761.93/8–1544: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

1406. At social gathering evening August 14 Colonel Roschin, Soviet Military Attaché who leaves shortly for Moscow for consultation and who is friendly, intelligent and unusually frank, engaged the Counselor in conversation, said there had been no improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and spoke harshly of responsible Kmt leaders. As regards reported desire of Generalissimo to send Soong to Moscow on special mission (paragraph 3 our 1301, July 2766) he said Chinese Government had adopted devious and childish method of making proposal; Foreign Office had sent to him a “very small man” who asked his personal opinion whether it would be useful for a Chinese official to go to Moscow, perhaps one “as high as” a Government Minister. Roschin had subsequently sent a “military” telegram to Moscow and Soviet Chargé had sent a telegram, but Stalin and others were necessarily too occupied with war to bother with such maneuvers which showed little sincerity.

Roschin’s mention of Kmt–Communist difficulties, which he said were still at stalemate, was in calm language and accompanied by expression of interest only because those difficulties prevented large numbers of Chinese soldiers from fighting Japs. On question of Sinkiang, however, he spoke with strong feeling, said situation there was intolerable, and while he understood difficulties in way of replacing Sheng Shih-tsai and did not blame Generalissimo for some delay in implementing latter’s assurance to Soviet Ambassador in May (our 1372, August 9,67 paragraph 2) that change would be made, Chinese Government must do something shortly. As example of [Page 805] Sheng’s “impossible” attitude toward Soviet, he said that recently one of Soviet advisers returning to Moscow who had served Chinese Government well for 3 years was arrested in Tihwa and held in jail over night because of minor discrepancy in his papers. As regards Kazak “revolt”, he said he thought [it] had quieted down and that if Sheng’s troops would not “press” the Kazaks and try to force them to farming there would be no trouble.

Gauss
  1. Ante, p. 135.
  2. Ante, p. 504.