EUR Files
The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
Here is the list of points I tried to make at our meeting yesterday:
First
1. The Moscow Conference of November 1, 1943,1 contemplated two organizations:
- a.
- “A General International Organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership by all such states, large and small” etc.
- b.
- An interim consultative organization of the four large powers for “maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security”.2
2. This recognized the self-evident fact that these large powers who have won the war for law and justice will be obliged to maintain the security of the world which they have saved during the time necessary to establish a permanent organization of the whole world, and for that purpose they will have to consult and decide on many questions necessary to the security of the world and primarily their own safety in establishing that security. I have always thought that this interim organization should be formal, subject to rules of consultation similar to Article XI of the old League, and actively at work until the world had gotten stabilized enough to establish and turn loose the large world organization which includes the small nations.
[Page 79]3. The job of the four big nations is principally to establish a guarantee of peace in the atmosphere of which the world organization can be set going.
This will necessarily include the settlement of all territorial acquisitions in the shape of defense posts which each of these four powers may deem to be necessary for their own safety in carrying out such a guarantee of world peace.
4. For substantially this purpose, at the end of the last war President Wilson proposed a joint covenant of guarantee by Britain and America of the security of France as the pillar of western Europe. But the mistake was made of not securing that guarantee before the second step of creating the League of Nations whose safety was in large part to be dependent upon such a guarantee. As a result the League of Nations lacked a foundation of security which ultimately proved fatal to it.
5. I think we are in danger of making a similar mistake by attempting to formulate the Dumbarton organization before we have discussed and ironed out the realities which may exist to enable the four powers to carry out their mission, and I was much interested to read Senator Vandenberg’s recent speech in which he took practically the same ground.
6. Any attempt to finally organize a Dumbarton organization will necessarily take place in an atmosphere of unreality until these preliminary foundations are established. The attitude of the numerous minor nations who have no real responsibility but plenty of vocal power and logical arguments will necessarily be different from that of the large powers who have to furnish the real security.
Second
1. An example of one of these difficulties has already appeared in the problem of the mandated islands. You are proposing to include them under your future principles of “trusteeship” or “mandates”. They do not really belong in such a classification. Acquisition of them by the United States does not represent an attempt at colonization or exploitation. Instead it is merely the acquisition by the United States of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are outposts, and their acquisition is appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense by the power which guarantees the safety of that area of the world.
2. For that reason you will get into needless mazes if you try to set up a form of trusteeship which will include them before the necessity of their acquisition by the United States is established and recognized.
[Page 80]3. They are of an entirely different nature from the German colonies in various parts of the world, quite unessential to the defense of any protecting power, to which was applied the doctrine of mandates under the League of Nations formula.
Third
1. You will find the same clash of fundamental ideas and interests with Russia in regard to certain more difficult problems. She will claim that, in the light of her bitter experience with Germany, her own self-defense as a guarantor of the peace of the world will depend on relations with buffer countries like Poland, Bulgaria, and Rumania, which will be quite different from complete independence on the part of those countries.
2. It is my suggestion that such fundamental problems should be at least discussed and if possible an understanding reached between the big guarantor nations before you endeavor to set up principles in a world organization which may clash with realities.
For all these reasons I think we should not put the cart before the horse. We should by thorough discussion between the three or four great powers endeavor to settle, so far as we can, an accord upon the general area of these fundamental problems. We should endeavor to secure a covenant of guarantee of peace or at least an understanding of the conditions upon which such a general undertaking of mutual guarantee could be based.
If there is a general understanding reached among the larger powers I do not fear any lack of enthusiasm on the part of the lesser fry to follow through with the world organization whenever a general meeting may be called.
The foregoing constitutes a consideration which I believe to be fundamental yet it is no more than the common prudence one would exercise in preparing for the success of any general assembly or meeting in business or political life.
There is another point, however, which relates to the advisability of raising any territorial questions at all during the course of the war or, at least, until after the Russians have clearly committed themselves to their participation in the Pacific war. Any discussions of territorial matters, whether they be in the nature of security acquisitions, trusteeships or outright territorial adjustments, are almost certain to induce controversies which put at risk a united and vigorous prosecution of the war itself. The introduction of these subjects into any general meeting would be most inadvisable, almost certainly provoke a welter of opinion and great jockeying for position. In my judgment it is fanciful to suppose that the subject of “trusteeships” could be introduced with a limitation of the discussion to the mere form of the trust organization. No such discussion could usefully proceed without a consideration of the nature of the specific areas to [Page 81] be trusteed. Immediately the subject is introduced, the various powers would certainly consider the subject in the light of how it would affect the areas in which they are interested or which they covet.
I feel that for us to raise the subject, on the proviso that no areas in the Pacific in which we are interested could be discussed is even more unwise. This would immediately provoke a sense of distrust and discrimination among the other parties to the discussion which would both call marked attention to our aims and poison the general atmosphere of the discussion.
It is my conclusion, therefore, that we should not bring up the subject of territorial adjustments, including “trusteeships” for discussion in any form, at least until the war is much further along and Russian participation in the Pacific war is accomplished. We should also make a determined effort to avoid a discussion of the subject. I realize that some discussion of territorial matters may be inevitable but we should not bring it up and we should avoid it if we can. The subject of “trusteeships” could certainly be avoided until a more suitable time, on the very sound ground that no satisfactory discussion can possibly take place without full knowledge of the types and character of the territories to be dealt with.