Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

Department of the Army Files: Telegram

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Truman, to the President³⁷

Frankfurt, 8 June 1945.

FWD 24075. The following is from Mr. Hopkins to the President:

“Have discussed Russian situation in Germany with Eisenhower³⁸ and have obtained his impressions of his conference with Zhukov at Berlin. I am convinced that present indeterminate status of date for withdrawal of Allied troops from area assigned to the Russians is certain to be misunderstood by Russia as well as at home.

It is manifest that Allied control machiney cannot be started until Allied troops have withdrawn from territory included in the Russian area of occupation. Any delay in the establishment of control machinery interferes seriously with the development of governmental administrative machinery for Germany and with the application of Allied policy in Germany. A delay of a week or two in starting the withdrawal would not be disastrous; however, this question should not remain in its present status until the 15th July meeting.

As a concurrent condition to our withdrawal we should specify a simultaneous movement of our troops to Berlin under an agreement between the respective commanders which would provide us either unrestricted access to our Berlin area from Bremen and [or?] Frankfurt by air, rail, and highway on agreed routes.

I am not sure of British reaction to such a proposal. However, I am sure that every effort will be made there to obtain British agreement to a cable to Stalin that you are prepared to start the withdrawal of American troops by 21 June subject to the respective military commanders working out an agreement with respect to the phasing of such withdrawal, the movement of our troops into Berlin, and the guarantee of routes of communication to our Berlin area. It is anticipated that United Kingdom will take parallel action.

If you believe that the settlement of the Austrian question should be a prerequisite to withdrawal from the Russian area in Germany, I suggest that your cable advise Stalin accordingly to include the specific conditions to be settled. However, if this question is to be included as one of the requirements for our withdrawal I strongly urge that you advise Stalin that final authority to settle zone questions in Austria has been delegated to our military commander to work out with his military commander and that this question be withdrawn from European Advisory Commission discussion.

As matters now stand in Germany, Eisenhower is in embarrassing position of not being able to discuss a specific date for withdrawal with the Russians. Moreover, the Russians have not been advised as to any specific requirements which we may have in view as a condition to such withdrawal.

I consider the decision as to the date we begin withdrawal into our own zone in Germany or at least specify in detail to the Russians the conditions which they must fulfill before such date can be established of major import to our future relations with Russia. Delays now may make withdrawal at a later date appear to have resulted from Russian pressure. I urge that prompt action be taken to dispose of this issue.

I am prepared to remain in Paris if this question will be decided in the next several days. I would appreciate very much being advised of your wishes to know if I may have the opportunity to discuss it further with Eisenhower prior to reporting to you on my return.”

37. Transmitted from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward Headquarters, Frankfurt, Germany, to the War Department for the White House. Recorded as War Department message number CM–IN–7709.
38. See also Hopkins’ personal notes regarding his visit with General Eisenhower at Frankfurt on June 7, Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 913–914.