Editorial Note
The Department of State has the typewritten ribbon copy (Top Secret) of
what is entitled “Record of Edward R.
Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State”. Mr. Stettinius’ prefatory note contains
the following pertinent remarks on the nature of this Record:
“While I was Secretary of State I maintained a Record of my principal
official activities in Washington, believing that a view of the
immediate past can be a guide for the future. This record is based
on personal conversations, letters, cables, press reports and
considerable other material. It is a straight factual account,
omitting any personal comments except for my own conversations. . .
.
“In order to focus important features of the wide panorama of world
affairs, the Record is for the most part divided into weekly
Sections, with these Sections further divided into topical
subsections. ... In the course of developing the Record, Sections
One to Five were set down in the third person, while the first
person has been used in the remainder of the narrative.”
Since the Record was maintained only for the periods during which
Stettinius was in
Washington, it contains no entries for the conferences at Malta and
Yalta, for which Stettinius left
the Department on January 23, in preparation for taking off by plane
early on January 25, 1945.
The excerpts from this Record which are reproduced on the following pages
represent those portions from the period December 1, 1944–January 23,
1945 which concerned preparations for the conferences at Malta and Yalta
or dealt with negotiations on subjects that came up for discussion at
those conferences. (As noted in the introduction, p. xiii, the Stettinius papers for these conferences have not been
made available to the Department of State.)
The Record contains a considerable number of references to sources from
which the Record was compiled, such as “Secretary’s appointments”,
“Summaries of Telegrams”, and “News Digests”. In the portions of the
Record presented herein, these source references have been omitted and
have been replaced, wherever appropriate, by cross-references to
pertinent documents contained in this volume.
[Page 430]
Week of 1–9 December 1944
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trouble in Italy and Greece
A statement of “Special Information for the President” which I had signed
December 1, carried the following item:1
“The British Ambassador has clearly stated to Bonomi that the appointment of
Sforza as Foreign
Minister would be unacceptable. Kirk considers this an undue interference in Italian
internal affairs which, since Itaty is a theatre of combined
operations, to some extent involves the United States.”
On Monday, December 4, according to Mr. Byington’s memorandum to Mr. Savage, “the Department of State was deluged with
questions from correspondents in regard to reports from London that the
United States supported the British opposition to the appointment of
Count Sforza in the Italian
Government.” . . .2 “I3 took these
questions up.” . . .2 “I submitted the draft of the statement thus
prepared to Mr. McDermott who
approved it and I then took it up with Mr. Matthews who suggested some changes.”
“The next morning I informed the Secretary of State by telephone in
regard to the great number of queries now pending before the Department
and read him the statement as drafted for his approval with the
suggestion that it be released prior to the Press Conference in order
that he would not be subjected to the very embarrassing questions which
were being put to the Department by the correspondents. The Secretary
after hearing the statement, which he had me repeat several times,
instructed me to take it to Mr. Dunn, have him go over it and after it received Mr.
Dunn’s approval, he
authorized me to release the statement. I took the statement up with Mr.
Dunn and then after receiving
his approval, I gave it to the press at about 10:45 on the morning of
December 5.”4
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Questioned at his noon press conference shortly afterward, Secretary
Stettinius said there was
nothing he could say on the Italian situation in addition to the
statement. He received a phone call from Dr. Matthews Office of European Affairs, that good reports
were coming in on the statement.
A letter dated December 5 from Ambassador Halifax reached Mr. Stettinius next day enclosing a “personal telegram”
which Halifax had received on the
night of December 4, from Prime Minister [Page 431] Churchill.5 Churchill said
that he felt “fully entitled to make the Italian Government aware of our
view upon this matter because we had been accorded command in the
Mediterranean, as the Americans have command in France, and therefore we
have a certain special position and responsibility,” and attributing the
loss of “all confidence in Count
Sforza’s letter to Berle dated September 23, 1943.”6 Churchill felt that, if
necessary, he would defend himself in Commons by saying that he
considered Sforza “not only a man
who has broken his word, but also an intriguer and mischief maker” and
that he was chiefly motivated by “consideration for his own
advancement.” Finally Churchill
had made proposals to the President at Quebec, “all of which have been
carried out and some improved upon, for easing the Italian situation,
especially before the Presidential elections.”
On the morning of Wednesday the 6th, Mr. Stettinius phoned Mr. Dunn that “in view of the big splash” which the Italian
statement had made in London, Mr. Matthews should call Mr. Michael Wright at the British Embassy. Mr. Dunn said that Eden had made a statement saying that
his position was unchanged in the light of everything that had been said
up to that moment and assured the Secretary that the position he took in
the statement was the President’s policy. Nevertheless, the Secretary
said a wire should have gone out to the President on the 5th telling of
the statement, that he was asking that a memorandum be sent to the
President immediately.
Meanwhile Prime Minister Churchill
had cabled the President7 asking permission to quote “Count Sforza’s letter to Mr. Berle of September 23, 1943,” because
it was on the basis of this letter that the British had allowed
Sforza to return to Italy. He
had later broken “a gentleman’s word of honor” according to Churchill, in repudiating this position
which had been personally discussed with Churchill. The Prime Minister continued “I was much
astonished at the acerbity of the State Department’s communiqué to the
public, and I shall do my best in my reply to avoid imitating it.” He
then reminded the President of his support during “the Darlan affair,” during the proposals
to divide the Italian Navy and in general in proposing “mitigation for
Italy.” He was, therefore, hurt that the State Department should
“attempt to” administer a public rebuke to His Majesty’s Government.
The President in replying to Churchill8 permitted him to quote from Sforza’s letter to Berle since it “merely transmitted
Sforza’s message to Badoglio and in no way involved this
Government.”
While deploring any difference, the President pointed to the “untenable
position in which we were put” by Eden’s statement in the [Page 432] House and that in spite of Italy being “an area of
combined Anglo-American responsibility” the disapproval of Sforza as Premier or Foreign Minister
“was made without prior consultation with us in any quarter.”
On inquiring of Dr. Matthews
whether he had seen the above wire from the Prime Minister to the
President, Mr. Stettinius
learned that Mr. Michael Wright of
the British Embassy “is bringing in a document from Eden9 which he must
present to ERS personally.” The Secretary agreed to see him late that
afternoon. Mr. Wright was
Counselor of the British Embassy and handled the situation because Lord
Halifax was compelled to be out
of town. Indicating that the British reaction had been prompt and
violent, he said that the Italian statement “had caused great
embarrassment and that the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden were aroused.” He particularly
feared the application of the statement to other “liberated territories”
especially Greece. Wright had a
message from Eden which he would
not leave with the Secretary because it was “very personal” and “too
unpleasant.” After supporting “our position on Italy following Quebec,
which was hard for them,” Wright
said the British felt that they should have been consulted and that in
view of a Parliamentary debate the following Friday “it would be most
helpful if we could make a statement promptly.”
The Secretary replied (having decided with Mr. Dunn just before Wright’s visit on “a very firm stand”)
that he especially regretted the incident because during lend-lease and
as Under Secretary his relations with the British had been “happy and
harmonious” and it was unfortunate to have this happen during his first
week in office. Tea was then brought into the Secretary’s office, and
the Secretary’s calendar notes report that Wright became “very pleasant and calm.” Explaining that
there was nothing in the statement except what had been agreed upon
between the British and United States Government at Moscow, the
Secretary continued “the big point I must make in your mind is that it
is another case of lack of consultation on your part, since if you had
consulted us this incident would never have occurred.” Wright agreed to that, but added that
our inevitable mistakes should be aired in private and not in public and
that the British should have been consulted about the statement “because
two wrongs don’t make a right.”
The Secretary concluded, “I must send a message to Eden tonight” and Wright responded “I will send one too
and say you have been reasonable about this matter ...10 and that you
will make a statement to be used to help them out of a corner on
Friday.” The Secretary’s long, informal and personal wire to Mr.
Eden11 ended: “We [Page 433] are working up a friendly statement to be given out tomorrow which I
sincerely hope will be helpful.” Consequently, at his press conference
at noon the next day (December 7) the Secretary said:
“I was interested to note that in his statement on the Greek
situation on December 5 Prime Minister Churchill told the House of Commons the following:
‘Our own position, as I have said is extremely clear. Whether the
Greek people form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for
their decision. Whether they form a government of the right or left
is for their decision. These are entirely matters for them.’ With
this statement I am in full agreement. It is also our earnest hope
that the people and authorities of Greece and our British Allies
will work together in rebuilding that ravished country.”
A wire from the Secretary to the President early that afternoon referred
to Eden’s “personal message to
me,” in response to which the Secretary had made a statement for which
“the quotation selected for endorsement was selected by the British
Embassy here.”
Mr. Stettinius also signed a
letter on the 7th to Lord Halifax,12 ending “I am
sure you know how much I value your friendship; as long as we can talk
things out friendly and frankly at all times and keep no differences
between us [sic].”
An aide-mémoire was drafted that day13 saying that
instructions had been sent to our representative in Rome, that the U. S.
Government was concerned “over the prolonged crisis in the Italian
Government,” outlining the Government’s past actions and re-assuming our
position and concluding that there would be consultation “between the
British and American Governments at the appropriate time.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Toward the end of the week Lord Halifax, back in Washington, called on the Secretary and
“complimented me on my message to Eden (on Italy) of the night before last—which he
thought was excellent. ‘I must tell you, Ed, I see your point and my
Government should have consulted you before acting.’ “Incidentally, he
also discussed fears of the British Ambassador in Rome regarding “the
possible arrest and execution of Badoglio,” and urged that the United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff direct Marshal Montgomery14 in Italy to give orders for Badoglio’s protection. Secretary
Stettinius directed that
“Dunn and Matthews immediately discuss the
proposal with our Joint Chiefs of Staff this afternoon in order that
they could express an opinion to Lord Halifax or to Michael
Wright not later than tomorrow.”15 Finally the
Secretary suggested to the President that [Page 434] matters be arranged so that the Marshal could
“intervene on behalf of Badoglio,
only as the last resort to prevent his arrest.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Sixth of December
Wednesday the sixth was destined to be an active day, full of
complications. The first appointment was on US-UK handling of mandated territories with Sir
Frederick
Eggleston, who declared that
joint trusteeship “would be a diplomatic error” and handed Mr. Stettinius the following significant
paragraph:
“Powers responsible for dependent territories should accept the
principle of trusteeship, already applicable in the case of mandated
territories. In such dependent territories the purpose of the trust
is the welfare and advancement of the native peoples. Colonial Powers should undertake to make
regular reports to an international body analogous to the
Permanent Mandates Commission, set up within
the framework of the General Organization. This body should
be empowered to publish reports of its deliberations and to inspect dependent territories.”
(underlining supplied)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Week of 10–16 December 1944
Italy, Greece, and the Soviet-Polish
Border
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Churchill’s message to
Tito in Yugoslavia was
“almost threatening” and protested against the “rude attitude of
Tito and the partisans
toward the British.” Meanwhile, U. S. Ambassador Kirk suggested that “we might well
re-examine and clarify our position in respect to Yugoslavia”
because “the present ruling group means to make use of every
opportunity to enhance the prestige of the Soviet Union while
seeking to discredit the western allies.”1 Prime
Minister Subasic, considering that his visit to Moscow had been a
failure, placed the blame partly “on us and the British.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On Saturday the sixteenth Mr. Stettinius discussed “the Polish thing” with a group
of Departmental officials in his office, for he had signed a wire to
Ambassador Harriman in Moscow
the preceding Tuesday2 that “in view of apparent impossibility of
present Polish Cabinet working out any agreement with the Soviet
Government regarding the future of Poland, the Department does not
contemplate [Page 435] that relations
will be more than correct ...3 that we would not look favorably
on full recognition of the Lublin Committee by the Soviet.”
On Friday, Mr. Stettinius
told Secretary Forrestal that
Harriman had a letter in
which our attitude toward Poland was “crystal clear” and that “to
say we haven’t got a position isn’t quite on the beam.”
In Italy, Badoglio, after
finding temporary sanctuary in the British Embassy, was possibly to
be flown to Malta—or again, he might enter the Vatican. Meanwhile,
Count Sforza “expresses
his gratitude for the American position in favor of Italian dignity
and independence,” saying that Churchill’s speech against him was contrary to the
truth. The Bonomi Government
in Italy was considered to be representative but weakened by failure
to include the Socialist and Action parties.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Week of 17–23 December 1944
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet-Polish Border
On Sunday, December 17 the Secretary received a phone call from Mr.
Bohlen that a wire had
just come in from the President “approving the press release on
Poland.” That day the Secretary “talked to Dr. Bowman for half an hour and
discussed all aspects of the Polish statement to be issued
Monday.”1 With
certain reservations “he thought it was all right.” Secretary
Stettinius also had Mr.
Durbrow, Chief of the
Division of Eastern European Affairs, check that morning with Mr.
Hackworth at home and Dr.
Pasvolsky in New York at
the Harvard Club to clear with them the Polish statement.
Phoning Lord Halifax Monday
morning the eighteenth the Secretary read him the statement and “he
said he thought it sounded very well. ...2
Halifax was very appreciative
of my having called him. ...2
Halifax said that Eden had called him in the middle of
the night and said he had sent all sorts of nice messages to me
which he now gave me. He wanted to thank me on what I had done on
the Palestine matter.” Eden
wished included in the statement a paragraph about Polish frontiers,
and Mr. Stettinius said that
he would “be delighted to consider the matter.” He told him,
however, that “this whole activity in Greece and in Poland was
causing great resentment in this country and we should definitely
have a private [Page 436] talk.”
United States military people were going so far as to say that we
ought to withdraw from Europe and “go to the Pacific now and win the
war there”.
Mr. Harry Hopkins also
approved the statement, likewise Senator Connally. Leaving no stone unturned, the Secretary
read the statement on the phone to Vandenberg, who linked the Polish situation and
other political developments to “the hold-out on our nominees and it
was just pouring water on the wheel for these fellows who were
trying to make trouble.” Incidentally, on the same day Mr. Edgar Mowrer in a visit to the
Secretary told him that “we are letting the British and Russians
ride roughshod over us . . .3 I asked Mr. Mowrer to be patient.”4
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
After issuance of the release, the Secretary told Mr. Hopkins “that the Polish statement
went well” and the Ambassador of Poland was enthusiastic about it
when talking to Mr. Stettinius on the phone, saying that it agreed
perfectly with their policy. Next day the Secretary called Mr.
Byington to ask about
editorials on the statement and was informed that “they are
favorable as a whole. . . .3 the Post
has a very good editorial on it,” which acclaimed the statement as
“based squarely on war aims of the United Nations.”
In a memorandum to the President on Friday after an overly
enthusiastic reaction by the Poles to Monday’s statement, the
Secretary submitted a proposed letter to go to the Polish Prime
Minister emphasizing that “we believe an early settlement of the
frontier question would be a great benefit to the Polish nation and
people.”
Various Developments Abroad
Lord Halifax advised the
Secretary on Tuesday that an agreement had been reached between
Tito and Subasic in
Yugoslavia,5 that Eden “hopes we will go along with this.” In
response, a wire went to London saying, “This Government would not
undertake to express an opinion” because it was a question of
personalities involved and also “because of the nature of the
language used and the technicalities of Yugoslav law. The Ambassador
should not enter into discussions of the questions involved.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On the eighteenth a memorandum to the President6 pointed out that since resignation of the
Iranian government in November, the Russians have not done anything
to interfere in internal Iranian [Page 437] affairs. “It would be a mistake for Harriman to approach Stalin as long as there is a
possibility that the tension in Iran is easing.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Civilian Supply
At 11 o’clock Monday morning, Secretary Stettinius received Mr. Richard Law, Minister of State of the British
Foreign Office. He stated he was here to discuss only economic
matters, shipping and feeding of liberated countries. While the
Secretary told him at first that his opposite in our Government
would be Mr. Acheson, it was
decided later in the week that, because Law’s project cut across several Departments and
also because he represented “His entire Government”, Mr. Harry Hopkins should work with Mr.
Law, in close
consultation with Mr. Acheson. Lord Halifax, Mr. Harry
Hopkins and Mr. Law met with the Secretary in his office Tuesday
noon in regard to shipping. Mr. Hopkins stated that “this thing would have to be
handled in an extremely delicate way” because of military and other
pressures. . . .7 “The central theme of the discussion was that
immediate relief for civilians to keep them happy and contented was
a part of modern war.” Hopkins and Law went to lunch together to talk this matter over,
and were finally to put it up to the Secretary regarding “what our
next step would be.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
War Crimes
Mr. Herbert Pell reported that
he had been “working under a great hardship in London” with
insufficient staff and that “the Australian representative was about
to resign . . .7 in disgust.” Pell found it hard to operate because he had
“practically no instructions. . . .7 He appealed for
clarification of our policy toward war criminals.” Secretary
Stettinius told him “I
would undertake the responsibility of having the policy clarified.”
The Department’s Legal adviser, Mr. Hackworth, had just informed the Secretary that
“Army, Navy and Justice are studying the policy matter not yet
established.”8
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Week of 24–31 December 1944
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[Stettinius had a talk with
Lord Halifax on Tuesday.] . . .
The question of a joint British-American position on possible Soviet
recognition of the Lublin Committee was also mentioned.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[Page 438]
United Nations (Big-Three Conference)
On Saturday, December 30, newspapers reported that “Stettinius has no plans at present
for going to London,” although the day before a rumor ran that
“Stettinius will meet
Eden in London to get
firsthand account of the Greek situation.” It was said that at the
next Big-Three Meeting the President would have to put aside his
usual “one big happy family” approach and that “Stettinius’ recent statement
regarding Italy and Greece showed that the White House now believed
we should use ‘plainer, blunter speech’.” Newspapers interpreted
remarks by Secretary Stettinius at the Tuesday press conference as
showing that efforts had been useless toward solving the “veto
problem” in voting in the Security Council and this was one of the
main reasons for the impending Big-Three Meeting. But the Secretary
noted in his private calendar that “the President did mention to me
that he is not too worried about Stalin’s position on voting procedure.”
Soviet and Polish Problems
Late Friday afternoon (December 29) Secretary Stettinius held a meeting in his
office with Messrs. Grew,
Dunn, Bohlen, Durbrow and Hayden
Raynor, to confront the situation that the Lublin
Poles would probably “declare themselves to be a provisional
government which might be so recognized by the Soviet Union, and
perhaps by certain other countries, such as Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia.” It was the consensus that the President should “send
Stalin a cable expressing
disappointment” over his taking such action prior to the Big-Three
meeting and expressing hope for deferment. Mr. Stettinius phoned Hyde Park “about sending a message
to ‘Young [Uncle] Joe’ on Poland” and Miss
Tully arranged for him to
talk to President Roosevelt
the next day.
Saturday morning (December 30) Ambassador Halifax phoned and asked if the Department had given
thought to “what we should say about Lublin.”
Mr. Stettinius: Yes. We worked through the
night on it. I am seeing the President today. We must say the same
thing. . . .1 this Lublin thing might break Monday.
The Secretary then called Mr. Matthews and “wanted to know if the boys were
keeping in touch with things.” Indicating complete agreement with
the British, Mr. Matthews
said that the Prime Minister in his last message declared “he didn’t
intend to recognize at this time.” . . .1
After “the President agreed with Bohlen and myself this afternoon that it would be
perfectly proper for us to make the statement over [Page 439] the weekend,” the Secretary instructed
Bohlen to “dictate that
message before he goes home this evening.” At three o’clock Saturday
afternoon, December 30, the President therefore sent Stalin a cable, as drafted in the
Department:2
The message was repeated to the Prime Minister with the notation:
“You will see we are in step.” This reference was in response to an
earlier plea for cooperation voiced by Mr. Churchill.3
Various Developments Abroad
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The hapless position of King Peter of Yugoslavia was presented to the Department
through ... [a] report which included Peter’s long fervent appeal to Prime Minister
Churchill, complaining
that his “Royal Constitutional rights” were not being protected, and
ending with the plea that “we may together . . .4 find a
solution,” even if that meant King Peter would have to “remain abroad for awhile.”
(However, within several days the King was destined to submit to a
regency with which he was ill-pleased.) ...4
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Week of 1–6 January 1945
New Year’s Day
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Secretary told Mr. Harry
Hopkins that the purpose of his 12:30 appointment
with the President next day was to “bring with him people who will
be involved in the forthcoming conferences.” The President, Mr.
Stettinius explained,
did not want to have anyone accompany him in an advisory capacity,
but he felt Messrs. Bowman and
Alger Hiss ought to go.
Hopkins promised to
discuss the matter with the President that afternoon. . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United Nations
On Wednesday1 the
Secretary talked over with Dr. Pasvolsky “what transpired at the White House
yesterday” and said “we would have to prepare to see the President
soon again on voting procedure.” The press was endeavoring to pry
out of the Department and Congress various details about the
impending conference, and [Page 440]
Senator Connally told the
Secretary that it was useless to discuss it because “It is the
voting procedure and the President wants to sit down himself with
Churchill and Stalin and see what we can get.” In
the Secretary’s conversation Friday with Senator Connally both felt that regarding
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals “nothing could be done now until the
big meeting.” Assuming that agreement would then be reached on
voting and on membership, Mr. Stettinius was hopeful “we
could have a United Nations Conference in the spring.”
Various Developments Abroad
Soviet and Polish Problems. During the New
Year weekend, Soviet Russia announced its recognition of the Lublin
Committee, and there was widespread alarm that this meant another
division among the Allies. However, the Secretary on Friday arranged
with the President that he could “tell the press that we were
consulted re Russia’s recognition of the Lublin National Committee
in Poland.”
. . . Meanwhile, discussions continued regarding handling of Soviet
prisoners of the Germans captured by Allied armies.2
As for Germany, the Department’s proposal3 bad “been
in the White House for several weeks.” Chief problem was American
control of Bremen and Bremerhaven in the British area to enable
ingress and egress to and from the American zone. Also the French
wanted equal participation with the Big Three in the occupation of
Germany and a memorandum went to the President on Thursday4 recommending acceptance of the French
proposals “subject to the approval of the military authorities.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
War Crimes. In asking for a report on the
status of the War Crimes Commission, the President told Secretary
Stettinius that “The
charges should include an indictment for waging aggressive and
unprovoked warfare, in violation of the Kellogg pact.”5 The Secretary in his reply6 listed the
Commission’s recommendations regarding courts for trying war
criminals, and added that next Monday a meeting was scheduled in
Judge Rosenman’s office, “to
come to some common understanding . . .7 and to submit a report to
you.”
[Page 441]
Other. Ambassador Winant in reviewing the first year’s activities of
the European Advisory Commission to be completed on January 14,
called attention to the fact that “only one paper has been finally
approved” and suggested ineffectiveness.8
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7–23 January 1945
United Nations
Preparation for the other conferences—the Big-Three Chiefs of
State—occupied much of my thought during these weeks. After
attending the annual meeting of the American Red Cross on the
morning of the eighth, I saw Messrs. Dunn, Pasvolsky, Alger
Hiss and Hayden
Raynor in my office, regarding a noon meeting at the
White House with the President.1 (At a dinner
that evening with Ambassador and Madame
Gromyko, the Ambassador advised me he was being
“recalled to Moscow for consultation.”) Next morning I met with
Messrs. Blanchard, Foote, Matthews, Alger
Hiss, Bohlen,
Conn, and Lynch to speed up preparations, and
Colonel Ireland called me to talk about the project and to “get the
information straight,” as he said. I asked him if he had talked with
Colonel McCarthy, as he
knew more about it. Colonel Ireland said that he wanted to discuss
my separate itinerary. In view of the secrecy of the undertaking, I
called him back on my White House phone and told him that I had to
get to the rendezvous before “number one” and discussed details,
including the question of an aide.
On Wednesday the tenth I told the members of my Staff Committee to
speed up preparation of memoranda for the President to take to the
meeting of the Big-Three, that the material should be ready on
January 18th, and all memoranda in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss not later than January
15th. As for the binder of material which I would take along with
me, I wished to have that by Tuesday, the sixteenth. I was advised
by Mr. Dunn that the
memoranda on the Near East were ready and that questions on Europe
could be ready as soon as he had discussed a few policy matters with
me. I told Mr. Dunn that he
would have to take the responsibility for those papers. I agreed
with his suggestion that everything be written up in final form by
Saturday, the thirteenth, subject to any modification which could be
introduced by revising certain pages in the book before it went to
the President. (By January 19th, I was able to arrange an [Page 442] appointment with the White
House for Mr. Bohlen to
present the completed binder, including the ten points.)2
I told Mr. Rockefeller in
answer to his question at a Staff meeting that the memoranda should
not only be background, but contain policy guidance. For instance,
the President would have to have a private talk with Mr. Churchill on British meat purchases
in Argentina.
On the same occasion I explained that if things went well at the
Big-Three meeting, I wanted to be able to cable Mr. Pasvolsky to start the machinery for
calling a United Nations Conference. Assuming the President could
clear up unsettled issues, I wanted to have the make-up of the
American Delegation all ready and the proposed date and place agreed
upon in advance so that there would be no delay later. I passed on
to the Committee my impressions from the President of how encouraged
he felt about pressing the American view on voting procedure with
Stalin, as well as his
general determination to see that we actually got a world
organization.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Of course, the major matter outstanding from the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference to be considered at the conference was the procedure for
voting, and on the tenth I asked Mr. Harry Hopkins to set a time “when a couple of guys
can come” to see the President about voting procedure. He said that
he would arrange it with Mr. Bohlen. I wrote President Roosevelt on the seventeenth
informing him the British would accept the proposed compromise
formula on voting in the security council as sent to the Prime
Minister some time ago.3 However, in a meeting which the President had with certain
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 11th,
he had been said by Mr. Acheson to have gone “further than expected towards
agreement with the Russian view . . .4 of requiring unanimity.”
The President felt we would probably have to yield to the Russians
on this point but that they would yield on their proposals for
seventeen votes. Just before he left on the morning of the
seventeenth, Ambassador Gromyko phoned me to say good-bye and to express his
regret at not being able to call on me before leaving. I told him
that I would see him there.
When the forthcoming conference of the Big-Three first became known
to the public, it was not stated that I would accompany the
President. A good deal of newspaper comment began to develop.
Arthur Krock on January
9th said, in summary, that “If Stettinius attends Mexico City meeting of American
foreign ministers, he cannot also be present at Big-3 meeting.
Undoubtedly his prestige and State Depart.’s would be enhanced if
Stettinius should go
with President [Page 443] to Big-3
meeting . . .5 However, it is good practice for President to
keep State Secretary in constant touch with formulation of policy.
Example of this good practice would be Stettinius’ presence at the Big-3 meeting.”
Senator Brewster made a speech
in Congress suggesting the President was “passing over Mr. Stettinius” in not taking me to
the Big-3 meeting. This was brought up in the meeting of my Staff
Committee while I was out of town and the Committee felt “secrecy on
this point was undesirable and unnecessary” and an announcement
should be made to the effect that I was going. The Committee
suggested I take the matter up with the President. I discussed with
him a number of secret items involving the conference, on the
morning of Thursday, the eighteenth, and next morning I checked with
the President’s Secretary, Mr. Early, about my making a statement to the press on
my trip abroad. Early said that he had just cleared this with the
President for the second time and urged me to make the announcement
as soon as possible. I told Early exactly what I was going to say
and he approved. At noon that day in answer to questions I revealed
that the President had invited me several weeks before to accompany
him on his forthcoming trip. And I added that this would not
conflict with the meeting at Mexico City, that I would attend that
conference also.
Details and plans for the big trip were discussed on the eighteenth
with Major Tyson and Major Richmond—who would respectively be my aide and
pilot—together with Alger Hiss
of the Department. I instructed Major Tyson to report to Colonel McCarthy for briefing.
Later that day I had a visit from the French Ambassador and Mr.
René Mayer, French
Minister for Transportation and Public Works, who told me of their
anxiety that General de Gaulle
should attend the Big-3 meeting. Without giving them much
encouragement, I advised them that the whole question was receiving
our very careful consideration. The British also required a little
handling. Lord Halifax had
requested that we give him certain preparatory information for
relaying to London, but after consultation within the Department I
telephoned Lord Halifax that
Mr. Hopkins would have
private talks in London on his arrival. Lord Halifax thought this was a very
satisfactory answer. The British also appeared likely to press a
proposal that Russia be informed of the urgency of the Iranian
proposals in advance of the Big-3 Conference, but our position was
that this would lend the Iranian situation undue importance.6
At 3:30 on Tuesday the 23rd I held a small off-the-record meeting of
the members of the party in final preparation for our departure.
A hopeful sign for international cooperation appeared in a successful
[Page 444] draft proposing a
Four-Power Committee to supervise “the return of democratic
government” in liberated and satellite states, to be called the
Emergency High Commission for Europe.7 I expected
to take up this project with the President on my return from Mexico
City. Ambassador Pearson of
Canada presented a statement of his Government’s views on Dumbarton
Oaks, principally recommending that middle-sized countries should be
more frequent members of the Security Council than smaller
countries.8
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A number of financial and economic matters involved relations with
the Soviet Union. Ambassador Harriman reported on a Soviet Aide-Mémoire which asked a postwar credit of six billion
dollars to run for thirty years at 2½ per cent a year, and which
suggested that development of friendly relations would depend upon a
generous credit.9 But
Harriman recommended that
our willingness to cooperate in large-scale Russian reconstruction
should depend on “Soviet international behavior”. While a rising
standard of living in Russia might mean increased tolerance, we
should retain control of any credits, and we should reach agreement
on lend-lease before putting into production additional long-life
industrial equipment.
I wrote Secretary Morgenthau that we had studied the Treasury’s
letter of January 1 to the President,10 proposing
comprehensive financial aid to the U. S. S. R. during its
reconstruction period. We would be glad to sit down with Mr.
Morgenthau and members of
his staff, I suggested, to discuss their plan and the original
Soviet request. In communicating with Mr. Crowley of FEA,11 we
concurred that the question of long-term credits for Soviet postwar
projects should be kept separate from lend-lease items on the war
supply program. Our position on the long-term financing was that we
could not immediately make concrete proposals for a large postwar
credit because of legislative restrictions but that we were anxious
to extend such a credit as soon as authorization was received from
Congress. Meanwhile, details of Soviet requirements would be
welcomed.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet authorities were pleased that Dr. Millspaugh and the forty-five Americans comprising
his mission might be withdrawn from Iran, owing to a decision to
place the powers of the mission in Iranian hands. The British, on
the other hand, were hoping that the mission would remain. The
American representatives themselves were almost indifferent. But
U.S. prestige was involved.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[Page 445]
On my return to Washington, Wednesday, January 17th, I met with the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the Capitol. I had a very
friendly reception. I spoke for thirty or forty minutes and was
questioned for about the same time. Nothing arose of an embarrassing
or dangerous nature. Mr. Acheson talked later with four Senators who were
extremely enthusiastic, and Senator Hill told Mr. MacLeish that he hoped such meetings would continue.
I suggested afterward to my Staff Committee that they might hold
these meetings with the Senate during my absence, but I had to
caution them against disclosing anything that ought not to appear in
the press. Unfortunately, forty-eight hours after the President had
spoken to members of the Committee about a closely guarded
secret—Russia’s demand for sixteen seats in the General Assembly—it
had appeared in the newspapers. . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Various Developments Abroad
Europe. The Polish Ambassador called on me
Tuesday morning January 9th asking what the next step of our
Government would be on the Polish situation. The Ambassador pressed
me to say that I personally felt it would be advantageous for
Mikolajczyk to be taken
back into the Government. I replied that it would be unwise to stir
the matter up at this time, that he would have to be patient pending
the outcome of certain conversations the President hoped to have.
Actually, the Department favored an arrangement regarding the Polish
boundary whereby Poland would acquire most of East Prussia, German
Upper Silesia, the eastern portion of Pomerania, and other former
German holdings. Resulting from Soviet recognition, the Lublin
Committee in Poland was gaining increasing support as a
government.
The Soviet Government took an aggressive attitude toward our
releasing Soviet nationals captured by our forces, regardless of
retaliatory measures the Germans might take against American
prisoners of war; and it appeared urgent for us to express our views
emphatically as soon as we had received all necessary information
from the War Department. When Secretary Stimson inquired regarding our policy and action, I
told him that I had informed Ambassador Gromyko we could take no action before discussing it
with the War Department. Secretary Stimson said that he would send a memorandum to the
President expressing his views. . . . On January 17th I signed a
wire to Ambassador Harriman
authorizing him to let Marshal Voroshilov sign the Hungarian Armistice on behalf of
the United States.12
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[Page 446]
. . . We informed Ambassador Murphy that we felt the Italian policy had been mild
even for Italy and that a much more rigorous purge program should be
applied to Germany. A general “post-defeat” directive for Germany
was approved by the State, War and Navy Departments, although the
financial sections had not been agreed to by the Treasury
Department; therefore Mr. Winant had been instructed to act without waiting
for the latter.13 By the time I left for the trip, the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was drawing up a document to
be presented to the four governments involved, proving [providing] for immediate activation in London
of the Control Council for Germany.14
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
At my press conference on the nineteenth a correspondent inquired
whether the U. S. policy was still the same regarding punishment of
Hitler and other Nazi
leaders as had been previously stated by Secretary Hull and the President. I answered
that that was still the policy of the Department. Ambassador
Joseph Davies phoned me
on the twenty-second to say he had a memorandum on war crimes; I had
a visit with him that noon.
