Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes ¹

Leningrad, February 7, 1945, 10 a.m.

1. Approval of Minutes of C. C. S. 186th Meeting ²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the Minutes of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

2. Utilization of the Fifteenth Air Force in Vienna-Budapest Area
(J. C. S. 1241)³

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Staff Planners had in this paper reviewed the problem of basing or staging U.S. strategic air forces in the Vienna-Budapest area and recommended that a memorandum be sent to the President requesting Marshal Stalin’s agreement to the staging of elements of the Fifteenth Air Force through airdromes in the Budapest area. He found no objections to the paper and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve it.

General Marshall drew attention to the fact that this subject had been discussed with the Russians at the tripartite meeting on 6 February 1945,⁴ and that the President need only to hand the memorandum to Marshal Stalin without discussion.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to present to the President the memorandum in Appendix “A” of J. C. S. 1241 enclosing the draft memorandum to Marshal Stalin, prepared in English and Russian text.

3. Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War
(C. C. S. 777;⁵ J. C. S. 1266/1 ( Argonaut );³ J. C. S. 1266/1 (Wash.))⁶

Admiral Leahy said that J. C. S. 1266/1 ( Argonaut ) was the report of an ad hoc committee which expresses agreement with the British proposal in C. C. S. 777 and recommends a memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to this effect. He pointed out that the Acting Secretary of State in Washington had already agreed to a different method but that this problem appeared to be one for the State Department to solve and was not the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He found no objection to the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in J. C. S. 1266/1 (( Argonaut ) and recommended approval.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the memorandum in the Appendix of J. C. S. 1266/1 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 777/1).⁷

4. Supplies and Equipment Requested by the U.S.S.R.
(J. C. S. 1138/3, J. C. S. Info. Memo 360— Milepost Summary)⁸

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had reviewed J. C. S. 1138/2⁸ and brought up to date the status of availability of equipment to meet the requirements for operation Milepost . In J. C. S. 1138/3 they recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the facts and conclusions of the report and that a copy of the paper be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee. He recommended that J. C. S. 1138/3 be approved.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Took note of the facts and conclusions developed in the report of the Joint Logistics Committee in J. C. S. 1138/3 and directed that a copy of the report be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee.

5. Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and Administration of “Greater Berlin”
(J. C. S. 577/28)⁹

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had recommended as the final action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and administration of “Greater Berlin,”¹⁰ the dispatch of the message to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy contained in the Appendix to J.C.S. 577/28. He saw no objection to the paper and recommended approval.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to dispatch to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the message contained in the Appendix to J.C.S. 577/28.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9. Zone of Limitation for British and U. S. Air Operations in Advance of the Soviet Armies

General Marshall requested General Kuter to report on the meeting of the tripartite air staffs in connection with the coordination of strategic air operations with the Soviets.

General Kuter said that the draft agreement reached had been circulated to the Chiefs of Staff informally. It had been decided not to use the term “bombline” because of the difference between the Russian, British and American definitions but to use instead, the expression “zone of limitation.” There were two items in the agreement which were not entirely satisfactory. The first was the 24-hour notice of Allied air operations required by the Soviet General Staff and second, the depth of the zone, which would be deeper than the Allied command desired. However, it was the best arrangement that could be worked out. The agreement had been changed in one respect. He had substituted the words “British and U. S.” wherever the word “Allied” occurred. He requested the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by General Deane, General Kuter explained that the Mission in Moscow would be furnished daily information of the location of the Soviet front lines, which automatically fixed the location of the zone of limitation.

General Kuter said that the matter of Allied-Russian liaison on a lower level had also been brought up at the meeting. For the necessity of such liaison the strategic air operations to the east of Berlin which had involved bombing within an extremely short distance of the Soviet lines had been used as an example. It was suggested that the Russians consider the use of VHF communication links with the Allied planes in order that their own fighter pilots might be able quickly to receive information of German movements discovered by Allied pilots and conduct their operations accordingly. He felt that the meeting, although not entirely satisfactory on all points, would lead to further discussions in Moscow. As an additional point, no decision on the advance bomber bases in the Vienna-Budapest area had been reached.

Admiral Leahy recommended that the agreement be approved as General Kuter had requested.

After further discussion,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the agreement for a zone of limitation for British and U. S. air operations in advance of the Soviet armies prepared by the British–U. S.–Soviet air staffs, as amended during the discussion. (Subsequently circulated as J. C. S. 1243.¹¹)

10. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff With the Soviet General Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the dispatch to General Antonov of a note requesting a meeting with the Soviet General Staff at Soviet Headquarters, Thursday, 8 February, at 1500.¹²

11. Report by Combined Shipping Staffs

General Somervell said that combined oil and shipping studies had been progressing. Eight of the ten points involved in the oil studies had been resolved and a paper would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. It had been decided to defer action on the remaining two points of difference in the oil studies.

The report of the Combined Shipping Staffs would be completed and circulated sometime during the night and would be ready for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the meeting scheduled for 8 February 1945.¹³

Several disturbing points had arisen. The Russians had demanded additional ships, and what was of greater concern, there was the accompanying question of cargo requirements, chiefly the item of trucks. As yet it was not known how the Russian requirements could be filled. There was also the question of a cut in British requirements. The Prime Minister was intensely concerned in this matter and was reluctant to accept any reduction in imports but would do so if necessary. It was his, General Somervell’s, view that the British import program should not be considered at this conference unless directed by the President.

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Somervell explained that the necessary military shipping would be found but he felt that the Director of War Mobilization would require complete information and would wish to discuss the matter before making any final allocation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Took note of General Somervell’s report on the progress of cargo shipping and oil studies.

1. J. C. S. 189th Meeting.
2. Ante, pp. 635–637.
3. Not printed.
4. See ante, p. 647.
5. In C. C. S. 777, dated February 4, 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff expressed their concurrence with a draft agreement that the Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary had submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before pursuing further negotiations with the Russians. The draft agreement under reference appears to have been the British redraft of the Soviet draft of January 20. The Soviet draft is presented ante, pp. 416–418. The British redraft is post, pp. 694–696.
3. Not printed.
6. Not printed. This paper was prepared in Washington and was sent to Yalta by courier on February 2, 1945. It set forth certain objections formulated by the Washington agencies to the British redraft which was then under consideration at Yalta. These considerations are reflected in the telegram of February 7 [8], 1945, from Grew to Stettinius, post, p. 697.
7. As amended and approved, this document became C. C. S. 777/2, printed post, pp. 754–756.
8. Not printed.
8. Not printed.
9. The appendix to J. C. S. 577/28 is printed ante, p. 118, footnote 1.
10. Ante, pp. 118–123.
11. Not printed.
12. The note and reply are printed post, pp. 698–699.
13. See post, pp. 750–751.