Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI

893.00/1–1049

Colonel David D. Barrett to Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer

[Yenan,] December 10, 1944.

Subject: Interview with Chairman Mao Tzu-tung.

1. On November [December] 8, 1944, I had a long interview with Mao Tzu-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and Chow En-lai, Vice-Chairman of the same committee. I opened the interview by saying I had been informed that General Chow En-lai did not intend to return to Chungking. Chairman Mao replied that there was nothing for General Chow to do there. We then entered into a very full and frank discussion of the present negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. The substance of the statements of Chairman Mao and Vice-Chairman Chow is summarized as follows:

“The principal point in the three terms which are offered us by the Generalissimo is that the Communist forces must submit to ‘reorganization’ by the National Military Council. This means the placing of our troops completely under the control of the Generalissimo and will result in their being cut down to any strength which he desires. We will then be at his mercy.

“In return for what is tantamount to complete surrender, we are offered one membership in the National Military Council as a whole. This membership means nothing. Generals Feng Yu-hsiang and Li Chi-shen, both of whom have been important leaders in their day, are both members of the National Military Council, but they can do nothing to influence its decisions. As a matter of fact, the whole National Military Council has not met for a long time.

“General Hurley says that if we accept this seat in the National Military Council, we will have access to all military reports, that we will know all that is going on in the government, and we will be in a position to influence the decisions of the government. We respectfully beg to differ with General Hurley, and we assure him we know whereof we speak when we say a Communist on the National Military Council would know no more about its workings than an outsider and would have no more voice in its councils.

“General Hurley also says that acceptance of representation in the National Military Council will give us ‘a foot in the door,’ and that from such a start we will be able to enlarge the importance of our position and increase our influence to such an extent that eventually we will be in control of the Government. We believe this is a fundamentally wrong conception, but we have been unable to convince General Hurley of this. All we can say is that ‘a foot in the door’ means nothing if the hands are tied behind the back.

“General Hurley, General Wedemeyer, and General McClure have told General Chow that the United States desires our military cooperation, but that before we can extend this cooperation, which we would most gladly give, we must accept the Generalissimo’s terms. The United States, however, offers us absolutely no guarantee of our safety under these terms. We have felt that we could not with propriety ask the United States for any such guarantee. As a matter of fact, we do not believe the United States, no matter how sincerely she might desire to, could guarantee us our safety under such conditions. We cannot trust the good faith of the Generalissimo, and no one who has studied impartially the history of the relations of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party could reasonably expect us to have any confidence in him.

“We find the attitude of the United States somewhat puzzling. General Hurley came to Yenan and asked on what terms we would cooperate with the Kuomintang. We offered a five-point proposal, of which the basis was the establishment of a coalition government. General Hurley agreed that the terms were eminently fair, and in fact a large part of the proposal was suggested by him. The Generalissimo has refused these terms. Now the United States comes and earnestly asks us to accept counter-proposals which require us to sacrifice our liberty. This is difficult for us to understand.

“We are told that it would be a noble thing for us to sacrifice ourselves to save the situation. We cannot see how for us to place ourselves at the mercy of Chiang Kai-shek would help in this present, crisis. General Hurley says we will gain the approbation of the world if we give in. The approbation of the world will do us little good if we submit to being tied hand and foot by the Generalissimo.

“General Wedemeyer says that if we come to an agreement with the Generalissimo, he can give us arms and can send United States; Army officers to train us and work with us. We would welcome such assistance with all our hearts, but we cannot be expected to pay the price which the Generalissimo demands for his permission for us to receive this help. We think the United States should take full cognizance of the fact that we will have little or nothing left with which to cooperate if we submit to the multitudinous restrictions which the Generalissimo can, and will, put upon us if we give up our only means: of self-defence, which is our army.

“There is no question in the present situation of our willingness to participate in the government. The fact is that the terms offered us give us no chance to participate. We repeat, the foot in the door means nothing if the hands are tied behind the back.

“It does not seem fair to us that we should be asked to sacrifice so much, while the Generalissimo, who is in large measure responsible for the present crisis, is asked to sacrifice so little. To recognize the legality of our Party is no sacrifice. We cannot see that to give us one seat in a helpless National Military Council is a sacrifice.

“No matter how sincerely General Wedemeyer may desire to help us, he cannot do so if we accept the Generalissimo’s terms. We want to cooperate with the United States in fighting the Japanese, we want to help in the present desperate situation. We need all the help the United States can give us. The whole thing is blocked by the Generalissimo. We have proposed a reasonable solution under which there would be no question of our receiving help from the United States. Our terms are flatly rejected by the Generalissimo, and he attempts to shift the responsibility to our shoulders.

“The United States believes that Chiang Kai-shek must be retained in power at all costs. We have no objection to such a policy. As long as he fights Japan, we are perfectly willing for the Generalissimo to remain the leader. We are not, however, going to give up our right of self-preservation for one seat on the National Military Council.

“If on his record, the United States wishes to continue to prop up the rotten shell that is Chiang Kai-shek, that is her privilege. We believe, however, that in spite of all the United States can do, Chiang is doomed to failure. Does General Wedemeyer think that Chiang Kai-shek will give wholehearted cooperation in carrying out his recommendations? Of course he will not. General Stilwell found out how much Chiang Kai-shek could be depended upon in military operations. Let the United States continue to support Chiang Kai-shek until he has lost Kunming, Kweiyang, Chungking, Sian, and Chengtu. Then perhaps she will realize how useless it is to support him.

“We are not like Chiang Kai-shek. No nation needs to prop us up. We can stand erect and walk on our own feet like free men.

“We admit that the Generalissimo, with all his shortcomings, has not made peace with the Japanese. For this we are very thankful. On the other hand, only a turtle would refuse to fight Japan.

“Under the ‘five points’ we believe we could, with the help of the United States, make a definite contribution toward saving the present situation. We are willing to shed the last drop of our blood in fighting the Japanese. We believe General Wedemeyer knows what help we can give if we are permitted, but we cannot fight with our hands tied. We are perfectly willing to obey the commands of a government in which Chiang is leader, provided we have some voice in that government, but one seat on the National Military Council will not give us a voice.

“If the United States abandons us, we shall be very, very sorry, but it will make no difference in our good feeling toward you. We will accept your help with gratitude any time, now or in future. We would serve with all our hearts under an American General, with no strings or conditions attached. That is how we feel toward you. If you land on the shores of China, we will be there to meet you, and to place ourselves under your command.

“We have welcomed the United States Army Observer Section, and we have done our best to cooperate with it. If the Section stays we shall be glad; if it goes, we shall be sorry. If it goes and later returns, we will welcome it back again. If the United States does not give us one rifle or one round of ammunition, we shall still continue to fight the Japanese, and we shall still be friends of the United States.

“We have fought the Japanese for seven years without any outside help, and we will keep on fighting them no matter what happens. If the United States will not help us, there is still England and the Soviet Union. (Note: I stated that in my personal opinion, they could not expect much help from England, to which statement they made no reply. I said nothing about the Soviet Union. DDB.)

“Colonel Barrett says we did not make it clear to General Hurley that the ‘five points’ were our final answer. He says he believes General Hurley thought they were our ‘asking price.’ They are our final terms. In them we have done all the yielding we are going to. We yielded in agreeing to accept the Generalissimo as leader, in agreeing to have our troops accept the commands of a united National Military Council, in asking nothing about the supplies given by the United States except that we get a fair share instead of nothing. We will not yield any further.

“We understood perfectly that General Hurley did not guarantee the Generalissimo would accept the ‘five points.’ We know he said only that the terms were fair and he would do his best to get them accepted. But after Chiang Kai-shek refused these fair terms we did not expect General Hurley to come back and press us to agree to a counter-proposal which requires us to sacrifice ourselves.

“All we have said today means nothing if the United States cannot understand the position in which we would find ourselves if we accept Chiang Kai-shek’s absolute control. While he was in Chungking, General Chow did his best to explain this to General Hurley. If General Hurley does not understand this now, he never will and it would be useless for General Chow to go back and say all these things over again.

“As Chiang Kai-shek has refused to agree to a coalition government and we are determined not to give in, we have decided on a decisive step. We are proposing to the People’s Political Councils of the various regions under our control that a ‘United Committee’ be formed representing all these areas. We shall seek the recognition of this body from the National Government, but we do not expect to get it. The formation of the Committee will be a preliminary step to the formation of a separate government.

General Chow did not tell General Hurley of the intended formation of the United Committee while he was in Chungking. The step has long been under consideration, but General Chow did not know until his return to Yenan that it had been definitely decided upon.

“Colonel Barrett says our present stand closes the door to negotiations. We have closed the door, but we leave the window wide open. The ‘five points’ are the window. We will come in on a coalition government today, tomorrow, or even day after tomorrow. But day after the day after tomorrow, after Chungking, Kunming, Kweiyang, Chungking, Chengtu, and Sian are all lost, we will not come in on the terms we have previously proposed.”

2. Chairman Mao’s attitude throughout the interview was recalcitrant in the extreme. He was not discourteous to me, but several times he flew into a violent rage. He kept shouting, over and over again, “We will not yield any further!”, “that turtle’s egg, Chiang!,” “If Chiang were here I would curse him to his face!” A statement on my part that I thought the Generalissimo looked on the “five points” as a means of forcing him to leave the stage provoked a particularly violent outburst. Leaping to his feet he howled, “He should have left the stage long ago!” General Chow never lost his temper, but backed up in cold, calm language everything that Chairman Mao said. I left the interview feeling that I had talked in vain to two clever, ruthless, and determined leaders who felt absolutely sure of the strength of their position.

3. During the course of the interview I expressed some personal opinions in an effort to influence the uncompromising stand of the Communist leaders. My opinions and the answers thereto are summarized as follows:

(1) Opinion. The decision to form a United Committee, leading to a separate government, will give Chiang Kai-shek an excellent opportunity to claim that all he has been saying about the Communists being traitors and rebels has been proved beyond contention.

Answer. He has been calling us rebels and traitors for so long that we are accustomed to it. Let him say what he pleases.

(2) Opinion. You are giving the Generalissimo a chance to say you have made a deal with the Japanese.

Answer. He has accused us of this many times before. Our continued resistance to Japan will prove we have made no such deal.

(3) Opinion. The news that the negotiations have failed and that you are going to break with the National Government will be received with rejoicing in Japan.

Answer. No matter what we do, Japan distorts the facts to her own purposes. There is just nothing we can do about this.

(4) Opinion. Not only Chiang Kai-shek, but a large section of public opinion in the United States may feel you are rebels if you break with the Kuomintang.

Answer. Time will prove the righteousness of our cause to the people of the United States.

(5) Opinion. Your failure to come into the government in this crisis may arouse a very unfavorable reaction in the United States.

Answer. When the true facts are known, as they surely will be, the people of the United States will approve what we have done.

(6) Opinion. If the Japanese are turned back from Kunming and Kweiyang by the forces of the Kuomintang and the United States, you are going to look very bad.

Answer. Should this happen, no one will cheer louder than we will.

(7) Opinion. If the Generalissimo is defeated and you have done nothing to help him in his hour of need, the United States may withdraw her forces from China altogether.

Answer. The United States cannot abandon China.

David D. Barrett