740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–2245: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received June 22—11:08 p.m.]
19. My immediately preceding telegram in regard to the proposal to demilitarize Germany. Hickerson’s memorandum reads as follows:
“Taking everything into account I believe this idea has considerable merit. I do not like the specific draft of a treaty prepared by Oscar Cox.79 I do not believe we have reached the point yet of considering a draft but I think the idea is worthy of exploration.
Specifically I believe that it would be desirable for the President to sound out Stalin and Churchill on this idea at the forthcoming meeting. I think that it would be undesirable for the President to go further at this time than to express an interest in this proposal and to say that he is willing to consider it and discuss it further through diplomatic channels if Stalin and Churchill think that it is a good idea. I do not feel that any commitment in respect of such a treaty should be made at the forthcoming meeting other than to discuss the matter further through diplomatic channels. The purposes of raising the idea at this time would be to find out how much importance the Russians would attach to such a proposal and whether it would in fact be useful in removing their fears that the western countries might at some time wish to strengthen Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.
After all we fully expect to participate in the demilitarization of Germany anyway and to keep Germany demilitarized for an indefinite period in the future. If there is advantage to the United States in agreeing to do this in a formal treaty it seems to me that it would amount to our obtaining this advantage in return for something we expect to do anyway.
I do not like the idea of a 25 year term. That is exactly the length of time between the outbreak of World Wars I and II and psychologically it seems to me it would be undersirable to use such a figure. Why not 50 years? I do not believe that such a treaty would be interpreted as showing a lack of faith in the United Nations organization. After all the charter makes specific provision for the control of enemy states outside the organization (chapter 12, paragraph 2 of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals).80 It is perfectly clear that this job will be done by the responsible powers outside the organization for an indefinite period of time.
As to timing such a treaty would not in the ordinary course of events be concluded and ready for signature until after approval in the United States of the charter. I see some merit in the idea of proposing a similar treaty in regard to Japan although the circumstances are quite different in regard to Japan from those relating to Germany. [Page 531] This point might be met by our making it clear that if we sign a treaty to demilitarize Germany we will expect a similar treaty to be concluded in regard to Japan at the appropriate time.
I think that if such a treaty is concluded it should be between the four countries represented on the control commission. However, I see some advantage to adding China as a signatory since China adhered to the Moscow declaration.”
- For text of Cox’s February 17 draft of a treaty on the demilitarization of Germany, see p. 424.↩
- See proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, October 7, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 890.↩