Bohlen Collection
Bohlen Minutes
Subjects: Poland
French Participation in Control Commission for Germany
Yugoslavia
World Security Organization
Reparations from Germany
The Dardanelles
The President said that he thought that Mr. Eden had a report to make on the progress achieved at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning.
Mr. Eden said that he had to report agreement on the future Government of Poland, that there had been two questions involved [Page 898] which he would refer to later but in the meantime he would read the new formula. He read the new formula with one correction which he admitted to have been made by Mr. Molotov. The new formula was as follows:
A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the re-organisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.
When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
The Prime Minister said that the document made no mention of frontiers. He said we are all agreed on the Eastern frontier of Poland and he agreed that Poland should receive compensation in the West, up to the line of the Oder if the Poles so desired. He said that the British Government was very doubtful about going any further or mentioning any such possibility at this stage, since he did not believe that the War Cabinet would accept the line of the Western Neisse. He said he felt, however, that some mention should be made of the territorial settlement otherwise the whole world would wonder what had been decided on this question. There would be some criticism, but nevertheless, it would be better than no mention at all.1
The President said that the Polish Government should be consulted before any statement was made in regard to the Western frontier.
[Page 899]Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought that there should be some statement on the Eastern frontier on which all present had agreed.
The Prime Minister concurred with this statement of Marshal Stalin and repeated the people would wish to know what we had decided on this question.
Mr. Molotov remarked that it would be a good thing if something definite could be said about the Eastern frontier, since it would clarify and quiet the whole situation insofar as the Poles were concerned. He said that it was certain that there would be criticisms, but he felt it would in general be beneficial. He suggested that the matter be referred to the three Foreign Ministers to draft some statement on this point. He added that it was perhaps not necessary to be as specific in regard to the Western frontier as in regard to the Eastern frontier.
The Prime Minister said that he had already gone on record to the effect that Poland would receive a good slice of territory in the North and in the West but that the opinion of the New Polish Government of National Unity would be sought.
The President said he had no objection in principle to such a statement but he thought the Prime Minister should draft it.
Mr. Molotov suggested that it should form a last sentence of the Polish statement.
Mr. Eden , continuing his report, said that in regard to his [the] declaration on liberated Europe the Soviet Delegation had proposed an amendment in regard to the last sentence of the fifth paragraph to the effect that the three Governments should immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultations. Mr. Eden said that he proposed a draft that the three Governments should immediately consult together upon the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.
After some discussion as to what had been agreed upon at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning, Marshal Stalin said he accepted the British suggestion.2
Mr. Eden then said there was a note which he wished to attach to this declaration, namely, that the French should be invited to associate themselves with the declaration and that his note would merely state that in issuing this declaration the three heads of Governments expressed the hope that the Provisional Government of France would associate themselves in the actions and procedures envisaged therein.3
The President then said that he had changed his mind in regard to the question of the French participation in the Control Commission. [Page 900] He now agreed with the views of the Prime Minister that it would be impossible to give France an area to administer in Germany unless they were members of the Control Commission. He said he thought it would be easier to deal with the French if they were on the Commission than if they were not.
Marshal Stalin said he had no objections and that he agreed to this.4
The Prime Minister suggested that there should be a joint telegram sent to De Gaulle informing him of these decisions to which there was general agreement.5
Mr. Eden said the next subject was that of Yugoslavia and read the text of a telegram to be sent to Marshal Tito and Subasic suggesting that the agreement which they had reached be immediately put into effect as the basis for the formation of a unified Government of Yugoslavia.6
The President said he was not sure whether he would be able to join in the statement on Yugoslavia but when it had been read to him he agreed that it was satisfactory and that he could associate himself with it.
After some discussion Marshal Stalin suggested that the telegram to Marshal Tito and Subasic should say that the heads of the three Governments have agreed that the agreement between Tito and Subasic should be put immediately into effect and that as soon as a new Government was formed the two amendments proposed by the British should be put into effect.7 He said he thought it was inconsistent to put more in the communiqué than there was in the telegram.8
The Prime Minister said he hoped that both of the two amendments proposed by the British could be in the communiqué.
Mr. Molotov said he thought it would be better to confine the telegram and reference in the communiqué to the entry into force of the Tito-Subasic agreement.
The Prime Minister said he thought the British people would be more reconciled to the Government and it would have a better reception if the two amendments were included.
After some discussion with the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden, Marshal Stalin said he thought that three points could be included in the telegram: (1) that the Tito-Subasic agreement should go immediately into force, (2) that the members of the Skupschina who had not collaborated with the Germans could be included into the Vetch, [Page 901] and (3) that the actions of the anti-fascist Vetch would be subject to the confirmation by the Constituent Assembly. He added that he thought these three points could go into the communiqué.
Mr. Eden said that the sub-committee in regard to Dumbarton Oaks had reported on the matter of informing the French and Chinese Governments and on the form of the invitations,9 but he did not feel that it was necessary to bother the Conference with these small matters. He went on to say that in regard to reparations the British Government still had reservations in regard to the Soviet proposals.
The Prime Minister said he had received instructions from the War Cabinet not to mention figures and that that should be left to the reparations committee to determine.
The President said that he was afraid that if reparations and especially if any figures were mentioned that the American people would believe that it involved money.10
Marshal Stalin explained that the sum mentioned was only the expression of the value of the reparations in kind.
The Prime Minister added that nothing would be published, as he understood it, in regard to reparations but that he could not agree to the inclusion of a definite sum.
Marshal Stalin said he wished to discuss the circumstances of the matter. He did not understand why there should be any confusion in regard to payment in money since the Soviet Union had concluded three treaties with Finland, Rumania and Hungary11 in which the value of reparations in kind were definitely stated and that there had been no confusion as far as he knew on this subject. He said that if the British felt that the Russians should receive no reparations at all, it would be better to say so frankly. He said he had heard a great deal of talk at the Conference that the Russians would receive reparations in kind in the form of factories and plants but that no decision had been reached. He said he thought that two decisions might be taken by the Conference: (1) that it was agreed in principle that Germany should pay reparations and (2) that the Reparations Commission to sit in Moscow should fix the amount and should take into consideration the American-Soviet proposal that there should be twenty billion dollars of reparations, with fifty per cent to the Soviet Union.
[Page 902]The President said he feared the word “reparations” somewhat since he thought the people in America would think it meant reparations in cash.
Someone replied that this could be easily avoided by using the term “compensation for damages caused by Germany during the war” instead of “reparations.”
Mr. Molotov said that the Moscow commission would have the duty of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula.
The Prime Minister replied that the British Government could not commit itself to any figure.
Marshal Stalin replied that there was no commitment involved but it might be said that the Commission might take as material for discussion the American-Soviet formula.
The Prime Minister then read a telegram from the War Cabinet which said that they considered it inadmissible to state any figure until an investigation had been completed on the spot and that at any rate the figure of twenty billion dollars was too great. It was equal to Germany’s export trade in times of peace and it was beyond the capacity of Germany to pay. It was true that some of these reparations would come from Germany’s capital assets but that in turn would make it more difficult for Germany to pay her bills. The payments would more than cover German imports and if these imports were not given a priority ahead of reparations it would mean that the other countries would be paying for German reparations to those countries receiving them.
Marshal Stalin said he did not want to go into the circumstances of the telegram the Prime Minister had just read. The experts may be right, but that all they were preparing was a figure to be used as a basis for discussions—it could be reduced or increased by the Commission in Moscow.
The President then suggested that the whole matter be left to the Commission in Moscow.12
Marshal Stalin said that he felt in principle that Germany should pay reparations which would be stated by the three Governments here.
Mr. Molotov said that yesterday Mr. Stettinius had analyzed the results of the meeting and had reported full agreement on the first two points of the Soviet proposal. Now the question was what countries should receive reparations and the type of reparations and differences only appeared between the United States and the Soviet Delegation on the one hand and the British on the other in regard to the naming of a sum.
[Page 903]Mr. Eden said that rightly or wrongly, the British Government felt that even the naming of a sum as the basis of discussions would commit them. He said he proposed that the Moscow Commission be instructed to examine the report of Mr. Maisky, made at the Crimean Conference.
Mr. Molotov and Mr. Maisky both replied that to refer a question put by the Crimean Conference to a lesser body would be utterly illogical.
The Prime Minister said that no agreement had been reached as to the mention of a sum.
Mr. Eden added that the first two points referred to by Mr. Molotov were agreed upon but not the last which related to the sum.
Marshal Stalin repeated that he was willing to propose the following formula: (1) that the heads of the Governments had agreed that Germany must pay compensation for the damages caused to the Allied nations as a result of the war, and (2) that the Moscow Commission be instructed to consider the amount of reparations. This was agreed to by the Conference.
There was then a short intermission.
The President inquired whether they could discuss the British text of the paragraph on frontiers to be added to the Polish statement.
Mr. Molotov replied that he had not yet received the Russian translation.
Marshal Stalin then said that he would like to say a few words about the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles.13 He said the treaty was now outmoded. As he recalled, the Japanese Emperor played a big part in the treaty, even greater than that of the Soviet Union. The treaty was linked with the League which does not exist just as the Japanese Emperor was not present at this Conference. Under the Montreux Convention the Turks have the right to close the Straits not only in time of war but if they feel that there is a threat of war. He said that the treaty was made at a time when the relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were not perfect, but he did not think now that Great Britain would wish to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese. The treaty needed revision. He thought that there would be no objection to a consideration of the revision of that treaty. He said in what manner the treaty should be revised he did not know and he did not wish to prejudge any decisions, but he felt that the interests of Russia should be considered. He said that it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia’s throat. He added, however, that it should be done in such a manner as not to harm the legitimate interests of Turkey. This was a question which an appropriate organization [Page 904] could consider and he thought that the three Foreign Ministers who were to meet periodically—every two or three months—might well consider this matter at their first meeting and report to their respective cabinets.
The President said he had one general observation to make and that was that in the United States we had a frontier of over 3,000 miles with Canada and there was no fort and no armed forces. This situation had existed over a hundred years and it was his hope that other frontiers in the World would eventually be without forts or armed forces on any part of their national boundaries.
The Prime Minister said that Marshal Stalin had reminded them of the question of the Straits when they were in Moscow last autumn.14 They had said then that they were in sympathy with the revision of the treaty and had suggested to the Soviet Government that a note be sent on the subject but none has as yet been received. He said that he thought that the method proposed by Marshal Stalin was a wise one. The British certainly felt that the present position of Russia with their great interests in the Black Sea should not be dependent on the narrow exit. He said if the matter is brought up at the meeting with the Foreign Ministers he hoped the Russians would make their proposals known. In the meantime, it might be well to inform the Turks that the matter of revision of the Montreux Convention would be under consideration. This was particularly true if the Allies desired them to come into the war on their side. Mr. Eden reminded him that he had mentioned the matter several times to the Turkish Ambassador in London. He said it might be advisable to give the Turks at the same time some assurance that their independence and integrity will be guaranteed.
Marshal Stalin replied it was impossible to keep anything secret from the Turks and that such assurance should be expressed.
The President agreed to this.
Marshal Stalin said the Foreign Ministers could meet at the United Nations Conference and discuss the question of the Straits.
The Prime Minister said that he thought that this matter affected the position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean more than it did that of the United States and that he felt that if the Foreign Ministers had a meeting in London that that would be the proper place to discuss this question. He went on to say that some years ago he had tried very hard to get through the Dardanelles and then the Russian Government had made available an armed force to help but it did not succeed.
Marshal Stalin said that the Prime Minister had been in too much of a hurry in withdrawing his troops since the Germans and Turks were on the verge of surrender.
[Page 905]The Prime Minister replied that by that time he was out of the government because of the Dardanelles campaign and had had nothing to do with that decision.
Marshal Stalin then inquired who was taking down decisions reached at this conference.
Mr. Eden replied there would be an agreed upon communiqué as well as a list of the decisions taken.
The President then said he wished to propose some small amendments in the paragraph regarding frontiers in the Polish statement. He said these amendments were necessary for American Constitutional reasons.15 He suggested that instead of the first words “The three powers” he would like to substitute “The three heads of government” and that in the second sentence the words “three powers” be eliminated, and in the last sentence the word “feel” instead of “agree” should be used.
These amendments were accepted by the conference, and the following text approved:
“The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. It is recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.”16
Mr. Molotov said he had one suggestion and that was to add to the second sentence “with the return to Poland of her ancient frontiers in East Prussia and on the Oder”.
The President inquired how long ago these lands had been Polish.
Mr. Molotov said very long ago, but they had in fact been Polish.
The President said this might lead the British to ask for the return of the United States to Great Britian.
Marshal Stalin replied that the ocean prevented this. He added that at the present the draft said nothing specific about frontiers, which he thought was very important for the Poles.
The Prime Minister said he would prefer not to mention the frontier in the west since he shared the same difficulties the President had spoken of.
[Page 906]Mr. Eden said that they had always said that they would accept any line up to the Oder that the Poles desired.
The Prime Minister said that there was no stopping place between what we proposed to do and the line of the Oder, and if the question is asked about ancient territories there would be no answer. He said that he was not against the line of the Oder in principle if the Poles so desired.
Mr. Molotov said he thought it might be worthwhile considering this wording.
Marshal Stalin said he would withdraw the Soviet amendment and leave the British draft as it had been.
The draft of the last paragraph regarding Polish frontiers was accepted.
The President then remarked he would have to leave Yalta tomorrow at three o’clock in the afternoon.
The Prime Minister remarked that he doubted if it would be possible to get all the work done by then, particularly the communiqué and the final text of the documents.
There followed a discussion between the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden concerning the possibility of preparing the communiqué before the time set for the President’s departure.
Marshal Stalin remarked that there was very little time and he felt it was impossible to complete the work in view of the dinner. He suggested that the dinner might be cancelled.
After some discussion it was decided that a drafting committee for the communiqué should come to the Villa and report at ten o’clock to the Foreign Ministers and heads of government.
The meeting then adjourned.
- For a facsimile of Hopkins’ note to Roosevelt at this point regarding boundary questions, see Stettinius, p. 261.↩
- See the Matthews minutes, post, p. 908, for the agreed wording of this proposal.↩
- Ante. p. 884.↩
- For the text as amended, see post, pp. 936–937.↩
- For the texts of the two telegrams lo De Gaulle, see post, p. 948.↩
- For a copy of the British telegram as sent, see post pp. 919–920.↩
- For two amendments proposed by the British, see ante, pp. 820–821.↩
- For the language of the communiqué on this subject, see post, p. 974.↩
- Ante, pp. 885–886.↩
- For a facsimile of Hopkins’ note to Roosevelt at this point on reparations, see Stettinius, p. 265.↩
- Presumably the armistice agreements of September 19, 1944, with Finland; of September 12, 1944, with Rumania; and of January 20, 1945, with Hungary. For the respective texts, see Department of State Bulletin, February 18, 1945, vol. xii, pp. 261–268; Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 59 Stat. 1712; and Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 456, or 59 Stat. 1321.↩
- It appears that the note of Hopkins, post, p. 920, was passed to the President at about this point.↩
- See ante, pp, 328–329.↩
- See ante, p. 328.↩
- For facsimiles of notes from Stettinius and Hopkins to Roosevelt in this connection, see Stettinius, pp. 183, 270.↩
- For a facsimile of a note which Hopkins passed to Roosevelt at this point, see Stettinius, p. 273.↩