Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 EW/5–1445

The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

Paris, May 14, 1945.

Dear Doc: The story of the negotiation with the German High Command of the short surrender document reported in my 2517, May 10, 7 p.m., and my 2493, May 9, 9 p.m.,⁶⁰ is amusing.

In considering this matter, the fact that the conversations were closely held by a few officers at different headquarters (SHAEF at Rheims and the 21st Army Group which then had its headquarters at Luneburg) should be remembered because the physical aspects had a good deal to do with it.

I think it is fair to say that SHAEF had made up its mind to restrict these conversations to the military and to exclude Foreign Office or State Department participation.

As you know, our main office of necessity is at Versailles where the US Group CC are housed, but I maintain an office also at SHAEF Forward, Rheims. Jake Beam⁶¹ stays there regularly and I go to Rheims about three or four times a week. Jake was not told anything about the initial stages of the negotiations. I was at Rheims on May 5, and Smith told me that he was expecting the arrival sometime that evening of Admiral von Friedeburg⁶² who was coming down from Headquarters 21st Army Group. I waited until the arrival of the party and after a conversation with them which I did not attend as I was not invited, Smith informed me that the Germans had no authority to sign anything, and that as the German ciphers had been left at 21st Army Group Headquarters, probably prolonged communications via 21st Army Group to Admiral Doenitz’⁶³ headquarters at Flensburg would be necessary. I returned to Versailles that evening and had no further advice from Headquarters regarding the progress of the negotiations until a telephone call at 2 a.m. May 7 saying that Colonel General Jodl⁶⁴ had arrived and that a signature of the surrender document would be made within a few minutes. This advice came from Secretary of the General Staff. I assumed that the reference to the surrender document referred to the EAC text. I was amazed therefore to discover only very much later in the day that a new text had been provided, but I was still ignorant of the source. I immediately returned to Rheims to discover that a group consisting of military officers only were proceeding forthwith to Berlin for the signature of a similar document. Upon inquiry I discovered that it was the opinion of several officers who had worked on this matter both British and American (G–3 SHAEF,⁶⁵ Generals Bull⁶⁶ and Whiteley⁶⁷) that as there was no Combined Chiefs of Staff directive concerning the use of the text, elaborated in the EAC and approved by the Governments, that SHAEF was not required to use that text which it was believed was only applicable in case a recognizable German Government existed at the time of signature.

I have driven home to all of the top SHAEF officers on both the American and British sides the point that the Russians saw to it that their delegation to Berlin had with it a representative of the Foreign Office (Vyshinski).

I enclose a copy in paraphrase of a telegram sent by Bedell Smith to the War Department on May 10 offering an explanation of the procedure followed by SHAEF in this matter and having reference to the Department’s 1950 of May 9 addressed to me⁶⁸ the contents of which were conveyed to General Eisenhower and General Smith. As you will probably understand, General Eisenhower entrusted to General Smith the entire responsibility for procedure in negotiating the surrender document.

Yours ever,

Bob

[Enclosure]

Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith to Major General John E. Hull ⁶⁹

[Paris,] 10 May 1945.

A query from the State Department as to why the instrument of unconditional surrender as negotiated in the EAC was not used has just been shown to me by Ambassador Murphy. I must say that we are all shocked to realize that the hours of work and worry spent here in preparing an instrument of surrender were completely unnecessary in view of the existence of a document which our three governments had agreed upon.

As a matter of fact a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the surrender terms negotiated in the EAC had never been received by us. Through Mr. Winant we did receive an informal copy and when negotiations began Ambassador Winant reminded me of this by telephone, and stated that a revised document had just been prepared. I suggested that he take immediate steps to invite the attention of Washington to the fact that we had never received a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff so that we might receive instructions on it through Combined Chiefs of Staff channels if indeed there was an approved surrender form. We proceeded with the short surrender document which was drafted here since we heard nothing further and in view of the urgent circumstances.

I find on checking back that we did receive a JCS paper on the subject of the surrender terms negotiated in the EAC which would have given us a guide to the existence of a set of agreed surrender terms. Although this was unfortunately overlooked, I do not think that any harm has been done as our own draft and the accompanying instructions cover practically everything covered in the EAC text. We did a great deal of worrying about Russia which we might have avoided had we been a little bit more alert however, and there has been a lot of unnecessary work done. The State Department is being informed by Murphy that any requirement of the EAC draft not covered by our own papers can be made the subject of additional instructions to the German High Command.

Why the Russians did not raise this question is a mystery to me since matters in Berlin were obviously being handled by Vyshinski who must have been thoroughly conversant with the whole affair. As Murphy remembered all the circumstances, if we had brought him into the picture we would not have missed this bet.

60. Latter not printed; it reported miscellaneous information obtained from SHAEF regarding the signing of the act of military surrender at Berlin, May 8 (740.00119 EW/5–945).
61. Jacob D. Beam, on the staff of the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy).
62. Generaladmiral Hans von Friedeburg, Chief of the German Navy.
63. Grossadmiral Karl Doenitz, Chief of State of the German Reich following the death of Adolf Hitler.
64. Generaloberst (Colonel General) Alfred Jodl, Chief of the German OKW/Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Operations Staff of the Headquarters of the Armed Forces).
65. Operations Division of SHAEF.
66. Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, Chief of G–3 SHAEF.
67. British Maj. Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley, Deputy Chief of G–3 SHAEF.
68. See footnote 34, p. 282.

69. Maj. Gen. John E. Hull, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff. In a letter to General Smith, dated May 11, General Hull wrote in part as follows:

    “The EAC document being on a governmental basis, would not, as such, be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for review. This coupled with the fact that no request was made on the CCS to forward the document to SCAEF for guidance, I think, explains why SHAEF did not receive a directive from the CCS. I believe this lack of a request was due, in part, to the absence of an approved EAC document that included the French. In January, the State Department requested the JCS views as to amending the Instrument of Surrender and other EAC documents to include the French. To this request the JCS on 24 January replied they had no objection. JCS papers on this (JCS 1226 series) were forwarded to CG, ETOUSA on 31 January. Nothing further on the matter of including the French was brought to the attention of the JCS but Mr. Winant in a cable to the State Department on 9 May 1945 said that an instrument including the French had not at that time been approved by the four governments.” (Political Adviser for Germany Files)