Executive Secretariat Files
Briefing Book Paper
Memoranda Concerning Iran
[Summary]
I American Policy in Iran
The U. S. supports Iranian independence and seeks to strengthen the country internally, so that excuses for outside interference will be minimized. Iran is considered a testing ground for U. S., U. K., and U. S. S. R. cooperation and for the principles of Dumbarton Oaks.
American, British and Soviet Ambassadors in Iran should be authorized and instructed to cooperate and consult closely on all questions of mutai interest. Allied wartime controls in Iran should be removed as rapidly as possible.
II Problem of Oil Concessions in Iran
We should dispel any idea in Soviet minds that U. S. officials or individuals prompted Iran to refuse the Soviet request for an oil concession. Effort should be made, however, to persuade the Soviet authorities that pressure on Iran to grant a concession would be contrary to assurance of respect for Iranian sovereignty contained in the Declaration on Iran.1
III Desirability of Limiting or Removing Allied Military Censorship in Iran
The progress of the war no longer requires the strict censorship now in force.
IV Suggested International Trusteeship to Operate Iranian Railways and Free Port on Persian Gulf
While the aims of the proposal are excellent, the Department sees no possibility of its being made acceptable.
[Memoranda Concerning Iran]
I American Policy in Iran; Continued and Growing American Interest in Iran as a Testing Ground for the Atlantic Charter and for Allied Good Faith
The basis of our policy toward Iran is a desire to contribute to the maintenance of the independence of Iran and to increase its internal strength. This policy is based on four principal desires:
- (1)
- to carry out the pledges of assistance we have given Iran;
- (2)
- to insure a nondiscriminatory position for the United States in Iran with regard to commerce, shipping, petroleum and aviation;
- (3)
- to contribute toward postwar security by helping to construct a strong and independent Iran, free from the internal dissensions and weaknesses which invite foreign intervention, and
- (4)
- to develop U. S., U. K. and U. S. S. R. cooperation there, as a testing ground for postwar relations and a demonstration of Dumbarton Oaks in action.
This policy was crystallized and given emphasis by the Declaration on Iran signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. This document acknowledged Iran’s contribution toward the war effort, expressed desire for the maintenance of Iran’s sovereignty and integrity, and pledged allied economic assistance to Iran both now and after the war.
Our policy toward Iran has been implemented in various ways: by the development of a comprehensive American adviser program, by American participation in the Middle East Supply Center program of meeting Iran’s essential needs, by supplying the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie with the military supplies necessary to maintain internal security, and by other similar means. The cornerstone of this program has been the American adviser program, under which we have assisted Iran in finding, always on specific Iranian request, a large number of American citizens to advise them in the fields of finance, economy, public health, army, gendarmerie, and irrigation. The largest of these advisory missions is that headed by Dr. A. C. Millspaugh in the fields of finance and economy, with a present strength of some 45 American citizens.
The Allies have a unique opportunity in Iran, common meeting place of the three great powers, to set a pattern of cooperation and develop a mode of conduct in dealing with small nations which will serve as a model in the postwar world. Since the sincere cooperation of the British and Russians must be obtained if this objective is to be realized, we should endeavor constantly to bring about allied consultation and common action in all matters of mutual interest regarding Iran. In the development of our own policy toward Iran, we should bear in mind the special historic interests of the British and Russians in that country. We should avoid the impression that we stand at Iran’s side as a buffer to restrain other countries or that we have undertaken a unilateral obligation to defend Iran by armed force. Toward this end, we should make a special effort to bring the Russians and British into common allied deliberations regarding Iran and should seek their active collaboration in carrying out an agreed policy. Moscow should be requested to instruct the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran to consult fully with his American and British colleagues on all questions of mutual interest. The three Ambassadors might [Page 342] constitute an Allied Advisory Commission in Iran, with a secretariat, to bring about constant collaboration on matters of mutual concern.
Effort should be made to remove two specific causes for allied friction in Iran. They are: the oil concession controversy; and the continuance of allied censorship. Each subject is discussed in a separate paper.
II The Problem of Oil Concessions in Iran and the Disturbing Effect recent Negotiations have had on Soviet-Iranian Relations
Soviet displeasure at the action of the Iranian Government in suspending, until after the war, all negotiations for oil concessions is an ominous development which should be carefully followed.
A brief summary of the immediate background of this matter follows. American and British oil companies began negotiations with the Iranian Government in early 1944 for a petroleum concession in southern Iran. The American and British Embassies in Iran were aware of these negotiations but regarded them as private commercial ventures and in no way participated in the negotiations. The negotiations seemed about to terminate successfully in September when a large Soviet delegation, headed by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze, appeared in Tehran and demanded that a concession be granted to the Soviet Government for the five northern provinces of Iran. The Iranian Government, alarmed by the sweeping Soviet demands, disturbed by Soviet refusal to discuss terms or conditions, and fearful that Iranian sovereignty would be jeopardized if a foreign government should obtain such wide and lasting control in the country, announced that all petroleum negotiations were suspended until the end of the war.
The United States Government promptly informed the Iranian Government that, while American companies were disappointed, we recognized the sovereign right of Iran to grant or withhold concessions within its territory. We asked that, when negotiations are resumed, American companies be informed and be placed in no less favorable position than granted to any foreign company or government. The British followed a similar policy although they made no formal statement to the Iranian Government, as far as we are aware. The Russians showed great annoyance, taking the Iranian action as an affront. The Soviet press began a strong and concerted attack on Iranian Prime Minister Saed and his Government, accusing Iranian officials of being “disloyal” and Fascist-minded. These attacks and the strong statements of displeasure by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze in Tehran brought about the resignation of the Saed Government.
The American Embassy in Moscow informed the Soviet Government on November 1, 19442 of the attitude we had taken and stated [Page 343] that our action had been based on the Declaration on Iran signed at Tehran by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin on December 1, 1943. The Soviet Government, in a reply addressed to us on December 28, 19443 strongly supported the action taken by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze, again accused the Iranian Government of unfriendly and “disloyal” action, denied that the granting of an oil concession to the Soviet Government would affect Iranian sovereignty, and declared that the concession would in no way be in contradiction to the Declaration on Iran. The note described the American attitude toward this Soviet-Iranian dispute as “unsympathetic” to the Soviet Government.
The British Government, for its part, subsequently called the attention of the Soviet Government to the harmful effects of Soviet action in Iran and has asked the Russians to state frankly their designs and intentions in this matter. The British have asked us to make similar representations in Moscow but we have taken no action other than our original note of November 1.
The situation is potentially dangerous, not only as regards Iranian sovereignty but in the more important bearing it may have on allied relations. The British, however willing they may be to make concessions to the Russians in Eastern Europe, will probably refuse to consider concessions in the Middle East, which is so vitally important to Empire communications. The consequences of this dispute, if it is allowed to continue, may be serious.
The American Government should continue to maintain the reasonable and tenable position we have taken; that we recognize the sovereign right of Iran to grant or withhold concessions within its territory. We should stress to the Russians, at the highest possible level and in the most friendly and constructive manner, the harmful effects of their action in Iran. While British opposition to the Soviet action may be based primarily on strategic grounds, our chief concern is that the assurances of the great powers of respect for Iranian sovereignty be not violated. The confidence of the world in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be seriously affected by action to force Iran to grant an oil concession.
III Desirability of Limiting or Removing Allied Military Censorship in Iran
When Russian and British troops entered Iran in August 1941 the British and Russian military authorities agreed upon a joint censorship arrangement under which each could exercise a veto over the release in Iran or dispatch from that country of any information considered harmful to the war effort. When American troops entered Iran in 1942, the American military authorities were invited to participate, [Page 344] to the extent of the American interests involved, in the censorship arrangements.
In actual practice, the arrangement has given the Russian a veto over the dissemination of news in Iran from American and British sources and over the dispatch from Iran of any news contrary to Soviet interests, while the British and American authorities have had no such veto, due to the fact that Tass despatches between Moscow and Tehran in both directions are sent over the Soviet Embassy wire and are consequently uncensored.
As a result of this situation, the Soviet authorities were able to prevent the facts regarding the recent oil concession controversy between Russia and Iran from being disseminated abroad, and even prevented the Iranian Government from telegraphing to its diplomatic representatives in Moscow, London and Washington.
The censorship has been irksome, not only to the Iranian Government but also to foreign newspapermen and civilians in Iran, who have frequently been denied American and British publications addressed to them by mail. Both the British and American authorities have complained about the operation of the censorship, but the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran claims that it is a matter of military censorship which he cannot control.
Iran is not a zone of military operations, and the excuse for military censorship there has practically disappeared. There is no excuse whatsoever for this censorship to be extended to political information. Its operation during the past two years has been a serious infringement of Iranian sovereignty and is no longer justifiable. Ambassador Morris feels strongly that a solution can be reached only through discussion by the highest officials of the U. S., the U. K., and the U. S. S. R.
Soviet control of news in Iran is an important phase of the larger question of the freedom of information in which this Government is so greatly interested. A solution would be to eliminate the veto feature and to require American, British, Soviet and Iranian concurrence before items are censored and to restrict censorship to strictly military questions. The remoteness of Iran from the war and the rapidly diminishing importance of Iran as a corridor for military supplies justify this move. An alternative would be to remove allied censorship, placing censorship responsibilities in the hands of Iran, one of the United Nations.
IV Suggested International Trusteeship to Operate Iranian Railways and Free Port on Persian Gulf
The Department has given careful study to a suggestion that the Iranian railways and an Iranian port on the Persian Gulf might be [Page 345] operated under an international trusteeship.4 The purpose of the trusteeship would presumably be (a) to provide to Russia an assured economic outlet to the Persian Gulf; (b) to assist Iran economically by developing transit of goods through the country; (c) to avoid more forceful methods by Russia to gain an outlet to the Gulf; and (d) to develop international cooperation rather than rivalry in Iran.
The aims of the proposal are excellent. A properly conducted trusteeship of this kind would bring advantages to Iran and to the world. The Department regrets that there are not, in its view, any feasible means for accomplishing the results desired.
No matter how drawn up or proposed, the plan would appear to Iran, and doubtless to the world, as a thinly disguised cover for power politics and old-world imperialism. Iranians are highly suspicious of foreign influence in the country and would unquestionably resent any extension of foreign control there. The railway, built by their own strenuous efforts at a cost of some $150,000,000, without foreign borrowing, is a source of especial and intense patriotic pride. The Department’s judgment is that the trusteeship could only be imposed on Iran, a sovereign, allied nation, by force of arms.
There is little reason to believe that Soviet Russia would be interested, at least for the present, in participating in an international trusteeship in Iran in the genuine manner contemplated, particularly if it included an element of non-Russian control in northern Iran.
The British, we feel, would almost certainly raise equally strenuous objections. British policy for more than a hundred years has been pointed toward preventing any other great power, and especially Russia, from gaining a foothold on the Persian Gulf. There is no indication that this policy has been altered. If we proceed on the assumption that the continuance of the British Empire in some reasonable strength is in the strategic interest of the United States, it might be considered wise, in protection of vital British communications in this important area, to discourage such a trusteeship. The British also will probably continue to endeavor to keep the Russians away from the vital South Iranian oil fields.
The laudable ends contemplated by the proposal might be accomplished in some measure through the employment by Iran of foreign technicians to assist them in operating the railway and port. The Iranians would prefer to employ Americans or the nationals of small European countries (Sweden or Switzerland) for this purpose, if they should agree to the idea.