740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–645: Telegram
The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower), to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
FWD 23724. At the meeting of four commanders at Berlin 5th June, only positive action taken was to sign Four Power Declaration30 with the correction indicated in Ourad 5th June.31 I proposed and British and French concurred to have the deputies sit immediately to develop methods and procedures for control machinery. Zhukov made it clear that he was willing to meet periodically to discuss matters not related to governing Germany as a whole but that any steps to set up control machinery must await withdrawal into the agreed zones. He stated that he would be willing to join in establishing control machinery as soon as withdrawal starts.
You authorized this question of withdrawal to be resolved by Control Council in Urad W11367 of 3 June.32 I suggested to Zhukov that it was a question which could be discussed by the Control Council. Montgomery concurred and stated that the Group Council could make a recommendation for the decision of the several governments. Zhukov apparently wanted an answer rather than a discussion.
The Russians treated us cordially. I gave Zhukov, in the name of the President, the Legion of Merit in the grade of Chief Commander and he reciprocated by awarding me the Order of Victory. Montgomery was likewise decorated and De Lattre33 was given a lesser decoration. Zhukov is to return my visit by a visit to Frankfurt on 10 June.
Nevertheless, it is my opinion that the question of withdrawal must [Page 329] be considered by Combined Chiefs of Staff and resolved by U.S. and U.K. Governments before any further discussion of control machinery with Zhukov will serve any useful purpose.
Also it is of utmost importance that the zone boundaries in Germany proper and in the Berlin district be determined finally. I do not believe this can be accomplished in Group Council. Nevertheless, they remain as obstacles to prompt establishment of control machinery.
I stated on several occasions to Zhukov that there was much that Group Council could accomplish in preliminary organization prior to withdrawal of Allied Forces from territory included in Russian Zone, pointing out that the two problems were not necessarily so closely related that they could not be dealt with separately. Obviously there are many steps in organizing Group Council which could be undertaken now. However, the fact remains that there is some justification for Zhukov’s position that he is unable to discuss administrative problems in Germany when he is still not in control and hence not familiar with the problems of the zone for which he will eventually be responsible. As a result of my discussion with Zhukov I am optimistic that the Russians will join in some form of control machinery when withdrawal is accomplished and will agree to our forces entering into Berlin concurrently with our withdrawal from their zone.
However, neither I nor members of my party found any evidence of Russian organization for Group Council government. This may have resulted from the apparent unwillingness of the Russians to have anything considered at this meeting other than the signing of the Four Power Declaration. It is possible that the Control Council may become only a negotiating agency and in no sense an overall government for Germany.
As our plans for governing our part of Germany must give cognizance to this possibility, I suggest that our Government should consider now the possible alternatives to quadripartite control of Germany as a whole. We must know if our zone in Germany is to be administered as an economic unit rather than as part of the German economy as a whole if we are to plan soundly. As I see it, if quadripartite government does not treat Germany as a whole we must either establish tripartite control of Western Germany to permit its treatment as an economic unit with full realization of all the implications involved, or else be prepared to govern our zone on practically an independent basis. I realize the undesirability of either alternative and hope that the necessity for the adoption of either will not materialize. Nevertheless, sound planning now does indicate that consideration should be given to this problem as many of our actions within our zone must be governed thereby.
- See bracketed note, p. 326.↩
- For a description of the correction made in the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany, see telegram FWD 23680, June 6, from the United States Political Adviser for Germany, supra. ↩
- On June 2, General Eisenhower cabled the Combined Chiefs of Staff for instructions as to the date for withdrawal of troops to designated zones of occupation. The following day, the Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of President Truman, instructed General Eisenhower. See Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 301.↩
- Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, Commanding General of the First French Army.↩