740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–1645

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

There is a chance that at today’s Cabinet meeting objection will be raised by Secretary Morgenthau to the new directive on Germany approved by the President, and that he may have support from Secretary Stimson. The basic difference in view between the State Department, on the one hand, and the Treasury and War Departments on the other, is over the scope of activity of Allied military government and the need for genuine Allied agreement on policy toward Germany. (The Treasury and War Departments advocate the same policy for different reasons: Treasury wants chaos; War wants decentralization and complete authority for its zone commander).

The Treasury-War Department view is that each zone of occupation should be treated largely as a separate unit and that the occupation authorities should concern themselves almost exclusively with a few simple tasks to be carried out in a few months by the occupation forces themselves. These are denazification and primary disarmament. On almost everything else we should keep hands off, avoid general economic controls, and get out as soon as possible, leaving [Page 458] future developments in Germany to the Germans. The War Department has maintained this view over months of discussion with us.

The Treasury-War Department position of granting almost complete liberty of action to the zone commanders would, if adopted, be interpreted by the Russians, and presumably also by the British, as a virtual repudiation of the control machinery agreement and as evidence that Allied unity in the question of the treatment of Germany is at an end. Should it become known to the Russians that we have no intention of working out a joint Allied policy for Germany, they will probably take the position that the agreement on zones is likewise invalid.

In the opinion of the Department, this concept of “smash-and-run” is directly contrary to the Yalta decisions and to the views of our Allies. An agreed, uniform and comprehensive control over Germany and the German economy is essential to achieve the purposes decided upon at Yalta as set forth in the Crimea declaration and throughout the discussions. The dispute in Washington over the past eight months regarding this central point has gravely hampered all negotiations with our Allies on this subject and our planning for control of Germany. Unless the clear-cut decision made in the memorandum approved by the President is adhered to, this confusion will persist, with consequences that will be disastrous to Allied cooperation and to the achievement of our basic program for peace. Unless we go forward with the cooperation promised at Yalta the Dumbarton Oaks organization87 will not be brought to fruition.

  1. Preliminaries to the establishment of the international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, August 21–October 7, 1944. For documentation regarding these discussions, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 713 ff.