711.93/560
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent)49 to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)
Mr. Stettinius: In response to a request from your office, the following are my comments for your use in connection with Ambassador Wei Tao-ming’s call tomorrow.
Wei has obviously returned from his three months’ visit in Chungking “loaded” to fire a broadside at the American “misconception” of the Chinese Communists’ role in China. He has, none too adroitly, been severely critical of the Communists in conversations with the Secretary, the Vice President,50 Lauchlin Currie,51 Owen Lattimore (O.W.I.),52 and, probably most fulsomely, with me. [Page 73] There is attached a memorandum of my conversation with him.53 I have marked several passages of special pertinence. There is also attached another memorandum of conversation54 which may interest you in connection with Wei’s call.
Wei will probably speak of China’s dire plight economically and militarily—of her urgent need of assistance.
With regard to economic assistance, we have, as you probably recall, been loath to accede to Chinese requests for further credits which could not now be translated into material assistance, but we are prepared, as soon as transportation facilities permit, to render all practical material assistance to China. In the meantime, we hope and expect that China will be able to hold together its seriously strained economic structure.
With regard to military assistance, we are of course giving as much aid as possible to China through Lend-Lease and through direct participation, mostly in the air, in China’s fight against Japan. This type of assistance and cooperation will also be increased when logistics make it possible.
We do not view the present fighting in Honan Province as being as critical as reports of the Chinese Central News Agency at Chungking would indicate; nor do we share the alarm of some of our own columnists and commentators. Reports from our military people in China support our view. The Japanese may open railway connections between Peiping and Hankow but we doubt that they will endeavor to extend their control over the railway from Hankow to Canton. It is difficult to assess the strategic value of the Honan campaign or an opening of the railway from Peiping to Hankow to the Japanese. Our American air and other forces in southwest China would not be directly affected, and while the Chinese strategic position in the area directly affected would of course suffer it is not clear that the over-all Chinese strategic position would be drastically affected.
Wei will undoubtedly also want to hear from you as much as you are willing to tell him of your visit in London.
Since writing the foregoing I have had a chance to talk to a competent Chinese economist (an old friend) who has just returned from a three months’ visit in China. He confirms my view with regard to the economic situation in China, indicating the belief that China can weather the storm, due primarily to its predominant agricultural structure. J. C. V.