Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945

891.6363/1–1745

The Secretary of State to the President ¹

top secret

Washington, January 17, 1945.

Memorandum for the President

Subject: The Iranian Question

There is enclosed in accordance with your directions a suggested reply to the Prime Minister’s telegram no. 890, January 15, 1945, regarding the Iranian oil concession controversy. You will note that we in the Department feel that the subject should be discussed at the forthcoming meeting, as the Prime Minister suggests, and that the talks should be among you, Churchill and Stalin as signatories to the Declaration signed at Tehran. We do not recommend, however, that advance notice be given of an intention to discuss it, since this would give the matter undue importance.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

[Enclosure]

The Iranian Question

1. I concur fully that the Iranian question should be discussed at our next meeting and feel that it should be with Stalin as a signatory to the Declaration signed at Tehran.

2. We have not seen sufficient evidence in Iran during recent days to demonstrate conclusively that Russia intends to insist upon an oil concession now or even upon the repeal of the Iranian law which forbids concession negotiations during the war, but Russia’s continued and avowed dissatisfaction with the law arouses apprehension which should be quieted.

3. The Soviets also replied to our note² on the question with a lengthy explanation of Soviet action and a reference to the American Government’s “unsympathetic” attitude in the matter. There seems little reason to doubt, therefore, that the Soviets are fully aware of the attitude of both our Governments. I do not think it would be advisable to single out the Iranian question by giving notice in advance of an intention to discuss it since no agenda is being planned and advance reference to this question alone would tend to accord it undue importance.

I concur that a test case may well arise in this matter which may have important bearing on the Dumbarton Oaks plans for postwar collaboration. For this reason we must make every effort, firm but conciliatory, to reach a just solution.

1. A White House status sheet attached to the original of this memorandum in the Roosevelt Papers indicates that it “was taken to Yalta by the President, but not read by him until his return to U. S., when he read it at Hyde Park and sent it to file without action”.
2. The United States note is not printed as such, but see the Department’s No. 2566 to Moscow, ante, pp. 330–331. The Soviet reply, of December 28, 1944, is printed ante, pp. 334–336.