740.0011 EW/1–2745: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State
Patterson telegraphed yesterday that Ambassador Stevenson, at Eden’s request, was pressing him to obtain instructions “to say something helpful” to King Peter to persuade him to approve the Tito-Subasic agreement. At noon the British Embassy here handed us a memorandum reporting that Stalin would like to see the agreement come into force at once with recognition by the three principal Allies with “no reservations of any kind” and asking us to send immediate instructions to Patterson which might be helpful in deciding King Peter “to play his part”. Later in the afternoon Halifax telephoned to me about it and in the evening Winant telegraphed that Cadogan at Eden’s request had called to say that they both very much hoped we would join the British and Soviet Governments in recognition of the united Yugoslav Government and that they were troubled by our suggestion in our aide-mémoire of January 231 of provisional representation at Belgrade. Cadogan said he felt that the possibility of a rift between the United States on the one hand and. the British and Soviet Governments on the other was an influence in King Peter’s holding out against the agreement.
We telegraphed to Patterson that since in accordance with our instructions he had seen to it that both King Peter and Dr. Subasic now have a clear understanding of our attitude and intentions it is neither necessary nor desirable that Patterson should take the responsibility of trying further to influence decisions on major Yugoslav political questions now in discussion between the King and the Yugoslav Government.
In my telegram to Winant, the content of which I telephoned to Halifax, I said that I felt we had gone a long way in our aide-mémoire to the British to meet the position which they had taken with respect to the new governmental authority in Yugoslavia, and that our position had the President’s approval. I continued “In the light of the President’s message to Congress it would be difficult for us to foreclose our position with respect to the expected developments in Yugoslavia by a commitment at this time which might be at variance with the declared policy of this Government toward liberated countries in general. The President’s message has had warm public approval here and I do not believe the American public would support our going out in advance of the developments before we know what the circumstances are. It does not seem to me that there is any possibility of interpreting our action as a rift between us and the British and Soviet Governments, as we have stated our willingness to send our diplomatic [Page 262] mission to Belgrade on the assumption that the agreement between Tito and Subasic would be carried out and Ambassador Patterson has received orders to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Belgrade upon the transfer of the Government to Yugoslavia. Both King Peter and Dr. Subasic have been informed in clear terms of our intentions along the foregoing lines”.