J. C. S. Files
Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes1
1. Levels of Supply of All Petroleum Products in All Theaters
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Overall Review of Cargo
and Troop Shipping Position for the Remainder of
1945
(C. C. S. 746/11)2
Admiral Leahy said that although the paper was an agreed report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board it appeared to him that the essence of the report was an agreement to reexamine the position when a need for further study arose.
General Somervell said that the necessity for a revision had already arisen, particularly with reference to redeployment plans. On the other hand, he felt that the paper in its present form was entirely satisfactory. Referring to paragraph 4b (1) (d) of the paper he said that during the Committee negotiations the British had insisted upon the submission of the report referred to therein on 1 June.
[Page 731]General Marshall said that if the war ended by 1 April 1945 the combined redeployment plan and the related combined report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and shipping authorities would be too late if submitted on 30 April 1945, as required in the paper.
General Somervell felt that the date for the submission of the report might well be moved up to 1 April.
Admiral King pointed out that the reports could be submitted at any time prior to 30 April. The requirement as stated in the paper was that they should be ready not later than 30 April.
Colonel Lincoln said that as far as the U. S. side was concerned the Planners already had a redeployment paper under way and that they could make this plan available by 1 April.
Admiral Leahy said that a change of the date to 1 April might not be acceptable to the British.
Admiral Smith said that the British members of the combined committees appeared to have no objection to a 1 April date. The date of 30 April had been selected to afford the U. S. Planners ample time to produce their redeployment plan.
General Somervell thought there might be some objection on the part of the British to moving the date up to 1 April. He understood that the British plans for redeployment had not progressed as far as the U. S. plans.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend approval of C. C. S. 746/11 subject to the change of the date in the third line on Page 4 from 30 April to 1 April.
3. Employment of War Weary
U. S. Bombers Against Large Industrial Target Areas in
Germany
(J. C. S. 1150/1)3
Admiral Leahy said that in this paper the representative of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, proposed that the question of the employment of war weary bombers be reopened by recommending that the President address a memorandum on the subject to the Prime Minister. He understood the Prime Minister had instructed the British Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their previous concurrence in the employment of this type of weapon and felt that to request the President to ask the Prime Minister to reverse his stand would be undesirable.
General Anderson explained that there was no intention of launching uncontrolled aircraft indiscriminately against the German countryside. He believed that there had been a misunderstanding on the part of the British as to the employment of this weapon. Recent developments had proved that explosive-laden aircraft could be [Page 732] directed against military targets with considerable accuracy and therefore had a definite military value when used against heavily protected underground installations.
General Marshall said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of Staff have no military objection to the project but that certain Cabinet Members had opposed it. He doubted the propriety of having the President press the Prime Minister to urge these Cabinet Members to reverse their position, for heretofore these same Members had supported the British Chiefs of Staff in war measures advocated by the U. S.
In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why this project should not be restricted entirely to France, General Anderson said that while the launchings were to be made in France all of the developments so far had taken place in base installations set up in England and to move these base installations to France would be a waste of effort.
General Kuter pointed out that further development of this project was highly important in view of the prospects of a very profitable employment of this type of weapon against Japanese targets.
Admiral Leahy said the discussion had given him an entirely different conception of the weapon. When this matter first came up, he understood that the aircraft would be launched in the general direction of Germany and that the explosive-laden planes would fall aimlessly when the fuel was exhausted. This he considered an inhuman and barbarous type of warfare with which the United States should not be associated; but now, since it appeared that the missiles could be controlled with a considerable degree of accuracy, he agreed that they could be usefully employed. He inquired why, since the planes employed were American and would be operated under American command, it was necessary to collaborate with the British in their use.
General Kuter said that, in view of the instructions already received on this subject by the British Chiefs of Staff and since the matter had heretofore been dealt with on a combined basis, it would be undesirable for the United States now to employ this weapon unilaterally. Moreover, the bases where the project was being developed were located in England.
Admiral Duncan felt that it would be entirely proper for the United States Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their original proposal to use uncontrolled missiles and present the project as a development of a controlled missile.
General Kuter said that the development of the control of this type of aircraft had progressed very rapidly, and it was essential that this development continue.
[Page 733]In view of the foregoing, Admiral Leahy said that he felt an approach should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for reconsideration at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to bring up for discussion at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to follow, the question of the employment of radio-controlled explosive-laden bombers.4
4. Subjects for First
U. S.–U. S. S. R. Staff Meeting
(J.C.S. 1227/4 and 1227/5)5
Admiral Leahy said that in J.C.S. 1227/4 the Joint Staff Planners suggest certain subjects which the United States Chiefs of Staff should discuss with the Soviet General Staff. In J.C.S. 1227/5 General Deane recommends a series of questions as the basis of the discussions. The Planners’ paper appears to go into considerable detail and to contain items not covered in the questions suggested by General Deane.
Admiral Leahy said that he entertained little hope of engaging in extended conversations with the Soviet General Staff.
General Marshall observed that our success in arranging a meeting with the Soviet Army Staff was a good omen as to the Soviets’ willingness to discuss the matters in which we are interested.
Admiral King said that he favored the approach to the Soviets advanced by the Planners.
General Deane said that he found no fault with the Planners’ paper except that he would not recommend that the status of the Milepost project be discussed by the United States Chiefs of Staff unless the Soviets first brought up the matter. Moreover, he proposed that the United States Chiefs of Staff refrain from suggesting a Russian strategic air force, inasmuch as it appeared that the aircraft necessary to constitute such a force could not be provided.
General Deane felt that it would be a mistake to bring up the matter of the exchange of weather information in view of the satisfactory progress that had been made so far. The Soviets had met every United States request for the exchange of this information.
General Kuter said that the weather information received so far did not meet the full requirements of the Twentieth Air Force in dealing with Japanese targets and suggested that there should be an increase in the number of weather stations in Siberia.
Admiral Olsen said that the Soviets had encountered considerable difficulty in setting up weather stations in Siberia because of the lack of transportation and communication facilities. They prefer to use their own personnel and equipment and therefore, if it were suggested that more stations be installed, the request should indicate willingness [Page 734] to make U. S. equipment available. He confirmed General Deane’s view that it would be a mistake to insist on a further exchange of weather information on a high level, since negotiations to meet United States requirements could be satisfactorily handled by the United States Mission in Moscow.
General Deane said he had arranged his list of questions with a view to permitting the Soviets to do the talking. The questions were designed to draw out Soviet views. Whether or not the questions were proper ones is a matter for decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In reply to an inquiry by Admiral Leahy, General Deane said that the operations referred to in Question 7 in J. C. S. 1227/5 were those to be initially undertaken by the Soviets if they entered the war against Japan. General Deane felt that the Soviet answer to the first question in his paper would undoubtedly lead to several contributory questions which would cover the points made by the Planners in their paper.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to use both J. C. S. 1227/4 and 1227/5 in their conference with the Soviet General Staff.