740.00119 EAC/5–1045: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 10—7:25 p.m.]
4709. Comea 237. Department’s 3449, May 2, 7 p.m., has been most helpful in discussion of consultation with the Allied Governments concerning the declaration on Germany’s defeat. At May 4 meeting of the European Advisory Commission I objected to the wording of paragraph 4 of the preamble to the declaration as tending to place the 15 or so Allied Governments on the same footing as the four major powers, and proposed the following wording: “Acting by authority of their respective governments and with the concurrence of others of the United Nations which have actively participated in the defeat of Germany and in the interests of the United Nations”. This draft drew a clearer line between the four powers, the “active” United Nations and the rest of the United Nations. It was accepted by Strang, but Gousev raised various objections to it until today, when he expressed a willingness to accept either this US wording or the words of the original instrument.
On further consideration today of the possible procedures for consulting the “active” Allies and for securing their concurrence, the Commission came to the conclusion that time does not permit of awaiting such concurrence. It was accordingly agreed to omit the reference to concurrence and to revert to the wording of the original instrument. In accordance with Department’s 3449 I urged that Governments which have contributed military forces be invited to adhere to the declaration by communicating it to them in advance of publishing it to the Germans.
With regard to the Allied Governments to be consulted, Strang proposed the following: (1) the European Allies already consulted concerning the summary of the surrender instrument; (2) British Dominions and India; (3) Brazil. Gousev at once proposed inclusion of the Polish Government in Warsaw42 among the adhering governments. He argued that absence of diplomatic relations between that government and several of the Allied Governments was no obstacle to informing it, as it was no bar in the case of India, with which the USSR has no diplomatic relations.
I put forward the suggestion, not as a proposal, that each of the four Allied Governments decide to which Governments, among those which had participated actively in Germany’s defeat, it wished to [Page 287] communicate the declaration individually and which it wished to invite to adhere to the declaration. To Gousev’s objection that this procedure would represent individual action rather than joint action by the four governments, Strang pointed out that it represented individual action taken on the basis of joint agreement. Massigli supported my suggestion. Gousev expressed objection to it without making any counter suggestion.
I believe that the injection of the Polish question into the discussion of concurrence by other Allies, in addition to the time factor, makes it wise to abandon the effort to include in the preamble to the declaration any reference to the “active” United Nations. Since the EAC cannot agree on a list of adherences which would include Poland, I assume that (1) my suggestion of individual communication by each major ally will be recommended to the four governments, or (2) the EAC will forward the draft declaration to the four governments without any agreed recommendation regarding procedure for communicating the text of other Allied Governments and for their adherence to it, thus leaving each government free to invite such adherences as it considers appropriate without reference to the other three governments. Of the two procedures now open, the first seems preferable in all respects.
- For documentation regarding the negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union regarding the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, see vol. v, pp. 110 ff.↩