J. C. S. Files
Kuter Minutes 1
Admiral Leahy opened the conference with the statement that we would discuss military problems in the Far East and that we required specific data on which to base the long range planning required by the great distances from the United States to the Pacific Theater.
[Page 758]Admiral Leahy then stated that we have prepared a series of questions on which replies were desired.
General Antonov asked to have all of the questions presented prior to any replies or discussion.
Admiral Leahy then read the questions set forth in the memorandum by the Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, “Subjects for First U. S.–U. S. S. R. Staff Meeting,” as stated in JCS 1227/5 (Argonaut), dated 7 Feb 1945.2 These questions were read as written with the words “or some more suitable area” interpolated in question (3).3
After brief discussion on the side with Admiral King, Admiral Leahy posed two additional questions, the first consisting of paragraph 3 of the memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners, “Subjects for First U. S.–U. S. S. R. Staff Meetings” as set forth in JCS 1227/4 ( Argonaut ) 7 February 1945.4 Admiral Leahy’s second additional question was based on paragraph 7 of the Planners’ paper and asked if arrangements could be made whereby weather information could be made available to the U. S. from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia.
General Antonov opened the period of reply and discussion with the very clear statement that he had no authority to give definite answers or promises or to make decisions on matters pertaining to the Far East. He stated that his comments represented his own personal opinion and views and further that he would refer the questions to Marshal Stalin the same day and would arrange to provide complete and authoritative answers as quickly as possible.
The following replies to questions and discussion ensued:
- a.
- There have been no changes in the Soviet projected plan of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October.5
- b.
- With regard to the Soviet requirement for a Pacific supply route after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start, General Antonov opened with the statement that the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railroad “can be hampered” by the enemy. The Soviets therefore cannot rely on that rail line to support their forces. A maximum effort will be made to keep the Trans-Siberian Railroad in operation. However, the Soviets will require that air and sea routes across the Pacific (mainly sea routes) be kept open. They will particularly require fuel (petroleum products) and foodstuffs.
- c.
- As to basing U. S. Air Forces in Siberia, no discussion could be had until Marshal Stalin’s decision was obtained.
- d.
- U. S. Forces may be required to defend Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia. General Antonov ’s words was [were] that the Soviets “will find American help useful.”
- e.
- As to pre-hostilities preparation including
construction, reception, and storage of U. S. stock
piles in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia, a rather
lengthy reply was given including the following
points:
- The Soviets will move much larger forces to the Far East than are now there—these augmented forces will require greatly increased supplies—the Soviet problem will be great to supply their expanded forces and they cannot promise to construct and store materials for American forces. They may need American materials with which to build fuel storage for the Soviet forces. This question could be answered after detailed requirements were known and after a decision had been obtained that U. S. forces would be employed in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia.
- f.
- Entry into Kamchatka by the American Survey Party will be determined by Marshal Stalin.
- g.
- The Soviets will occupy southern Sakhalin as quickly after the beginning of hostilities as possible and will do this without American help. The Soviet Navy will deny Laparousa Strait to the Japanese but it will be difficult to permit friendly surface movements through the Laparousa Strait until a Soviet Navy base and shore artillery are established.
- h.
- This question “Are we assured that combined planning in Moscow will be vigorously pursued” is somewhat garbled in reply. General Antonov stated that he had planned in October to start the movement of troops in early 1945. However, all Soviet troops, including those released from Finland and Latvia are now joined in the battle on the Eastern Front. He stated that the intended troop movements will, therefore, be delayed until the necessary units can be disengaged from the present battle. Later in the conversation, General Marshall expanded the American requirement for firm data on which to base future plans. He explained that necessity had lead the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to relieve their Senior Planners from their global responsibilities to permit them to move to Moscow to concentrate on the Russian-American phase of the war against Japan. He made it very clear that we must have planning basis and that we are security conscious. General Marshall concluded with a forceful statement that specific and constructive planning in Moscow must be pursued. General Antonov stated that he would do his best to improve the planning situation in Moscow.
- i.
- Weather in Siberia was discussed at some length and its relation to the initiation of hostilities. From a ground force view point the most difficult conditions would be experienced during the thaw and floods in April and May and although June is a favorable month, [Page 760] July and August is also undesirable. As far as the ground forces are concerned, weather would be most favorable in September, October and November. At sea weather is favorable in July, August and September.
- j.
- Authority to obtain weather stations would be discussed with Marshal Stalin.
Admiral Kuznetsov presented his desire to take over ships from the U. S. at Dutch Harbor or Kodiak but accepted Admiral King’s statement that Cold Bay was more desirable and would be used. Some discussion followed and it was concluded that Russian crews could be moved from Murmansk to the east coast of the U. S. by returning convoys and then to be moved by rail to the west coast. However, the provision of American shipping to move these crews to Cold Bay was not viewed with favor by Admiral King.
Except for the immediately preceding conversation, the Russians had no questions to ask.
General Marshall presented a summary of recent operations—gave to General Antonov a written statement as to our views of the combat effectiveness of German divisions after the Ardennes battle and left with the Russians our estimate of Japan’s strength in the Pacific.
Air Marshal Khudyakov presented a Russian version of the agreement to create a restricted zone for air operations on the Russian front.
Upon adjourning General Antonov stated that he would see Marshal Stalin forthwith and would inform the U. S. Chiefs of Staff as to when we might expect the next meeting to receive official and definite replies to our questions.
Dictated to and transcribed by T/Sgt George J. Lang. General Kuter’s notes and Sgt Lang’s shorthand notes have been destroyed.
Major General, U. S. A.
Six (6) copies prepared with distribution to the individuals indicated below:
| General Marshall | 3 copies |
| General Deane | 1 copy |
| General Hull | 1 copy |
| General Kuter | 1 copy |