740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–2845
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
Mr. Roger Makins, British Minister-Counselor, called this morning and said that he had now received a reply to my inquiry as to the meaning of the pertinent phrase of paragraph six of the British [Page 312] Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of May 24. By “outstanding questions” the British Foreign Office meant to refer to the “whole question of the future relations” of the British and American Governments with the Soviet Government in Europe. In other words, Mr. Makins said, the British Government feels strongly that British and American troops should not withdraw to the agreed zones of occupation of Germany until all these questions have been settled. He left with me the attached Top Secret Aide-Mémoire on the subject.1 I said that this interpretation did not surprise me but that it made it quite clear that there was a basic difference of opinion on this matter between British and American Governments and that we could not agree with the British position.
I went on to say that in any event there will probably be some delay getting the quadripartite Control Council organized and that I hoped the British meanwhile would go ahead with our plans for the issuance of the proclamation and the establishment of the Control Council in Berlin on June 1. I said that meanwhile our two Governments could continue discussions with regard to the time for withdrawal to the agreed zones and the breakup of SHAEF. Mr. Makins said that personally he favored this and that he hoped and believed the Foreign Office would go along with it. He said that he would telegraph urgently and endeavor to get an immediate reply. I emphasized the importance we attach to taking steps to issue the proclamation assuming authority over Germany which had been agreed to by the four Governments and to setting up the Control Council.
Mr. Makins said that in addition to our proposed presentation of the matter in the European Advisory Commission, his Government thought that we should likewise take it up directly at Moscow and Paris. I told him that we had thought of the European Advisory Commission as the most expeditious method of procedure in view of the fact that Gousev and Massigli were both familiar with all the background. I said, however, that we would be glad to make a parallel démarche at Moscow and Paris urging quick action to meet, if possible, the June 1 date.
Mr. Makins called me back at 6:30 this evening to say that he had now received a reply from the Foreign Office to his inquiry and that unfortunately he had been wrong in his opinion. The British Government does not agree to proceed with the issuance of the proclamation or the setting up of the Control Council until our two Governments [Page 313] have thrashed out the basic issue, namely, whether we will stick to our presently held lines in Germany or withdraw to our respective zones prior to a settlement of “outstanding questions” with the Soviet Government. I told Mr. Makins flatly that we could not go along with the British side on this. I reiterated importance this Government—both the Department and our military authorities—attach to immediate issuance of the proclamation and the establishment of the Control Council. I said that public opinion in this country was, as he must realize, becoming increasingly impatient and bewildered at the delay. I said, therefore, that our instructions to Ambassador Winant to present the matter immediately in the EAC must stand and that we would take simultaneous steps at Moscow and Paris. If the British do not agree, they may, of course, take that position in the European Advisory Commission but we feel that we must proceed without any delay.
Mr. Makins said that he would inform his Government of our position.
- Infra. ↩