Matthews Files

The Secretary of State to the President
secret

Memorandum for the President

The Cabinet Committee has not been able to agree upon a statement of American policy for the post-war treatment of Germany. The memorandum presented by the Secretary of the Treasury2 is decidedly at variance with the views developed in the State Department. In the meantime, I have received your memorandum of September 15,2 with the statements of views respecting the Ruhr, Saar, etc., and the conversion of Germany into an agricultural and pastoral country, which was formulated at Quebec. This memorandum seems to reflect largely the opinions of the Secretary of the Treasury in the treatment to be accorded Germany. I feel that I should therefore submit to you the line of thought that has been developing in the State Department on this matter.

1. Status of Negotiations With the British and Russians

The instrument of unconditional surrender of Germany3 has been recommended by the European Advisory Commission and has been formally approved by this Government. It is anticipated that British and Russian approval will be forthcoming. The question of the American and British zones of occupation was, according to your memorandum, worked out at Quebec and there will presumably be no more difficulty over this matter. In the meantime, the European Advisory Commission is going ahead on plans for a tripartite control machinery and military government for Germany during the occupation period. All three governments have submitted proposals which are similar in their general outline. The American proposal contemplates a Supreme Authority consisting of the three Commanding Generals of the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R., which would coordinate Allied control of Germany and supervise such centralized governmental functions and economic activities as the three powers deem essential. A Control Council, composed of representatives in equal numbers from each of the three Allied Governments, would be established by the Supreme Allied Authority and will coordinate the administration of military government throughout Germany, including detailed planning for the execution of directives received from the three governments. We expect to have a recommended plan on this from the European Advisory Commission in the near future.

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2. Important Problems For Which High Policy Decisions Must Be Worked Out by the Three Governments

The fundamental question to be decided is what kind of a Germany we want and what policy should be put into effect during occupation to attain our objectives. The most important of these problems are set forth below with an explanation of the State Department’s views. It should be emphasized, however, that these objectives will have to be worked out with our principal Allies if they are to be applied throughout the German Reich.

(a) Demilitarization of Germany. The complete dissolution of all German armed forces and all Nazi military, para-military and police organizations, and the destruction or scrapping of all arms, ammunition and implements of war should be effected. Further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war should be prohibited.

(b) Dissolution of the Nazi party and all affiliated organizations. The Nazi Party should be immediately dissolved. Large groups of particularly objectionable elements, especially the SS and the Gestapo, should be arrested and interned and war criminals should be tried and, if found guilty, executed. Active party members should be excluded from political or civil activity and subject to a number of restrictions. All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion should be annulled.

(c) Extensive controls should be maintained over communications, press and propaganda for the purpose of eliminating Nazi doctrines or similar teachings.

(d) Extensive controls over German educational system should be established for the purpose of eliminating all Nazi influence and propaganda.

(e) No decision should be taken on the possible partition of Germany (as distinguished from territorial amputations) until we see what the internal situation is and what is the attitude of our principal Allies on this question. We should encourage a decentralization of the German governmental structure and if any tendencies toward spontaneous partition of Germany arise they should not be discouraged.

(f) Economic Objectives. The primary and continuing objectives of our economic policy are: (1) to render Germany incapable of waging war, (2) to eliminate permanently German economic domination of Europe A shorter term objective is to require the performance by Germany of acts of restitution and reparation for injuries done to the United Nations.

To achieve the first two objectives, it will be essential (1) to destroy all factories incapable of conversion to peaceful purposes and to prevent their reconstruction, (2) to enforce the conversion of all other plants, (3) to eliminate self-sufficiency by imposing reforms that will [Page 158] make Germany dependent upon world markets, (4) to establish controls over foreign trade and key industries for the purpose of preventing German rearmament, and (5) to eliminate the position of power of large industrialists and land-owners.

This Government has little direct interest in obtaining reparations from Germany and no interest in building up German economy in order to collect continuing reparations. However, the U. S. S. R. and a number of other states which have been victims of German destruction and exploitation may press claims for German production and labor service for rehabilitation and construction.

Extensive controls over industry and foreign trade will be essential during the immediate period of demilitarization and dismantlement, as well as during the period of reparations. After this phase, a system of control and supervision of German industry and trade will have to be worked out in the light of world security developments. This system should be of such a character that the victor powers will be able and willing to enforce it over a considerable period.

It is of the highest importance that the standard of living of the German people in the early years be such as to bring home to them that they have lost the war and to impress on them that they must abandon all their pretentious theories that they are a superior race created to govern the world. Through lack of luxuries we may teach them that war does not pay.

  1. The copy indicates that the memorandum was drafted on September 29, 1944. It was presented to the President on October 1, 1944. (See post, p. 161.)
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Ante, pp. 113118.