevitable that men
of this age group be selected because of the contamination of
younger men with Nazi associations. Several of these German
officials at least seemed more than a little in the toils of the
spirit of German bureaucracy and hence were inclined to think in
terms of the past rather than of future requirements. This is
unfortunate and will complicate the successful operation of the
Military Government program, but it is certainly not surprising.
Whether Germans of younger age and less traditional and restricted
outlook can be found even after every avenue has been explored is a
big question. The present selections are probably as satisfactory as
can be expected under the initial circumstances.
. . . . . . .
5. Political Problems. … In no case did we
receive any more than passing reference to political problems. It
may be that the detachments are not sufficiently conscious of the
local situation and that political problems actually are pressing.
Our contacts were not such that we were in a position to judge,
though we certainly gained the impression that most of the officers
had reasonably good local knowledge. In Augsburg it was stated that
some local political organizations asked to be permitted to
recommend persons for office. They were told that they could not be
recognized as parties, but that any lists of names they furnished
would be received and indeed welcomed. Such lists were supplied. It
was reported that in a few instances political groups had to be
informed that no meeting could be permitted at this stage. But there
was no indication of any urgency in this field. It should be
stressed that the situation is developing rapidly and that such
problems may become acute before long. Here [Page 949] again the lack of familiarity on
the part of Military Government officers of German political history
is a handicap. In those instances where a detachment has an officer
responsible for political intelligence there was little evidence
that much was being done. Usually such an officer has several other
duties which receive his major attention. There seems to be real
need to establish some sort of political reporting which will be
available to the Military Government officers. At present they do
not receive reports even from G–255 and OSS. It does not seem probable
in the opinion of the survey party that the detachments themselves
can be relied on for any organized system of political reporting. In
this connection it may be noted that the Catholic hierarchy seems to
be distinctly fearful of leftwing activity and tends to lump Social
Democrats, Communists, etc. into a single category. The Catholic
bishop of Regensburg was outspoken in denunciation of all of these
groups and expressed the fear that they would become potent because
of the strict policy followed by the United States in contrast to
that of the USSR; he remarked on the influence of the Russian
broadcasts reporting on the higher food ration, the opening of
amusements, the more friendly treatment accorded Germans, etc. in
Berlin.
. . . . . . .
