Hiss Collection
The Director of the Office of Special Political
Affairs (Hiss) to the Secretary of
State1
secret
[Washington,] March 19,
1945.
1. Attached is a draft message from the President to Marshal
Stalin along the lines you
indicated to Mr. Raynor over
the telephone Saturday. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky strongly recommend that the President
should not at this time send a message to Stalin on this subject for the reason that there are
three or four other urgent matters of great importance which will
require messages of this nature. (One of these has already been
sent.) Mr. Dunn feels that it
will rob this method of communication of its true importance when so
many messages are sent at once. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky feel that you should take this matter up
yourself with Ambassador Gromyko along the lines of the attached outline of
points to be made.
2. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky also feel strongly that we
should not attempt, at least at this time, to get out of the
commitment on this subject which was made at the Crimea. They
therefore think that any message from the President that might be
sent despite their recommendation should not go into that subject
and should be limited simply to the precise issue raised by
Gromyko last
Saturday.2
[Attachment 1]
Draft Message From the President to Marshal
Stalin
secret
Last Saturday Ambassador Gromyko informed the State Department that a
party of thirty representatives of the Ukraine and White Russian Soviet Republics
would arrive at San Francisco to attend the Conference. I feel
certain that there must be some misunderstanding about this
communication. During the Crimean Conference it was very clearly
settled that these two republics would not be invited to send
representatives to San Francisco and would not be separately
represented there. It was agreed that the United States and the
United Kingdom would support at San Francisco a Soviet proposal,
to be presented at the Conference when the question of initial
membership is under discussion there, that the two republics be
included among the initial members of the United Nations
Organization when
[Page 991]
created. I want you to know that since my return to Washington I
have been giving this matter very considerable thought. I have
in particular been considering how the objectives you have in
mind could be carried out most effectively. Quite frankly the
difficulties, both in relation to the effect on American public
support for the proposed organization and to the attitude of
other governments, seem to be far greater than I had realized. I
expect to communicate further with you on that aspect of the
matter later but in the meantime I should appreciate it if you
would take steps to clear up the misunderstanding which has led
to Ambassador Gromyko’s
communication of Saturday.
[Attachment 2]
secret
Memorandum of Points To Be Made by the
Secretary in Talking to Ambassador Gromyko
1. I am very much disturbed about the statement made to Mr.
Dunn last
Saturday.
2. It was clearly settled at the Crimean Conference that the two
republics would not be invited to San Francisco and would not be
separately represented there.
3. In accordance with this decision no invitations have been
issued to them.
4. It would be most embarrassing and contrary to the Crimean
arrangements if their representatives should come to San
Francisco.
5. Ambassador Gromyko
should take this up with his Government immediately and have any
misunderstanding eliminated.
[Attachment 3]
secret
Memorandum of Decisions Reached at the
Crimean Conference in the Matter of the Two Soviet
Republics3
The Soviet Representatives proposed that two or three of the
Soviet Republics should be invited to the San Francisco
Conference and should become initial members of the
organization.4
This matter was referred to the Foreign Ministers for
consideration. At the Foreign Ministers’ meeting Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden jointly agreed that in the
course of the San Francisco Conference the Soviet
Representatives would propose that the Ukraine and White Russian Republics be
named as initial members of the organization and that this
proposal would be supported by the British Representatives.
[Page 992]
Mr. Stettinius said that he would
have to reserve his position.5 This meeting was held at the British
Delegation’s headquarters with Mr. Eden presiding. A drafting committee composed of
Mr. Jebb, Ambassador Gromyko and Mr. Hiss was appointed to draft the report of this
meeting, to be read at the next plenary session by Mr. Eden as Chairman of that day’s meeting
of the Foreign Ministers. The draft agreed upon by the drafting
committee was in the foregoing sense. Subsequently, without
clearing Math or informing Mr. Hiss or, presumably, Ambassador Gromyko, the British
Representatives changed the report6 so that it stated that
representatives of both the United Kingdom and the United States
will support the proposal to admit the Soviet Republics to
original membership. The British Representatives said that they
had cleared this change with Mr. Stettinius but this was not the case as he did
not understand that any such issue was presented to him. At the
afternoon plenary session7 Mr.
Eden read the revised
report and before the matter could be clarified the President
expressed his agreement as a matter of policy.
The question of whether or not the two Soviet Republics should
adhere to the United Nations Declaration prior to April 25 and
the question of whether they should be invited to the Conference
were both discussed fully at the plenary session and a negative
decision was reached on each point.
