Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

178. Minutes of the 11th Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board⁰

Washington, November 26, 1946, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
• Members Present
• Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
• Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
• Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
• Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff–2
• Also Present
• Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff–2
• Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
• Mr. George R. Fearing, Department of State
• Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
• Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
• Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
• Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
• Secretariat
• Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
• Mr. J. S. Earman, Assistant Secretary, N.I.A.

1. Coordination of Collection Activities (C.I.G. 18/2)¹

General Vandenberg gave a brief description of the contents of C.I.G. 18/2. He also stated that at this time he would like to make it a matter of record in the minutes that certain collection activities assigned to the Central Intelligence Group, namely, those covered by Special Operations, F.B.I.S. and information gained from business concerns and individuals who have traveled abroad, would not be governed by this paper.

General Chamberlin stated that this was the finest piece of work turned out so far and that as suggested by General Vandenberg we should get away from detail. General Chamberlin felt, however, that the paper should assign fields of primary responsibility for all activities, rather than being confined only to coordination of collection. He believed that the general assignment of responsibilities contained in paragraph 2 a of the proposed C.I.G. Directive should be taken out and made into a N.I.A. Directive.

Mr. Lay explained that the preparation of a S.I.D. on the U.S.S.R. is in fact now an inter-agency operation under C.I.G. coordination.

General Chamberlin suggested that the word “area” in paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive be changed to “country.”

Mr. Edgar explained that the word “area” was used since it was not at all impossible that certain countries by name would not be covered, hence the responsibility for coverage would necessarily have to be given to the coordinator covering that area in which such countries might be located.

General Chamberlin said that we must realize that Ambassadors are political officers sent out without intelligence training. He therefore felt that we should define certain broad principles by which the Ambassadors should be guided.

Admiral Inglis stated that this was a fine paper. He said, however, that he had not had time enough to study the paper as thoroughly as he wished, but would agree to it in its broad principles.

General Vandenberg then asked Admiral Inglis if it could be approved for use as a guide.

Admiral Inglis answered that he would like to request another week to study this paper and suggested that an ad hoc committee be appointed to consider the paper further, in view of the fact that he had some changes to recommend.

General Vandenberg stated that he felt that there should be no further delay and that those parts of the paper that were highly controversial could be taken out and resubmitted at a later date for further consideration.

Mr. Eddy agreed with General Vandenberg’s suggestion and stated that he was in agreement that an ad hoc committee be appointed. He further stated that ICAPS had prepared a very fine paper. Mr. Eddy said that the collection of intelligence in the field presented a separate problem from that of the over-all policies governing coordination of intelligence activities. Mr. Eddy went on to say that the intelligence scene in Washington differed from that in the field in view of possible reduction in one Department and increases in others.

General Chamberlin stated that he believed the assignment of basic responsibilities should be the same for Washington as the field.

Mr. Eddy stated that he did not quite agree with this and that he felt that there should be an over-all policies and objectives directive and a separate collection directive for the field.

Admiral Inglis stated that he believed that there should first be an N.I.A. Directive on collection policies.

Mr. Eddy suggested that General Chamberlin’s over-all written suggestions,² which were previously passed to the I.A.B. members, be turned over to ICAPS for consideration and that we go ahead on the collection direction.

General Chamberlin stated that he felt that the broad principles of the paper should cover all contingencies.

Mr. Eddy stated that he felt that the collection directive should be separate.

General Chamberlin stated that he felt that the first place to tackle this problem was on the evaluation level here in Washington rather than in the field.

Mr. Eddy stated that he believed that collection in the field could be covered separately, particularly since there may be changes in Washington which in a great many instances would not affect the collection activities in the field.

Admiral Inglis suggested that the collection problem be considered now and the over-all problem be considered at a later date.

General Chamberlin stated that he was ready to vote on both problems, taking into consideration his suggestions.

Admiral Inglis stated that he could not go along with General Chamberlin’s suggestion since he felt that Navy had not had enough time to study the problem. He suggested that an ad hoc committee be appointed to work on C.I.G. 18/2 and that ICAPS undertake another study on the ultimate responsibilities of the production of intelligence.

General Chamberlin agreed to go along on getting out the collection directive if agreement could not be reached on the whole problem.

Mr. Edgar stated that he hoped that S.I.D. would not be turned over all at once, in order to give C.I.G. a chance to build up a staff, since he did not feel it would be right to begin recruiting a staff at the present time, and have them sit around until June with nothing to do.

General Chamberlin stated that as they completed a chapter it would be turned over to C.I.G.

After further discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. Agreed to have ICAPS reconsider C.I.G. 18/2 in the light of General Chamberlin’s written suggestions and the general discussion in the meeting.³

b. Agreed that ICAPS prepare a companion document covering the coordination of the production and dissemination of intelligence.⁴

c. Agreed that an I.A.B. ad hoc committee composed of Colonel Fearing, Colonel Ennis, General Samford and Captain Davis will review the revision of C.I.G. 18/2 and subsequently the directive which will be prepared by ICAPS for the coordination of the production and dissemination of intelligence.

d. Agreed that the revision of C.I.G. 18/2 be submitted to the I.A.B. and that the directive for the coordination of the production and dissemination of intelligence be submitted when prepared to the I.A.B.

2. Production of Political-Psychological Study on U.S.S.R. (C.I.G. 20)⁵

General Vandenberg briefly explained the recommendations contained in this paper. He stated that there appeared to be two courses of action open:

a. A specialist or specialists in this particular field could be contracted to prepare such a study which would be disseminated as intelligence information, the contents of which would be the views of the individuals preparing the study, only.

b. A specialist or specialists in this particular field could be contracted to prepare such a study under C.I.G. (ORE) guidance. An ORE evaluation would be placed on the study prior to dissemination.

He further stated that C.I.G. preferred course a.

Admiral Inglis stated that he did not quite understand what was meant.

General Vandenberg explained that the study would be prepared and presented to the interested agencies over the signature of the person preparing the study and that there would be no evaluation whatsoever by C.I.G. The study in short would be presented for “what it was worth.” He also stated that this study then could be used as a basis on which the agencies could expand their own thoughts on what was presented.

Mr. Eddy thought it might be better to have a group work on this study.

Admiral Inglis stated that at the present time he felt that there were only a limited number of people who could prepare such a study, and furthermore that such a study, if prepared by Dr. Ladislas Farago, would be what he thought and not a result of his being given access to the files of the agencies. He particularly pointed out that Dr. Farago was a Hungarian by birth and great care should be exercised relative to the classified material given to him in the event he was selected to make a study.

General Vandenberg felt that for the timely completion of the study it would be better to have one person prepare it.

Mr. Eddy suggested that possibly one man could be found to go along with whoever might be selected to make the study.

General Vandenberg agreed and asked Mr. Eddy if he could find some one.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. Approved the recommendations in C.I.G. 20 pending the securing of a person and possibly an assistant to conduct this study.

3. Exploitation of Enemy Document Repositories (C.I.G. 21)⁶

General Vandenberg briefly outlined the recommendations contained in C.I.G. 21 and stated that in view of the fact that the priority on such a plan is questionable and that C.I.G. is not prepared to undertake this program it be held in abeyance until the document situation is sufficiently clarified for constructive C.I.G. recommendations.

Admiral Inglis stated that this was just the reason why he had made the recommendations contained in this paper at the present time since he was afraid that the documents might soon be lost.

General Vandenberg replied that C.I.G. is at the present time awaiting a reply from the Navy relative to the transfer of the Washington Document Center to C.I.G.

Admiral Inglis stated that he thought that this reply had been made and that he would take action to see why C.I.G. had not received an answer from the Navy.

General McDonald stated that there were a lot of documents still in Berlin and that he believed that microfilms of the documents were presently in this country.

General Chamberlin stated that he felt that quite a few of these documents in Berlin were still there in view of the War Crimes Trials.

Admiral Inglis stated that there are literally, not carloads nor tons, but shiploads of captured enemy documents.

General Chamberlin stated that he was well aware of this fact and that in view of his personnel situation he could only contribute a limited amount of help.

General Vandenberg suggested that a committee be appointed to look into all the problems involving the present document situation.

General McDonald stated that a representative of the Library of Congress had looked through some of the captured documents in the possession of the Air Forces.

General Vandenberg suggested that it might be well to appoint an inter-agency group to look over the problems arising from this paper.

General McDonald felt that it was dangerous to delay too long in considering the document question.

General Vandenberg asked Admiral Inglis whether he felt we should wait or appoint a committee to consider the problems which had arisen from this discussion.

Admiral Inglis stated that he felt that we should appoint a committee and go ahead.

General Vandenberg questioned whether it would be well to have a representative of the Library of Congress as a member of this committee.

Admiral Inglis stated we should be very careful about the person selected from the Library of Congress and that we should make certain that the selectee was secure.

General Vandenberg stated that C.I.G. would select an individual from the Library of Congress who would be agreeable to all agencies and that we should make certain that he had been cleared before being put to work.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. Agreed to appoint a committee consisting of Mr. Kilgour, State Department, Colonel St. Clair, G–2, Colonel Robert Taylor, A–2, Captain Murphy, Navy, and a representative from the Library of Congress to consider the document situation.

b. Agreed to let C.I.G. 21 go over until a report had been received from the above-appointed committee.⁷

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–281. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held at the New War Department Building.
1. CIG 18/2, November 21, was a report of CIG’s Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, submitted for IAB approval, which delineated responsibilities for the collection of foreign intelligence information. It allocated collection of political, cultural, sociological, economic, and “international” information to the Department of State; military information to the War Department; naval information to the Navy Department; and scientific information to “each agency in accordance with its respective interests.” (Ibid., HS/HC–276) See the Supplement. The subject had been put on the IAB agenda at the request of the Department of State, which had proposed a “basic delineation of responsibilities” in the collection field. See CIG 18, October 25, and the enclosed October 18 memorandum from Eddy to Vandenberg in the Supplement. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276)
2. Not found.
3. See Documents 179 and 181.
4. See Document 318 and footnote references thereto.
5. CIG 20, November 21, was a proposal by the Chief of Naval Intelligence for a “comprehensive political-psychological study” on the USSR. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.
6. In CIG 21, November 21, the Chief of Naval Intelligence recommended that CIG “arrange for and coordinate the search of all repositories of captured enemy documents for the purpose of extracting, cataloging and abstracting all documents relating to political-social-psychological warfare.” (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.
7. The Committee’s report is in CIG 21/1, April 10, 1947. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.