Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–2045

Report on the Franco-American Conversations Held in Washington, November 13–20, 1945, Concerning the Future Status of the Rhineland and the Ruhr⁶²

[Washington,] November 20, 1945.

In the course of the meeting of Foreign Ministers in London the French Delegation circulated on September 14th, 1945 a memorandum⁶³ setting out its views on the steps of being taken with regard to the control and administration of Germany.

In this paper the French Government recalled that it had been informed on July 31st of the text of the arrangement reached at Potsdam between the American, British and Soviet Governments regarding the “Political Principles which would govern the treatment of Germany in the initial period of control.”⁶⁴ The French Government had since that date expressed reservations about this agreement. These reservations concerned particularly the decision to re-establish forthwith German central administrations set up in Berlin which seemed like the first manifestation of a rebirth of the Reich.

Moreover, the French Government had observed that in the terms of the Potsdam communiqué, the territory situated to the east of a certain line would be handed over to the administration of the Polish Government and would immediately be removed from the authority of the inter-allied Control in Berlin and from the authority of future German central administrations. The French memorandum, without raising objections a priori against an arrangement on these lines, drew attention to the danger that this arrangement might be interpreted as confirming the maintenance of German sovereignty over the rest of Germany.

The French Government, which has on many occasions given public notice of the importance which it attaches to the future of the Rheno-Westphalian region in particular, asked the Council of five Ministers of Foreign Affairs that, pending the settlement of a definite status for this area, it would be laid down that the area would be withdrawn from the authority of German central administrations if these were later set up.

This proposal was laid before the meeting by M. Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on September 14th, 1945. It was agreed that a study of the whole of the questions raised by the French memorandum would be pursued through diplomatic channels.

The French Government asked the Governments concerned to state their views on the procedure to be followed in order to carry out this decision.

The British Government suggested on October 8 that in the first stage the conversations should be carried out by the French Government separately and directly with each of the three other Governments. It was agreed that these first conversations would have no other object than to inform each of the three Governments of the French Government’s views, without involving commitments on either side.

Exchanges of views took place in London from the 12th to the 16th of October at the British Foreign Office, of which Mr. James C. Dunn was informed as Deputy of the Secretary of State at the Council of Foreign Ministers.⁶⁵

The French Government at the same time expressed to the American and Soviet Governments, through its Ambassadors in Washington and Moscow, its desire to conduct similar conversations with them.

Mr. Couve de Murville was sent by the French Government and entrusted with the task of explaining to the Department of State the point of view of the French Government. In the course of meetings, which were held from the 13th to the 20th of November, this point of view has been described in detail as set forth below, on the basis of documents drafted in London (which were communicated to the American authorities) as well as by supplementary explanations which were given by Mr. Couve de Murville in the course of these conversations.

The French point of view.

The main preoccupation of the French Government is security. After the last war nothing was done to infringe the integrity of Germany and the measures of security which were taken, i.e. military occupation, were only planned for a limited period during which there was in fact no chance of Germany becoming a danger to peace. The maintenance of German integrity implied the maintenance of a military Power whose energies were inevitably directed towards revenge and the recovery of territories which Germany had lost as a result of the war. This error must not be repeated.

In the opinion of the French Government, the security of Europe and of the world demands that Germany should lose the free use of the war potential represented by the industry and the resources of the Rheno-Westphalian area. It is also desirable that these rich resources should be utilized in the general interest. Moreover, the security of the west demands that the Rhineland countries should not be able to reconstitute an avenue, an arsenal and the starting point for an attack directed against France and more generally against the western powers. To meet these preoccupations, the French Government does not propose to have recourse to territorial annexation but to exclude from now on the activity of any central German authority from the Rhineland and the Ruhr and to establish in these areas a régime conducive to the objectives indicated above.

Two general principles can at this stage be set out:

(1) Whatever may be the details of the final arrangements, it is most important that a decision of principle should be taken immediately to the effect that these territories should be permanently separated from Germany and that this should be made perfectly clear to the inhabitants by a public declaration. This decision implies that the areas in question would be removed from the authority of the Allied Control Council in Berlin at a date which remains to be fixed but which should be within the shortest possible time.

(2) These territories should not constitute as a whole a single entity either politically or economically. Different regimes must be worked out for each of the areas involved.

(a) Left bank of the Rhine.

Adequate military forces must be permanently stationed in the German territories on the left bank of the Rhine, including perhaps some bridgeheads on the right bank.

Insofar as this occupation is intended to constitute a covering force for France itself, i.e. up to and including Cologne, it would be for France to see to the military organization of the left bank of the Rhine, perhaps in conjunction with Belgium or Luxembourg.

Further north the problem is not of such direct interest to France but rather to Belgium, Holland and to the United Kingdom if the latter considers it appropriate. The object of the Forces of occupation will be primarily strategic. These forces will constitute the outposts of the general defence system of all territory west of the Rhine.

The Rhineland should not form part either of Germany or of France and must be subjected to permanent military occupation. The establishment of a definite status for this area in accordance with these principles will depend on the development of local conditions. There may be a single State subjected to inter-Allied military occupation or there may be two or three States each occupied by the troops of different Allied Powers.

Subject to their accepting the presence of Foreign garrisons and refraining from militarisation and from attempts to rejoin Germany, the Governments of the State or States to be created in the Rhineland would be free to manage their own affairs.

(b) The Saar.

The Saar mines, whose ownership was granted to France by the Treaty of Versailles⁶⁶ and was regained by Germany in 1935,⁶⁷ must become once more French property, with the corollary that the territory of the Saar should be included in the French customs and currency system, since the economies of France and the Saar are almost entirely complementary. The final form of government of the territory would be decided in due course. French military forces should be stationed there permanently.

(c) The Ruhr.

The Ruhr area consists of the coal mines and of the factories associated with them. It has a population of about 5 million inhabitants.

The French Government considers that in order to ensure that the natural and industrial resources of this area shall no longer be exploited for military purposes but rather in conformity with the general interest of humanity, it is essential to treat the area not as part of a State or even of a large territory but as a political entity independent from Germany and subjected to an international political and economic régime.

All the countries concerned should participate in the organization of this régime; the States particularly concerned should participate in the selection of the members of the Government, the other interested Powers in some other way.

The local administration should be appointed, so far as possible, by the local population which could also, in due course, participate in the functions of Government.

An international force would be stationed in the territory and its integrity should be guaranteed by all the Powers concerned.

The Ruhr territory would be open to the trade of all countries. It would be served by the international waterway of the Rhine and would in the opinion of the French experts probably be prosperous. There would be no objection to the Ruhr exporting part of its production to the rest of Germany provided, of course, that these exports did not include any kind of war material. The Governing Commission and the Powers which were in a position to direct the Commission’s activities could orientate the production of the Ruhr in any direction which seemed desirable. In particular they could take all necessary measures to ensure that the Ruhr did not unfairly compete with other areas with & similar range of production.

The principles of economic disarmament which may be drawn up by the Control Council would be applied in the Ruhr territory in the same way as in Germany. Part of the probable surplus in the Ruhr trading accounts could perhaps be used for a certain period as part-payment for necessary supplies imported into Germany on the basis that such supplies may be calculated by the Control Council.

The mines and the most important industrial enterprises would be expropriated and turned into an international interest. The exploitation of these mines and enterprises and of the mines belonging hitherto to the Reich should be taken over by international public utility undertakings. The interest of the workers should be safeguarded.

It has been made clear by the French experts that the French proposals have not been put forward on economic grounds and that the decisions to be taken depend essentially on political considerations. These questions are dealt with in greater detail in a French memorandum and in British and French comments which are attached to this report.⁶⁸

Such are the outlines of the French proposals concerning the organization of the Rheno-Westphalian area.

The question has been raised of the date at which these arrangements should be put into effect. The French view was that while it is important to agree, as soon as possible, that the whole of these areas should be separated from Germany, there is not the same urgency in coming to a detailed decision with regard to the future status of the Rhineland.

The Ruhr, on the [other?] hand, raises urgent problems, notably with regard to coal production which interests many Powers. The implementation of the Ruhr régime should be undertaken immediately and could be carried out in stages beginning with economic measures.

The International Régime in the Ruhr.

Detailed study was undertaken of the nature of the régime envisaged for the Ruhr with the following results;

(1) Establishment of the Régime.

The international régime of the Ruhr should be laid down by a decision of the four Powers in occupation of Germany. Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland, as Powers directly concerned, should later be invited to associate themselves with this decision.

(2) Objectives.

This decision shall specify that the object with which this régime is established is to ensure that the natural and industrial resources of the Ruhr are no longer exploited for military purposes but in conformity with the general interest of humanity.

(3) Area.

The territory subjected to this régime shall be as small as possible and should include particularly the coal basin and the principal industries associated with it. The limits of the area covered by this definition are shown on a map drawn up by the French experts.

(4) Separation from Germany.

The régime envisaged involves the complete and permanent separation of the territory from the German Reich and the establishment of the territory as an entity in international law to be named the Ruhr Territory. The inhabitants of this territory who possessed German nationality would lose it and would have the right to become citizens of the Ruhr Territory. They could, on the other hand, within a period to be fixed opt for German nationality on condition that if they did so they left the Ruhr Territory.

The Governing Commission or an authority appointed by it for this purpose would lay down rules governing the entry into the Ruhr Territory of all persons who left it on the arrival of the forces of the United Nations or who at that date were not habitually resident there. For the future, conditions for the acquisition and loss of Ruhr Territory nationality would be decided by the legislative authorities of the Territory.

(5) Governing Commission.

The question was asked whether the Ruhr should be governed by a body set up through the United Nations Organisation or by a group of States acting outside the Framework of the United Nations Organisation.

The view was expressed, so far as the French representatives were concerned, that the conception of trusteeship could not be applied to the Ruhr and that it would be better to put the régime under international control established by a special agreement between the Powers concerned.

It is clear that the instrument setting up the new régime should be registered with the United Nations Organization.

The government of the Territory should be entrusted to a Governing Commission composed of nine members corresponding to the following list of ministerial departments:

• Political
• Interior
• Finance
• Justice
• Education
• Transport
• Posts and Public Works
• National Economy
• Labour and Public Health.

The members of this Commission should be appointed by majority decision of the Powers directly concerned. Their appointments should be terminable in the same fashion. They would be appointed for five years and be replaced by rotation. Retiring members would be eligible for re-election. The Commission would decide the functions of each of its members and those which it would carry out itself. The head of the Commission would be appointed by a majority decision of the Powers directly concerned. He would act as the executive of the Commission.

The character of a political régime drawn up on these lines would be determined by the fact that the Governing Commission was entrusted with a political mission with the object of maintaining international security. The members of the Governing Commission would be appointed by certain Governments acting collectively and would not be regarded as the representatives of these Governments but as the members of a collective body whose functions were of international concern.

It is contemplated that in due course the local population might participate in the exercise of government.

(6) Powers of the Commission.

The Commission should have in the Ruhr Territory all the powers of government. Consequently, it could take all legislative and administrative measures which it might judge necessary. It could in particular maintain or modify administrative institutions. It would appoint and dismiss officials and magistrates, some of whom might if necessary be recruited among nationals of foreign countries.

Justice would continue to be administered by the courts existing in the Ruhr Territory at the entry into force of the new régime except that a new Supreme Court would be substituted for the Reichsgericht of Leipzig. The Governing Commission would be able to modify existing judicial arrangements.

As a consequence of the separation of the Ruhr Territory from the German Reich the Governing Commission would take all necessary measures for the replacement of the Reich by the new territory particularly as regards the ownership of goods which were the property of the Reich and it would take all measures necessary for the complete separation of public services such as railways and posts from those of the Reich.

(7) Gendarmerie, Police and Customs.

The Governing Commission should see to the organization of a Gendarmerie and of a police force of the Territory which could be recruited on the spot and would function under its authority.

It would similarly provide for the frontier police whose personnel would at first be partly recruited outside the Territory. A customs administration would also be necessary whose personnel would be in the main recruited locally except for the high officials.

(8) Armed Forces.

In order to ensure internal security in the Ruhr Territory the States directly concerned would put at the disposal of the Governing Commission a military force, whose numbers have been estimated at 50,000, which would be stationed permanently in the Territory.

The upkeep of this force would be paid for by the Territory.

The different contingents would be placed under a single command.

The Commander-in-Chief would be appointed by the Governing Commission in rotation among the generals of the States mentioned in par. 1 of this section and after consultation with the Governments of these States. He would be directly responsible to the Governing Commission.

Air forces (about ten fighter-bomber squadrons) could be put at the disposal of the Governing Commission without being stationed in the Territory.

These armed forces and the persons attached to them who were in possession of an identity document issued by the military command and all those employed by these forces or in their service should be liable only to the military jurisdiction of the force.

All persons accused of a crime against these forces or members of them could be tried before the military courts of these forces.

The Governing Commission would be the only authority capable of declaring martial law. The nature of such martial law would be decided by the legislature of the Territory.

(9) Foreign Relations.

The United Nations would be able to appoint consuls in the Ruhr Territory. It would be for the Governing Commission to grant them an exequatur.

The Governing Commission could arrange for the protection of Ruhr citizens and interests abroad by appointing consular agents who could be nationals of the territory in which they were to function and at a later stage by the appointment of career consuls.

The Governing Commission could also entrust this protection to one of the Powers indicated in Section 5 above.

The Governing Commission would take the necessary steps to arrange for the independent participation of the Ruhr Territory in technical and administrative international unions and commissions and to negotiate economic treaties affecting the Territory.

(10) Supervision and guarantee of the status of the Ruhr Territory.

The supervision of the application of the Ruhr regime would be carried out by the Governments who signed the instrument setting it up (See Section 1 above).

These Governments would receive each year an annual report from the Governing Commission on the manner in which its functions had been carried out, and on the situation of the Ruhr Territory.

These Governments would see that the Governing Commission’s activities were in conformity with the objective set out in Section 2 above.

These Governments would work out the directives to be given to the Commission.

They would be entitled to receive claims concerning the Ruhr Territory which might be submitted through diplomatic channels and to deal with them in such manner as seemed suitable.

The above mentioned Governments would guarantee the integrity of the Ruhr Territory and would ensure respect for its status. The scope of this guarantee would be in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

The Governments which signed the arrangement setting up the Ruhr Territory would draw up from time to time a list of States which should receive copies of the annual report of the Governing Commission by virtue of their importance either as importers or purchasers for the economy of the Ruhr.

The signatory Governments would receive the observations of these States on the report and could invite one or more of these States to take part in their discussions on this subject.

General Observations

The French proposals are based generally on the idea that the only satisfactory way of ensuring that Germany is never again in a position to wage a war of aggression is to remove from German control the mineral and industrial resources of the Ruhr. If Germany is deprived both of Silesia and of the Ruhr she would almost certainly not again present a danger to security.

The proposals with regard to the occupation of the Rhineland are complementary to the proposals with regard to the Ruhr, the establishment and stability of the international regime for the Ruhr being facilitated by the occupation of the Rhineland, in view of the geographical situation of the two areas. The object of the proposals is to deprive Germany of an area which she has more than once used as a base for invasion. It is not intended that the Rhineland should be intensively occupied. The important thing is that the Allies should have the facility of stationing troops on the Rhine over its whole length.

It would be of great importance to estimate the reactions of the population both in the Ruhr and in the rest of Germany to the introduction of proposals on the above lines but it is practically impossible to do so in advance.

The French view is in general that the Germans will be discontented with any possible settlement of Germany and will inevitably harbor feelings of revenge. It is only by removing the Ruhr from the control of Germany that these feelings could be prevented from assuming practical expression in a new outbreak of militarism and aggression.

If the proposals were to be introduced, the sooner this could be done the better since in the present state of Germany less violent reactions would be expected than when the Germans had recovered to a greater extent.

The administration of the Ruhr would have to be carried out in such a way as to make the new regime as attractive as possible to the inhabitants. This would involve, e.g. allowing them a higher standard of living than the rest of Germany, but it is not intended that the programme of removal of plant for reparations from the Ruhr Territory should be modified if these proposals are put into effect. It would also naturally be desirable to allow the inhabitants of the Ruhr as much freedom as possible in running the affairs of the territory, but it would be most undesirable to hold out any hope to them that they might eventually become independent of international control.

The introduction of the French proposals would not enable the Powers occupying Germany to reduce their forces immediately in case the separation of the Ruhr and the Rhineland might lead to local unrest in Germany. But it would enable the occupying Powers to reduce the duration of the occupation of the rest of Germany, since Germany would, without the Ruhr and the Rhineland, be unable to develop her military power. (This does not take account of the other purposes of occupation, such as the reeducation of the German people and the installation of a democratic government.)

The most dangerous thing would be if a new regime were set up in the Ruhr on the lines of the French proposals and then at a later stage, owing to disagreement between the Controlling Powers or for some other reason, the regime were abandoned. For if this resulted in the reincorporation of the Ruhr Territory in Germany the latter would, at a stroke, reacquire her richest industrial area in a state of far greater prosperity than if it had never been separated.

Supplementary Observations

(a) The American representatives inquired whether, in evolving a plan for separation from Germany, it was possible to (1) combine the Ruhr and the Rhineland in one state, or (2) form an independent state of the Ruhr rather than establish an international regime.

It was pointed out on the French side that a state comprising the Ruhr and Rhineland, with a population of about 15,000,000 inhabitants and disposing of enormous resources, would constitute a powerful state which would be difficult to control and which would inevitably tend to unite again with Germany, once the latter had recuperated. Furthermore, it was emphasized that the Ruhr was not a political entity and possessed none of the characteristics (population, traditions, common aspirations, etc.) which constitute the basis of an independent state. Finally, the French Government considered it would be right that the richest region of Europe should never again be allowed to become an instrument of war, but should be used, under international control, in the interest of common welfare.

(b) The question was raised by the American participants as to the economic effect of separation of this region on the Central Germany that would remain. The opinion of the French delegation was that considerable economic resources would remain to a Central Germany sufficient for its peace-time economy. As Germany was over-industrialized, the removal of the highly industrialized Ruhr would not be of such consequence for the remnant Germany as might have been anticipated. Furthermore, the French plan envisaged the maintenance of important economic relations between the Rhineland-Ruhr regions and the rest of Germany, including the use of Ruhr export surpluses initially to pay for necessary German imports.

(c) The American representatives inquired what the relationship would be between the governing body of the Ruhr and the organization which would be over it in which additional states would participate. The reply was given that the precise form could not be worked out until the views of the three governments were known. Presumably, the participating states would agree on the general policy to be pursued.

(d) Inquiry was made respecting the ownership of Ruhr mines and large industrial plants and also respecting development corporations. The French delegation replied that (1) these properties should be taken away from the former owners, among whom are found the Prussian state and war criminals, in order that they can be removed from German control and utilized for the common good; (2) with this end in view, development corporations especially for coal and steel should be established; (3) the shares of these corporations should be given to Allied countries participating in the regime or with a claim to German reparations.

Other questions asked during the course of the conversations gave an opportunity to the French representative to develop in more detail the views of his Government as expressed in this report.

62. Authorship not indicated on file copy of report, but at the third meeting of the French Delegation with officers of the Department of State, held November 19, 1945, it was decided that Mr. Berard of the French Delegation and Mr. Riddleberger of the Department of State would draw up the report on the conversations (740.00119 Control (Germany) /11–1945).
63. Ante, p. 869.
64. See Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, pp. 1543–1566; and France, Ministére des Affaires Étrangères, Documents français relatifs à l’Allemagne, Août 1945-Février 1947 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1947), pp. 7–13.
65. See telegram 11056, October 22, 7 p.m., from London, p. 886.
66. Far section IV, articles 45–50 relating to the Saar Basin in the Treaty of Versailles, signed June 28, 1919, and notes on these articles, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, pp. 162–182.
67. See ibid., pp. 179–180.
68. Not attached to file copy.