893.00/1–1049
Memorandum of Conversation2
| Present: | General Chen Cheng,3 General McClure, and Lt. Eng. |
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McClure. 1. Plan. General.
I have here a secret but tentative plan to discuss with you. I would like to have absolute privacy in presenting it. As a soldier to a soldier, I am going to tell you the plan. Speaking for General Wedemeyer and myself, we as soldiers do not desire to enter politics and economic factions in China. This plan is presented with a viewpoint of a practical soldier that the U. S. has a right to fight its enemies anywhere in the world as a matter of national self-preservation. Also it is our great desire to assist to the limit of our ability in the world all those who wish to fight the Japanese. This plan, in outline, concerns fighting the Japanese in Communist territory with units under U. S. army officers and with U. S. men. We presuppose that in presenting this plan to the Generalissimo, the Minister of War, and the entire National Government, must have faith in our character and integrity. Here is the plan:
Details: Put in Communist territory highly-trained airborne units to destroy lines of communication behind the enemy.
- a.
- To destroy railways and bridges South of Yangtze.
- b.
- To organize, lead, and command Communist guerilla troops and direct attacks on Japanese blockhouses and to annihilate those detachments.
- c.
- To strike so hard and so often that the enemy has to divert troops from South China and elsewhere.
Other details. Details of the plan are yet to be completed, but they must be secret. I request the Minister of War to consider carefully before we present the plan to the Generalissimo. So far this plan is known only to five people, Dr. T. V. Soong, General Chen Cheng, General McClure, General Hurley, and Lieutenant Eng. Naturally we must not keep any secret from the Generalissimo but the plan will be presented to him at an early date after you have studied it from the military point of view and Dr. Soong from a civilian point of view. Following this meeting with you today I will draw up a detailed plan for presentation to the Generalissimo, that is, after Dr. T. V. Soong and you have a chance to see it.
To carry out this plan, we will need a force of about 7,500 U. S. officers and men, with a great deal of signal equipment, demolition equipment, and planes for transportation.
Use of the Communists.
- 1.
- We will use them for building airfields as we will need a large number of workers.
- 2.
- As guides and to give protection to the various demolition groups.
- 3.
- To transport supplies, demolition equipment and foodstuffs to outlying groups from base airfields.
- 4.
- To effect night attacks under U. S. direction on Japanese blockhouses.
- 5.
- To make observations and intelligence reports re Japanese troop movements, supply movements, their locations, et cetera.
Command. Every unit or individual, Chinese or U. S., will be under U. S. Army command and control. If General Wedemeyer and the Generalissimo will permit me, I shall go there to take personal supervision. This operation can be very successful with a minimum of force.
General Information. All weapons, explosives, and ammunition will be the property of the United States and under the absolute control of the United States. All these are intended solely for operation against the Japanese. There will be positive guarantee and reports will be made to the Generalissimo with regard to all the above-mentioned. We will not permit any Chinese unit or individual associating with us in this operation to hoard or to build up stocks which might later be employed in a civil war. The total amount of weapons to be used is insignificant as compared to those under the control of the Generalissimo.
I hope you have confidence in us. No military man can resist from hitting those lightly guarded objectives. The Japanese have lost their sea lanes, and now we will like to see that they lose their land lanes [Page 743] too. As a military man I would like to see all factions get together but am realistic that that is not our business. We are interested only in kicking the robber out of the house. As a friend of China, I am convinced that only the United States is interested to see a strong post-war China.
Chen: Thank you very much. I feel the intensity of your sincerity. The plan is very meaningful, but it needs a good deal of consideration. We have to study which unit can be used in what area. I will give you some background material for this.
The Peiping–Hankow, Tientsin–Pukow and the Lunghai Railways are the most important lines of enemy communication. We need to study where within the limits of these lines we can build airfields.
McClure: I appreciate your interest in this plan. This plan might involve the withdrawal of such highly-trained troops from Europe as needed. At the present there is no definite commitment. There are however small demolition groups already on their way here. I am glad that you are going to study the plan, but I hope you will decide soon, as I expect to submit a complete plan to the Generalissimo sometime early next year.
Chen: I will do so.