740.00119 EAC/5–1045: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 10—9:19 a.m.]
4668. For the Acting Secretary and Mr. Matthews. Special German Series No. 9. In replying to Department’s 3630 May 9, 3 p.m., I refer to my telephone conversation with Mr. Matthews on Friday May 4 as background. In that conversation I explained that SHAEF had not received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff an authoritative copy of the surrender instrument as agreed among the four Governments.
On Saturday May 51 got word that a military surrender was imminent, and late that evening I was told that a very brief form of unconditional surrender was to be used and that approval of this instrument was being asked in Washington and London through military channels. At that time, although the European Advisory Commission had passed on the unconditional surrender instrument with the inclusion of the French amendments of May 1, these amendments were awaiting governmental approval. Likewise, although agreement had been reached by the three governments at Yalta on the inclusion of the word “dismemberment”, the Russians had not agreed to informing the French of this addition. Copies of the full text of the unconditional surrender instrument, in two sets both with and without the additional word, were being held available here, but, as I understood it, authority to sign the surrender instrument had not been delegated by the four Governments.
This was not the reason, however, as I understand it, for deciding on the briefer form of surrender. It was known that Germany was smashed and incapable of continued effective resistance and that a quick surrender would save life. It was thought that a simpler acknowledgment [Page 284] of complete defeat could be obtained with least controversy and delay, and therefore the briefer document was used.
My conversations with the Prime Minister and General Bedell Smith were to make certain that this briefer instrument did not preclude the later use of the unconditional surrender instrument or of the declaration prepared by the EAC. I wanted to make certain that the degree of agreement reached in these papers by the four powers after long and painful negotiation would be fully preserved. It was so understood by both the Prime Minister and General Smith and article four of the military instrument was worded in such a manner as to leave the way fully open for the imposition of the terms contained in the instrument or in the declaration based on the instrument. It was after inclusion of that article that I sent my 4600, May 6, 4 p.m., as both SHAEF and the Prime Minister were then agreed on the inclusion of this article.
Last night I informed you in my 4657, May 9 [8], 6 p.m. that we hope to get complete agreement today on the exact wording of a declaration of unconditional surrender, to be issued by the four governments under article 4 of the brief military instrument. Gousev has stated to us that his Government prefers the declaration to the use of the unconditional surrender instrument. We believe the declaration to be equally binding on the four occupying powers and to be a solid basis for the imposition of the will of the four powers on Germany.
I am cabling this morning the articles of the declaration on all of which we have already reached agreement. After today’s meeting of the EAC I will cable you the preamble, on which two points remain to be settled. As I stated to Mr. Matthews in my conversation of May 4, the declaration contains no mention of the word “dismemberment” since the preamble of the declaration, as has already been agreed by the four delegations, provides for the later determination by the four Governments of the future status of any or all parts of Germany.