Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)

top secret

WAR 23255

This replies to your M 22261.1

In such further discussions with the Russians as you consider profitable in the limited time prior to Argonaut you will be guided by the following:

a. Determine from the Russians, without giving any impression whatsoever of commitments, if any trans-Pacific aid will be required to sustain Russian effort after she enters the war, assuming that Milepost has been completed.

b. Indicate to the Russians that any operations by U. S. to open sea routes to Sea of Okhotsk-Amur river ports will be costly and at the expense of our own efforts toward Japan from the south; that because of limitation of means amphibious operations in the North Pacific in 1945 are remote.

c. Emphasize that if a difficult campaign were conducted to open a sea route of only limited capacity the U. S. and U. S. S. R. should insure that use made of the route will be that which will bring about earliest defeat of Japan.

d. Stress the desirability of the early employment and exploitation of the combined Russian and U. S. air superiority over the Japanese. Point out limitations of island air bases available to U. S. within air range of Japan and the availability immediately after hostilities of experienced U. S. Strategic Air Force Units. In view of Soviet opposition to basing U. S. Forces in the Maritime Provinces, point out that surely in eastern Siberia, there must be areas from which U. S. Air Forces, either heavy or very heavy bombers could operate. Emphasize that there is no intention of displacing Russian Air Forces by U. S. Units, or of interfering with the Russian campaign on the Asiatic mainland. Emphasize that operations of U. S. Strategic Air [Page 395]Forces from eastern Siberia would assist in denying munitions to the Jap Manchurian Army and consequently directly support the Russians on that front.

e. Because detailed plans for the employment of U. S. Air Forces in eastern Siberia, such as the one you propose have not been fully examined, particularly as to logistics, you will not submit any such plans to the Russians at this time, or propose the basing in Russia of a U. S. Air Force of definite composition.

Finally therefore you should endeavor to secure agreement in principle by the Russians to the eventual employment of U. S. Air Forces from eastern Siberian bases in the event future developments indicate this employment to be both practicable and advantageous.

  1. Not printed.