Roosevelt Papers
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President
Dear Mr. President: At a conference called by Mr. Eden at the Foreign Office nearly three years ago, to which he invited Maisky and myself, the idea of a coordinated policy of the three great Powers in relation to Europe was discussed. At that meeting Maisky stated that there were two ways of approaching the European problem. One was to agree that all questions affecting Eastern Europe and within the area of Russian military action could be the primary consideration of his country and that problems affecting Western Europe within an area of future Anglo-American military control could be a responsibility of Great Britain and the United States, or (two) that the three nations should work together to destroy Fascist and Nazi domination and to restore and rehabilitate Europe to conditions of peace. Maisky went on to say that his Government supported the concept of tripartite action.
I believe it was in part as a result of these informal conversations that the idea of the Moscow Conference emerged. One of the results of that Conference was the establishment of the European Advisory Commission. It was while we were at Teheran, fourteen months ago, that you made me a member of that Commission. The Russians were not members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the creation of the European Advisory Commission gave them representation on a continuing body to study and recommend joint policies for the treatment of Germany and Austria and of the satellite states.
Each of the three countries appointed Advisers to their respective representatives from their State Departments and from the three branches of their armed services—Army, Navy and Air. The responsibility for appointment of the Advisers rested on the respective services. The conclusions and recommendations reached by the Commission have been by unanimous agreement and with the concurrence of the Advisers.
When I returned to London to take up my duties on the Commission, I understood from you that there was agreement at Teheran on the basic principle of unconditional surrender, and that you supported the principle of tripartite responsibility following unconditional surrender. You also told me that you wished United States troops to occupy the northwestern zone in Germany following unconditional surrender. These directions which you gave me as guidance I followed without compromise. Holding to your instruction to insist on the northwestern zone was responsible for delay in reaching agreement on zones of occupation.
[Page 131]By last November 14 three basic agreements had been reached in the European Advisory Commission: the Unconditional Surrender Instrument, the Control Machinery for Germany, and the Protocol on Zones of Occupation.1 The Control Machinery Agreement and the Protocol on Zones also provide for the assignment of areas for occupation in Greater Berlin and for tripartite control of the administration of Berlin. Each and all of these Agreements contains a larger share of the United States’ position than of those advanced by the British or the Russians.
All three Governments have agreed on the Unconditional Surrender Instrument. The United States Government and the United Kingdom have agreed on the Control Machinery. U. S. approval of the Protocol on Zones in Germany and Areas in Berlin has been waiting until the British conceded the control of Bremen and Bremerhaven and of rail, road and canal facilities for our use in supplying our troops in the southern zone. I understand that the British and U. S. Chiefs of Staff have now reached agreement on these facilities.2 It is my hope that you and the Prime Minister, or the two Secretaries of State, will get Russian governmental confirmation of the two Agreements on Zones and on Control Machinery.
Other matters that are before the European Advisory Commission I hope I will have an opportunity to discuss with you after your meeting at Argonaut . Harry Hopkins told me, while in London, that you were arranging for my meeting you before your return to the United States.
Control machinery was worked out within the Commission with the understanding that in the first phase of occupation after unconditional surrender there would be military control in Germany. It was understood that the commanding general of each of the three forces would both serve as a member of the Control Council and be in command of his own zone with, of course, authority to delegate such powers as he saw fit. If the French, who have been admitted to the European Commission, are to sign the Unconditional Surrender Instrument and be admitted to the Control Council and be given a zone of occupation, you would then have quadripartite instead of tripartite participation. The British have conceded this; neither the Russian representative nor myself has as yet been authorized to state a position on the French proposal.
The theory on which we have proceeded is that broad overall policies in matters affecting Germany as a whole would be arrived at by agreement between the participating Powers, either in the form of general orders or directives, and that the residue of powers would [Page 132] remain with the commanders in the zones. These general authorities affecting Germany as a whole would be agreed between the Governments in broad terms, leaving all detailing to the Control Council. The necessity for governmental agreement is due to the fact that neither the Russians nor the British are willing to delegate political authority to generals in the field. You can do this because you are not only the Chief of State but also, under the Constitution, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. Stalin might do so but does not choose to do so. An illustration of this is the authority given by him to Vyshinsky in supervising the execution of the armistice terms in Rumania. This fact has also been made very clear to me by Gousev in the European Advisory Commission.
The converse of this is that agreements by the generals, even in the Control Council, would be subject to interference by the Governments. It is true, the generals could ask for governmental agreement, but our experience in dealing with the Russians has shown that it is easier to get agreement prior to occupation than after occupation.
If the position stated by the British and Russian Governments in the European Advisory Commission is in any way a criterion of the position of their respective Governments, they mean to force the central German government agencies, after stripping them of Nazi political leadership, to carry out their will in Germany. The question of an orderly decentralization of political Germany can come later. Both the Russian and British concept is to prevent disorder and disease, for the protection of Allied occupying forces, by making full use of German administrative functionaries. This has nothing to do with a “hard” or “soft” policy that may be adopted toward Germany.
The suggestion in the overall Civil Affairs Directive . . .,3 which has just been sent to me, runs counter to this concept, and, as far as I can understand it, sets up an economic control within each of the three or four separate military zones without taking account of the existing nationalized transport system and without prior provision for common utilization of the food surpluses, most of which will be in the Russian zone, and of coal, all of which will be in the British and Russian zones. These are only examples of problems that must be faced.
There are two other considerations that I believe should not be lost sight of. One, that contradictory basic regulations in the separate zones are likely to lead to serious friction between the Allied forces of occupation and would encourage the Germans to try to play one Ally against another. Two, since we have insisted in the Surrender Instrument that the signatory Powers are “acting in the interests of the United Nations”, we have taken on a trustee obligation to other [Page 133] European United Nations which we will fail to discharge unless we get agreement, for example, on freezing of property until equitable arrangements can be made to protect the rights of our other Allies to restitution and reparation.
I hope I may have an opportunity to discuss these problems with you when we meet.
Sincerely,