[Attachment]
The Commanding General, United States Military
Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane), to the Chief of Staff, United States Army
(Marshall)
secret
Moscow, 2 December
1944.
Dear General Marshall: Now that I have been in Russia
for some time and am qualified as an “expert,” I think it might be
of some interest to you to have my general reactions. They may be of
value to you since I have served under you long enough to enable you
to evaluate them. A report is always more useful if one knows the
reporter.
Everyone will agree on the importance of collaboration with
Russia—now and in the future. It won’t be worth a hoot, however,
unless it is based on mutual respect and made to work both ways. I
have sat at innumerable Russian banquets and become gradually
nauseated by Russian food, vodka, and protestations of friendship.
[Page 448] Each person high in
public life proposes a toast a little sweeter than the preceding one
on Soviet-British-American friendship. It is amazing how these
toasts go down past the tongues in the cheeks. After the banquets we
send the Soviets another thousand airplanes, and they approve a visa
that has been hanging fire for months. We then scratch our heads to
see what other gifts we can send, and they scratch theirs to see
what else they can ask for.
This picture may be overdrawn, but not much. When the Red Army was
back on its heels, it was right for us to give them all possible
assistance with no questions asked. It was right to bolster their
morale in every way we could. However, they are no longer back on
their heels; and, if there is one thing they have plenty of, it’s
self-confidence. The situation has changed, but our policy has not.
We still meet their requests to the limit of our ability, and they
meet ours to the minimum that will keep us sweet.
The truth is that they want to have as little to do with foreigners,
Americans included, as possible. We never make a request or proposal
to the Soviets that is not viewed with suspicion. They simply cannot
understand giving without taking, and as a result even our giving is
viewed with suspicion. Gratitude cannot be banked in the Soviet
Union. Each transaction is complete in itself without regard to past
favors. The party of the second part is either a shrewd trader to be
admired or a sucker to be despised.
We have obtained some concessions after exerting all the pressure we
could assemble. These included the
Frantic
bases, improved communications, exchange of weather, trucks
to China, exchange of enemy intelligence, some promises regarding
the Far East, and some other inconsequential ones. The cost to the
Soviet Union for any of these projects has been nil compared to the
cost of our efforts in their behalf. Some will say that the Red Army
has won the war for us. I can swallow all of this but the last two
words. In our dealings with the Soviet authorities, the U. S.
Military Mission has made every approach that has been made. Our
files are bulging with letters to the Soviets and devoid of letters
from them. This situation may be reversed in Washington, but I doubt
it. In short, we are in the position of being at the same time the
givers and the supplicants. This is neither dignified nor healthy
for U. S. prestige.
The picture is not all bad. The individual Russian is a likeable
person. Their racial characteristics are similar to ours.
Individually I think they would be friendly if they dared to
be—however, I have yet to see the inside of a Russian home.
Officials dare not become too friendly with us, and others are
persecuted for this offense. The Soviets have done an amazing job
for their own people—both in the war and in the pre-war period. One
cannot help admire their war effort and the spirit with which it has
been accomplished. We have [Page 449]
few conflicting interests, and there is little reason why we should
not be friendly now and in the foreseeable future.
In closing, I believe we should revise our present attitude along the
following lines.
- (1)
- Continue to assist the Soviet Union, provided they request
such assistance, and we are satisfied that it contributes to
winning the war.
- (2)
- Insist that they justify their needs for assistance in all
cases where the need is not apparent to us. If they fail to
do so, we should, in such cases, refuse assistance.
- (3)
- In all cases where our assistance does not contribute to
the winning of the war, we should insist on a quid pro quo.
- (4)
- We should present proposals for collaboration that would
be mutually beneficial, and then leave the next move to
them.
- (5)
- When our proposals for collaboration are unanswered after
a reasonable time, we should act as we think best and inform
them of our action.
- (6)
- We should stop pushing ourselves on them and make the
Soviet authorities come to us. We should be friendly and
cooperative when they do so.
I think there is something here worth fighting for, and it is simply
a question of the tactics to be employed. If the procedure I suggest
above were to be followed, there would be a period in which our
interests would suffer. However, I feel certain that we must be
tougher if we are to gain their respect and be able to work with
them in the future.
Sincerely yours,
