I have, of course, made plain to London that I supposed the principal
point on which the State Department had felt disturbed, had been the
fact that we had said what we had in regard to Sforza without previous
consultation with you.
The feeling of London on this would be, I think, that the thing came
up very suddenly and Noel
Charles had to express an opinion almost immediately,
having regard to the undesirability of allowing the Italians to go
on with their Cabinet making, without knowledge of how His Majesty’s
Government felt about Sforza.
I am going off to New York and will call you up and come and see you,
if I may, when I get back in two days time.
[Attachment]
top secret
Personal Message From the Prime Minister to
Lord Halifax, Dated
December 4th, 1944
“1. There is no question of His Majesty’s Government putting a
veto on the appointment of Count
Sforza to be Prime Minister or Foreign Minister
of Italian Government. What is certain however is that he will
not command the slightest trust or confidence from us, and that
the Italian Government might be thought ill-advised in making
difficulties for themselves in this matter with one of the two
Great Powers to whom Italy has unconditionally surrendered and
whose armies are still skirmishing on a large scale in their
country. We felt ourselves fully entitled to make the Italian
Government aware of our view upon this matter because we have
been accorded command in the Mediterranean, as the Americans
have command in France, and therefore we have a certain special
position and responsibility. Before Italian personalities take
their decision about the [Page 268] appointment of Count
Sforza, they ought surely to have been put in
possession of our thoughts upon such a subject.
2. The reasons why we have lost all confidence in Count Sforza arise primarily
from his letter to Mr. Berle of September 23rd 1943.1 This letter was written
at a moment when we were deprecating to the State Department his
being sent to Italy at all. We felt sure that he was only going
to make trouble with the struggling community and
administration, of whose help, though they were defeated, we had
military need. The arrival of this letter which was communicated
to us, decided His Majesty’s Government to withdraw our
objections to Count
Sforza’s repatriation. On his way to Italy,
Count Sforza lunched
with me and I took occasion to show him a copy of his letter to
Mr. Berle and asked him
to say on his honour, as a gentleman, whether these were his
sentiments or not. He gave me the most positive assurances.
Witnesses can be produced.
3. No sooner however had he returned to Italy than he began
violent and continuous intrigues against the Badoglio Government. This
Government, it may be remembered, had effected surrender to us
of the Italian fleet. So great an importance did we attach to
this surrender that, rather than divide it up with the Russians
we provided 13 ships out of 14 from the Royal Navy to satisfy
the Russian claim, the United States providing the cruiser
“Milwaukee”.
4. When the Badoglio
Government fell in the circumstances which both our great
Allies, the United States of America and U. S. S. R. have
admitted were irregular, Signor Bonomi took office under the prescribed
conditions. Count Sforza
figured as Minister for the purge, and it was under his
administration that the far from edifying incident of two hour
lynching of Donato
Carretta took place in Rome. All the time
Count Sforza has been
intriguing against Signor Bonomi, with the formation of whose Government
he had been prominently concerned. In particular he had
interfered so much with the work of the Italian Under Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, Visconti
Venosta, that the latter declined to continue in
office. The opinion of the Italian Government and of its Prime
Minister has been clearly shown by their marked wishes to have
Count Sforza’s civil
capacities win their full play at a very considerable distance
from the shores of Italy. The Count has, for some time past, been weighing
honourable employment of Ambassador to the United States against
his chance of getting something better out of a political upset
in Rome. He has played a leading part in making Signor Bonomi’s position so impossible
that he had to resign.
[Page 269]
5. In short, if I were compelled, which I should regret, to state
my objections to Count
Sforza as Prime Minister or Foreign Minister, I
should be forced to tell the House of Commons, in my own
defence, that I regard him as a man who has broken his word of
honour to me, as set forth in a document which I put to him
categorically. I should also be forced to disclose the fact that
I consider him not only a man who has broken his word but also
an intriguer and mischief-maker of the first order, and that
there was a very strong suspicion that in these evil courses
consideration for his own advancement played an important, if
not a decisive part. It should also be remembered that he, like
these other Italian Ministers who are put in as stop gaps till
the will of the Italian people can be expressed, has absolutely
no popular mandatory or democratic authority of any sort or
kind, and that this would have to be pointed out too. These
would certainly not prove favourable auspices for his future
relationships with His Majesty’s Government.
6. Finally, you should remind our friends, as I shall, if
necessary, remind the President, of the great trouble I have
taken personally to secure mitigations of Italy’s position. At
Quebec I laid before the President a series of proposals, all of
which have been carried out and some improved upon, for easing
the Italian situation, especially before the Presidential
elections. I consider therefore that I am entitled to expect
considerate treatment from the State Department.”
