893.24/12–144
The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Penfield) to the Secretary of State 86
[Received December 28.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum87 of a conversation of November 30 with Mr. P’an Ch’ang-yu and Mr. Li [Page 720] Ming-liang. Mr. P’an is Chairman of the Board of the Szechwan Provincial Bank at Chungking and is said to be extremely influential in Chungking business circles. He is also a brother of General P’an Wen-hwa, who ranks second to Teng Hsi-hou in the Szechwan warlord hierarchy and is said by some to be the militarily most powerful of these warlords. Mr. Li, who speaks some English, is apparently a henchman of Mr. P’an and seemed to be along merely to assist in interpreting.
I had not previously met or had any dealings with either Mr. P’an or Mr. Li but I have seen and talked with General P’an on several occasions. It seems probable, therefore, that the call, which was very obviously made for the purpose of bringing informally to the attention of an American official the alleged determination of the Szechwan warlords to defend their province and their desire for American military equipment, was inspired by General P’an.
This is not the first time that the question of supplying provincial troops with American equipment has come to my attention. Local Szechwanese in general and the warlords in particular more or less openly express their dissatisfaction with the treatment, both in the military and the political fields, which Szechwan is receiving from the Central Government. When I first called on Liu Wen-hui, Governor of Sikang, he made no attempt to conceal his considerable interest in the disposition of American military supplies sent to China (my despatch no. 29, June 8, 194488). A few weeks ago I was confidentially approached by a local landlord who has no active political affiliations but who appears to be sincerely devoted to the cause of Sino-foreign cooperation and friendship on a mutually beneficial basis and who is apparently a close personal friend of several local warlords. This gentleman remarked on and deprecated the antagonism between the Central Government and Szechwanese militarists. He then explained what he described as his own plan for minimizing this antagonism. He said that if the American military authorities would agree to set up a training center in Szechwan to train and equip a certain number (smaller than the local warlords would demand) of provincial troops, he felt that he could obtain both local and Central Government support for the project, working through General K’ang T’se, who is a Szechwanese but a strong supporter of the Generalissimo (see in this general connection, my despatch no. 45, September 13, 1944, “Szechwan Particularism.”).
On the basis of these conversations and other evidence available it appears reasonable to assume that some credence can be given to the claim that the Szechwan armies would make an effort to repulse any attempted Japanese invasion of the Province; that these forces represent, [Page 721] as Chinese armies go, a potentially powerful force; that, although any American equipment these armies might obtain would probably be used against the Japanese should it be so needed, one of the principal motives behind the desire to obtain such equipment is to improve the local military position vis-à-vis the Central Government; that Szechwan represents, politically and militarily, a potentially unified, dissident force the possible effect of which on China’s future cannot be disregarded; and that Szechwanese leaders, although perhaps less direct in their approach than other groups, are just as anxious to obtain and utilize for their own ends foreign aid and support.
Respectfully yours,