Executive Secretariat Files
Briefing Book Paper
Political and Military Situation in China in the Event the U. S. S. R. Enters the War in the Far East
Background:
Territory now controlled by the Chinese Communists covers large portions of North China and disconnected areas to the east and south. Reports also indicate that Communist underground strength in Manchuria is considerable. The Communists claim to have 500,000 regular troops and 2,000,000 militia. The soldiers are poorly equipped but are well-trained in guerrilla warfare and are in good physical condition.
Inner Mongolia lies between Outer Mongolia and the northern areas under Chinese Communist control. The Chinese armies in Inner Mongolia are of poor quality. They are passively hostile to the Communist armies.
It is reasonable to anticipate, or one must at least be prepared for the eventuality, that one line of attack by Russian armies would be from Outer Mongolia, where military strength could be amassed in advance of hostilities, through Inner Mongolia toward Shanhaikuan, the principal gateway between North China and Manchuria. After traversing Inner Mongolia, the Russians would have on their right flank Chinese Communist armies.
(When he returned from Chungking last spring, the Chinese Ambassador made the disturbing comment to Mr. Vincent that, in the event Russian troops attacked Japan through north China, the Chinese Government had plans which would prevent contact between Russian troops and Chinese Communist troops. However, it may be assumed that the Russians would not be deterred from making use of Chinese Communist forces by any attitude or actions of the Chinese Government.)
Solution:
It is of course highly desirable that embarrassment and difficulties, political or military, be avoided in the event of Russian military operations in north China. The obvious and reasonable solution would be a working agreement between the Chinese Government and the [Page 352] Communists which would establish a unified Chinese military command to work with the Russian command. There is, however, doubt that such a working agreement will be reached.
An alternative solution would be an over-all American command of Chinese troops. If Russia enters the war in the Far East, it would be highly advantageous to have in China such a command rather than a disunited Chinese command. Furthermore, it would make practicable supply of ammunition and demolition material to the Communists and would obviate political difficulties in the event of coastal landings adjacent to areas under Communist control. And finally, an American command could serve as a stabilizing influence in the period immediately following the conclusion of hostilities in China.
Recommended Action:
Continuation of efforts to bring about a settlement between Chinese Government and Communist leaders which would bring about united military command and action.
At the same time negotiations looking toward the establishment of an over-all American command in China directly under the Generalissimo. Institution of such a command may not be immediately feasible but the groundwork should be laid to enable smooth establishment of such a command if and when developments make such a step advisable.
In the event neither of these courses of action bring about the desired results, it is recommended that this Government, and the British Government, lend no support to a policy by the Chinese Government which might impede Russian military action against Japan. On the positive side, the two Governments should make every effort to bring about cooperation between all Chinese forces and the Russian military command in order to prevent military developments from further widening the gap between the Communists and the Chinese Government and increasing the possibility of a disunited China after hostilities.