Executive Secretariat Files
Briefing Book Paper
Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland
Summary
With regard to Poland, we should continue to maintain our announced policy which has for its objective the eventual establishment by the Polish people of a truly democratic government of their own choice. In the attainment of this end, we should endeavor to prevent any interim regime from being established which would exclude any major element of the population and threaten to crystallize into a permanent government before the will of the population could become manifest. In pursuance of this policy, we should not recognize the Provisional Government of Lublin, at least until more conclusive evidence is received that it does in fact represent the basic wishes of the Polish people. With the same objective in view, we should use our full influence to see that the Polish Peasant Party, the largest in the country, and its leader, Mikolajczyk, are given an opportunity to take a leading role in any interim arrangements which may be made pending full liberation and free elections. In order that the eventual elections may achieve the objective we seek, we should sponsor United Nations arrangements for their supervision.
With respect to the Polish frontier, we should use our influence to obtain a solution of this problem which would minimize future points of friction, possible Irredentism and the number of minority groups which would have to be transferred as a part of the settlement in order that the solution would contribute to the fullest possible extent to the peace and future tranquility of Europe. In pursuance of this objective, we should support a frontier settlement which in the east would take the Curzon Line as a basis but would, if possible, include the Province of Lwów in Poland in order that this predominantly Polish city and the economically important oil fields to the southwest would remain within the frontiers of the Polish state. In the north, Poland should receive the bulk of East Prussia and, in the west, the only changes in the 1939 frontier we should support should be the inclusion of a small strip of Pomerania west of the so-called Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia. We should resist the exaggerated claims now being advanced by the Provisional Government of Lublin for “compensation” from Germany which would include the cities of Stettin and Breslau in Poland and make necessary the transfer of from eight to ten million Germans. In connection with the frontier settlement, we should, in so far as practicable and in collaboration with the other United Nations, be prepared to assist in the orderly transfer of minority groups provided the Polish Government so desires.
[Page 231]Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland
It is not known how representative of the basic desires of the Polish people the present Polish cabinet in London may be, or how representative a new cabinet which Mikolajczyk might form would be. On the other hand, much evidence has been received indicating that the so-called provisional government at Lublin is having considerable difficulty establishing itself and gaining real prestige in the liberated areas in Poland. It would appear that what prestige it may have is based, to a considerable extent, on that of the Red Army and the NKVD, the Soviet secret police.
Given the fact that less than half of Poland has already been liberated, and that consequently the majority of Poles are not in a position to express an opinion, it would be against our announced policies to recognize the provisional government of Lublin at least until more conclusive evidence is received that it does in fact represent the basic wishes of the Polish people.
Because of the activities of diverse groups, interim regimes of various sorts are springing up in liberated countries. These regimes may well crystallize into permanent governments through the power they may wield during the period of bewilderment after liberation. It would appear highly desirable, therefore, if the influence of the United States is to be felt and if the types of truly democratic governments the American people hope to see established in Europe are to be set up, for the United States Government now to take an active part in seeing that in each liberated country liberal democratic groups are given a full opportunity to participate in the activities of their interim regimes. If we do not use our influence to this end, it may not be possible later to establish permanent democratic regimes based on the four freedoms.
It is for this reason that in regard to Poland we should use our influence in an effort to see that the Polish Peasant Party, the largest in the country, and its head, Mikolajczyk, are given an opportunity to take a leading role in any interim arrangements which may be made pending the full liberation of the country and the election of a truly representative government.
Moreover, in order to assure, in conformity with our announced policies, that the Polish people shall be permitted eventually to express their preference as to the permanent government they desire and in actual fact regulate their own internal affairs, we should continue during the interim period to exert our influence to assure that the Polish people have the full possibility at a later date freely to express their will in the choice of their government and that they have the right to establish a truly democratic government which would foster and maintain freedom of expression, freedom of the press and information, [Page 232] and personal liberty. In order to assist in the attainment of this end, we should sponsor United Nations arrangements for this supervision of elections in liberated countries.
Frontier Question
Although the frontier question has figured prominently in the discussion of the Polish-Soviet dispute, it is felt that this matter is definitely secondary to the major problem, the establishment of a viable and truly independent Polish Government.
In this regard it is felt that the United States Government should use its influence to obtain a solution of this problem which would minimize future points of friction, possible Irredentism and minimize the number of minority groups which would have to be transferred as part of the settlement in order that the solution would contribute to the fullest possible extent to the peace and future tranquility of Europe.
The provisional government of Lublin and its predecessors including the Moscow-sponsored Union of Polish Patriots have for more than a year and a half been steadily increasing their demands for “compensation” for Poland from Germany. While the motivation for these increased demands is not clear, it is possible that the following factors may have figured in making these increased demands:
- 1.
- By including a large section of German territory in Poland and the probable transfer of some eight to ten million Germans, the future Polish state would in all probability be forced to depend completely on Moscow for protection against German Irredentists’ demands and in fact might become a full-fledged Soviet satellite.
- 2.
- If it should not prove possible to establish a world security organization and the Soviet Union should thus be forced to rely on its own resources for its security, the advantages are obvious of having the Polish frontier as far West as possible, particularly if the future Polish Government should be more or less under the domination of Moscow.
- 3.
- By giving the future Polish state maximum compensation in the West, it may be the hope of the Soviet authorities that the Polish people would more willingly accept the loss of forty-two percent of former Polish territory in the East.
While it appears that the Soviet Government is now sponsoring
“compensation” for Poland from Germany, up to the so-called
Oder–Neisse River Line (line (a) on attached
map1) which would
include the cities of Stettin and Breslau in Poland and make it
necessary to transfer from eight to ten million Germans from these
areas, and while the British Government may not object to
“compensation” for Poland up to the Oder Line (line ( b) on attached map), the United States
Government should use its influence to obtain the less radical
solution outlined below which it is felt would, from a long range
point
[Page []]
[Page [Map 2]]
[Page 233] of view, contribute
materially to the future peace and tranquillity of Europe. Moreover,
the suggested solution would in all probability be much more
acceptable to world opinion and increase the prospects of American
acceptance of membership in a world security organization, the
existence of which would not be jeopardized from the start by having
to back up possible untenable settlements such as that suggested by
the Lublin group.
It is believed, therefore, that every effort should be made to persuade the British Government and, if necessary, the Polish Government to stand for a frontier settlement along the following lines in order that efforts could be made to persuade the Soviet Government to accept this solution.
In regard to the Eastern frontier, efforts should be made to effect a solution with the Curzon Line as a basis but including the province of Lwów in Poland in order that that predominantly Polish city and the economically important oil fields to the southwest would remain within the frontiers of the Polish state. In the North, Poland should receive the bulk of East Prussia and in the West, the only rectification of the 1939 frontier should be to include in Poland a small strip of Pomerania west of the so-called Polish Corridor in order to eliminate the German salient in this area and Upper Silesia which is predominantly Polish in population and is particularly important from an industrial point of view.
While this solution would reduce considerably the size of Poland compared to its prewar frontiers, it would include only areas which are predominantly Polish, would make for a viable Polish state from an economic point of view and would reduce to a minimum the problems of the transfer of populations (these boundaries are indicated on the attached map).
In regard to the British attitude on this question, Mr. Churchill has already indicated that he would not oppose the suggested Soviet solution in the East with Lwów and the oil fields included in the Soviet Union rather than in Poland and has indicated that he favors compensation for Poland in the West. While he did not define exactly the extent of compensation Poland should receive from Germany, he stated in Parliament on December 15 that the new Poland would stretch broadly along the Baltic on a front of two hundred miles.2 This statement would indicate that the British Government’s plan for compensation from Germany would correspond roughly with Line (c) on the attached map (which approximates the suggested American solution outlined above).
[Page 234]Before discussing the proposal for a frontier solution with the Soviet authorities, it might be well to make an effort to obtain tentative concurrence with the British on this proposed solution.
If our full efforts determined to attain this solution fail, we should then concentrate on obtaining a solution of the Polish frontier which would minimize the possibility of Irredentism and population transfers and should resist any proposals for a solution based on either the Oder or the Oder-Neisse Line (line (b) and (a) on the attached map).
In connection with any final frontier settlement agreed upon, we should in so far as practicable and in collaboration with the other United Nations be prepared to assist in the orderly transfer of minority groups provided the Polish Government so desires.
Reconstruction
In order to implement our efforts to establish a truly free democratic Polish state, we should be prepared, subject to legislative authority, to assist through credits or otherwise in the reconstruction of the country. As a corollary to this we should insist upon the establishment of a policy of equal opportunity for private American firms to carry on business activities in Poland.