893.00/1–1049
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Davies)92
The Generalissimo’s Dilemmas
The Generalissimo is confronted by two major dilemmas, one military and the other political. Both have now attained the magnitude of crises.
Chiang’s military dilemma lies in the possibility that the Japanese will soon drive on Kunming or Chungking, or both. He is at best not strong enough to insure adequate defense of both against determined enemy attack. If he chooses or circumstances compel him to attempt a serious defense of one, he runs the risk of sacrificing the other.
[Page 725]His decisions in the face of this military crisis are conditioned by the political dilemma which confronts him in his complex domestic and foreign relations.
The Chinese Communists. The history of Chiang Kai-shek’s relations with the Communists is one of long and bitter enmity. The Communists are his principal foe, for in the long run it is they and not the Japanese who challenge his supremacy in China. They are the next in line of succession. The Generalissimo realizes that if he accedes to the Communist terms for a coalition government, they will sooner or later dispossess him and his Kuomintang of power. He will therefore not, unless driven to an extremity, form a genuine coalition government. He will seek to retain his present government, passively wait out the war and conserve his strength, knowing that the Communist issue must eventually be joined.
The Communists, on their part, have no interest in reaching an agreement with the Generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government. They recognize that Chiang’s position is crumbling, that they may before long receive substantial Russian support and that if they have patience they will succeed to authority in at least North China. They are now so confident and so little concerned with Chung-ting that if the current negotiations break down, they intend to bring together the heretofore decentralized areas which they control under a centralized administrative federation. This would be a blow to Chiang which he could not effectively counter.
Other Chinese factions. If Kunming is successfully defended but Chungking is threatened, we may attempt to persuade the Generalissimo to move to Kunming. One of the reasons Chiang will be reluctant to make such a move is that the Yunnan Provincial Chairman is an unregenerate warlord who may be expected to do everything in his considerable power to undermine the Generalissimo’s position in Yunnan. The same thing will be true of the Szechuan–Sikang provincial faction if the Generalissimo flees to Hsichang, Yaan or Kangting. Although the Northwest is also nominally under Chiang’s control, he cannot rely upon the loyalty of the Mohammedan leaders. If he falls back to the northwest he will, furthermore, find himself between the Russians and the Chinese Communists. Finally, the political factions and armies in Southeast China which once professed fealty to him are now cut off by the Japanese and functioning independently of Chungking.
The Puppets. Chiang’s greatest hope for domestic reascendency lies in cooperation with the Japanese-sponsored Chinese puppets. Assuming that the United States and possibly Britain will drive out or cause the withdrawal of the Japanese from East China, the Generalissimo’s surest strategem for the repossession of the vital Yangtze [Page 726] valley and the southern coastal cities is collaboration with the puppets, who may be expected to attempt interregnum control between the Japanese and Chiang. The Generalissimo has therefore looked with complacency if not approval upon the “surrender” to the enemy by some of his generals and their subsequent incorporation in the puppet armies. At the same time he has maintained through Tai Li’s and other secret services constant contact with the puppets. Through these channels he is able to receive and reply to Japanese peace feelers and other propositions.
Japan. The Generalissimo has not and will not capitulate to the Japanese. He has more to gain from us than from them. But that does not mean that he wants to fight the Japanese. He wants, and may well have, a mutual non-aggression agreement with the Japanese which will give him time to recuperate for what he considers inevitable—civil war.
We can no longer assume that the Japanese desire to destroy Chiang and his government. The destruction of the Chiang regime would only tip the balance of power in China in favor of the Communists, whom the Japanese regard as greater enemies than Chungking. It might also bring into being a vigorously anti-Japanese coalition government. If the United States, and possibly Russia, supported that coalition and exploited the Communist position in the heart of Japan’s inner zone, the Japanese would be worse off than they are now. With the Chungking Government, the Japanese can always take comfort in the fact that, no matter how bellicose his pose, Chiang can be depended upon to procrastinate over and fumble American military plans.
Finally, in hedging against ultimate defeat, Japan’s leaders know that the Chiang Government will probably seek to ameliorate American peace terms to Japan and that only through cooperation with Kuomintang China can a defeated Japan hope to rise quickly again to the position of a world power. They realize that these two conditions are less likely to materialize if Chiang’s Government is succeeded by a leftist regime.
Britain. The British do not deceive Chiang. The Generalissimo realizes that the newly-found British cordiality to him is based on London’s calculation that he is now potentially, if not actually, a weaker force in China than the Communists. The Chinese have not forgotten one hundred years of experience in dealing with the British. A policy of spheres of influence and balance of power within China is no novelty to either Chiang or the Communists.
The Soviet Union. The Generalissimo fears the Russians as he fears the Chinese Communists. He is convinced that the USSR will sooner or later throw its strength behind the Chinese Communists to [Page 727] overthrow him. His only chance to neutralize the Russian threat is to play the United States and Britain off against the Soviet Union.
The United States. The paradox of Chiang’s relations with the United States is that while his Government is increasingly dependent upon us for survival, it has been and is our support in the form of offensive action and offensive potential which provokes Japanese attacks. These attacks hurt us relatively little but, as a by-product, threaten to destroy Chiang’s position. Furthermore, for our political support of him as one of the “Big Four” and for what postwar promises we make him, Chiang pays the increasingly costly price of at least token resistance to Japan. If the Generalissimo could determine the character of American support, he would have only civilian goods and such military supplies as would build up his domestic position against the day of civil war.
With all of these complex political factors in mind, the Generalissimo is likely to be impelled in the direction of a decision to hold Chungking at all costs. Chungking is his political base. If he loses it, his government will be threatened with disintegration and he will become, in effect, a refugee. Not only will he become a refugee, he will also find himself more than ever under American influence with all that it implies. Chiang probably reckons that if the Japanese intend to penetrate West China, their primary objective will be Kunming. He also realizes that if he blocks a Japanese drive on Kunming, the Japanese attack may be deflected to Chungking. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the Generalissimo has already decided, should the necessity arise, to sacrifice Kunming to save Chungking.
- Copy also transmitted by Mr. Davies in his letter of December 11, 1944, to Harry L. Hopkins at the White House, with the following comment: “Since writing the enclosed memorandum, the military crisis has perceptibly eased due to the withdrawal of the Japanese column which had been moving on Kweiyang. … The basic political factors discussed in the memo, however, remain valid. I think that you will be particularly interested in the sections on page 2 dealing with Japan and the Puppets.”↩