740.0011EW/9–2044
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)2
Memorandum
The Secretary had a meeting in his office this morning attended by Secretary Morgenthau and Secretary Stimson. The Secretary of the Treasury gave an account of what took place at Quebec while he was present.3 Mr. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. White of the Treasury, and I were also present.
Secretary Morgenthau said that the question of the economic treatment of Germany came up at dinner on Wednesday night, September 13th, and Prime Minister Churchill was violently opposed to the policy eventually set forth in the President’s memorandum to the Secretary of State.4 He quoted Mr. Churchill as inquiring with annoyance whether he had been brought over to Quebec to discuss such a scheme as that and as stating that it would mean “England would be chained to a dead body” (Germany). Secretary Morgenthau turned to Secretary Stimson and said: “He was even more angry than you Harry”. The discussion broke up apparently with the suggestion that Mr. Morgenthau (and apparently Mr. White) should discuss the question with Lord Cherwell, which they apparently did on the basis of the Treasury’s memorandum.5 Having convinced Lord Cherwell, the latter discussed the question again with the Prime Minister. The proposal apparently appealed to the Prime Minister on the basis that Great Britain would thus acquire a lot of Germany’s iron and steel markets and eliminate a dangerous competitor. In any event, he came around completely and proved to be an advocate of the Treasury [Page 135] policy. Mr. Morgenthau said that several attempts were made to write up the understanding, none of which pleased Mr. Churchill. At Mr. Morgenthau’s suggestion, the Prime Minister thereupon called in his secretary and dictated his understanding of what had been agreed. The result is the document quoted in the President’s memorandum to the Secretary of State, dated September 15th. Mr. Morgenthau insisted that this was entirely the Prime Minister’s drafting.
In reply to a question from Secretary Stimson, Mr. Morgenthau denied that there was any connection between the Prime Minister’s acceptance of the German policy embodied in the memorandum and his eager desire to obtain a commitment on Lend-Lease in Phase 2. Mr. Morgenthau admitted, however, that the latter was clearly the Prime Minister’s principal objective (in the non military field) at Quebec and that his interest in the Far Eastern campaign was to a great extent motivated by Lend-Lease.
The next day Mr. Eden arrived and, said Mr. Morgenthau, was very much upset at the decision taken on the economic treatment of Germany. He had quite a heated discussion with the Prime Minister and the latter instructed Mr. Eden not to take it up in the War Cabinet until he (Churchill) returned; that he was bent on pushing it through. Mr. Morgenthau seemed surprised at Mr. Eden’s opposition as he had gained the opposite impression in his conversation with the Foreign Secretary in London a short time ago.
Mr. Morgenthau said that there was no discussion whatsoever in his presence of the partition of Germany or of German territorial amputations.
On Lend-Lease Mr. Morgenthau said that he found the President was prepared to accept the Prime Minister’s thesis without question, but he (Mr. Morgenthau) had insisted that a committee be set up to work it out. Neither Mr. Morgenthau nor Mr. White seemed to feel that the committee would be any too effective in the long run in obtaining British cooperation in the field of commercial policy and other economic questions, but they felt that at least it gave us a foot in the door. In answer to my specific question, Mr. Morgenthau said that the President at no time raised any question as to what policy the British should pursue in return for our Lend-Lease assistance.
The Secretary expressed his shocked feelings at the way such vital matters were settled without any consultation with our Government experts or regard for what has gone before.
- Carbon copy.↩
- For information on the Quebec Conference of September 11–16, 1944, and the so-called “Morgenthau Plan”, see the forthcoming volume in this series; also Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 244–245; New York Times, September 17, 1944; The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. i, pp. 207–208, vol. ii, pp. 1602–1622, 1701; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947), pp. 568–583; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany Is Our Problem (New York, 1945); Henry Morgenthau, Jr., “Our Policy Toward Germany”, New York Post, November 24–29, 1947; Sherwood, pp. 813–819; Leahy, pp. 259–266; Churchill, pp. 146–161.↩
- The President’s memorandum of September 15, 1944, quoted the text of the so-called “Morgenthau Plan”, which had been approved by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Second Quebec Conference.↩
- Not printed.↩