893.00/11–2444
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the
Secretary of State
No. 3180
Chungking, November 24,
1944.
[Received December 18.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of Report
No. 44, October 14, 1944, prepared by Mr. John S. Service, Second Secretary
detailed to U. S. Army Headquarters here, on the subject of “The Present
Communist Party Attitude Toward Relations with the Kuomintang.” The first
page of the report contains an adequate summary.
The enclosure to the report is a translation of a speech made by General Chou
En-lai on October 10, 1944, at Yenan. For Mr. Service’s
[Page 718]
translation there has been substituted a
translation made by this Embassy,85 prepared for transmission to the Department prior to the
receipt of the report from Army Headquarters.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Service)
No. 44
[Yenan,] October 14, 1944.
Subject: The Present Communist Party Attitude Toward
Relations with the Kuomintang.
To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech. USAF–CBI, APO 879.
- 1.
- The Communist Party newspaper has recently been full of extensive
news and comment dealing directly or indirectly with relations with
the Kuomintang. The volume of this material precludes complete
translation: much of it, however, is repetitious. In my report No.
42 of October 11, 1944,85 I gave the gist of propaganda slogans and
speeches in commemoration of the Chinese National Anniversary. Other
comments are contained in my report No. 43 of October 12, 1944, in
confidential remarks made by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and General Chou
En-lai.
- 2.
- The most important recent public statement of the attitude of the
Communist Party in regard to relations with the Kuomintang is the
speech given by General Chou En-lai on October 10 to a large
audience of representatives of Party, government and mass
organizations in Yenan. A translation of this speech is
attached.
-
Summary. Steady defeats on China’s
regular front contrast with victories and the expansion of
the liberated areas under Communist leadership behind the
enemy lines. Kuomintang defeats are due to the refusal to
bring the people into the war—not to lack of foreign help.
The Kuomintang Armies cannot fight the Japanese as long as
their commanders intrigue with the enemy and are more
concerned with eliminating the Communists. Foreign aid must
be based on a rebirth of China’s own efforts and should be
given to those forces who can and will fight. There must be
an end of the Kuomintang’s one-party despotism and personal
dictatorship. There must be created a truly national
government of all parties and groups. This should be done
through an emergency national conference. Without full power
to reorganize and control the military high command, this
coalition government will be useless. There can be no
disbanding of active anti-Japanese forces and governments.
We have the right to demand that these forces receive a
share of foreign aid proportionate to the enemy forces they
oppose. End summary.
- 3.
- A number of conclusions regarding the present public stand of the
Communists seem apparent.
[Page 719]
- (a)
- The Communists are no longer interested in negotiations
with the Kuomintang on a basis of haggling and bargaining
over terms and conditions. They consider it useless to argue
over the number of divisions to be “recognized”, to consider
the “abolition” of other existing forces, or to debate the
“legalization” of existing guerrilla governments.
- (b)
- In this sense, the Kuomintang Chargé that the Communist
terms keep growing is true. The Communists freely admit it.
Their argument is that the situation in China is changing
rapidly and has altered a great deal in the two years
(counting from General Lin Piao’s visit to Chungking in
November, 1942) that the negotiations have been
spasmodically going on. Now the country is in crisis. The
Kuomintang is much weaker—so much that its continued ability
to fight effectively is in doubt. And the Communists are
very much stronger. General Chou’s speech indicates that the
Communists are now not merely seeking recognition of the
present forces and Communist-controlled Governments, but of
all future ones which may be set up in recovered territory
behind the Japanese front.
- (c)
- Rather than a compromise on a negotiated basis of terms
and conditions, the Communists now seek a thorough-going
reconciliation and broad cooperation. The whole emphasis has
therefore been swung from these negotiations to the drive
for a complete governmental reorganization—which is the only
possible basis for genuine cooperation.
- 4.
- Although the Communist leaders have indicated that they intend to
wait for some time before taking any further step in their present
political campaign against the Kuomintang, I expect that the present
critical propaganda will be continued, and perhaps even intensified,
in order to keep the issue before the people (and foreign opinion)
and encourage the growth of pressure for change throughout the rest
of China.
- 5.
- It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted to the
American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF–CBI, for the
information of Mr. Davies.
Approved for transmission:
David D. Barrett, Colonel, G. S. C.
