Subject: Comments of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and General Chou
En-lai on the Internal Situation in China.
To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech. USAF–CBI, APO 879.
Approved for transmission:
David D. Barrett, Colonel, G. S. C.
[Enclosure 1]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of
Embassy in China (Service)
[Yenan,] October 10, 1944.
Mao Tse-tung and his wife were at the small impromptu dance at
Headquarters last evening. Both were in fine humor, dancing repeatedly
with each other and with most of the others present in a manner which,
remembering Mao’s normally quiet and reserved bearing, can only be
called gay.
Early in the evening, Mao came over and sat beside me during a lull
between dances and started a conversation which lasted for perhaps 20
minutes.
He commenced by jokingly congratulating me on the American reply to
Chinese criticism of the small quantity of American aid. As I was at a
loss, he explained the article in the evening paper quoting a “release
of the State Department” (see my report No. 41 of October 1026). I insisted that there must
have been some mistake, that the State Department could not possibly
have issued the supposed statement, and that there were no other
indications that we were taking such a strong line with the
Kuomintang.
He switched to the subject of Kuomintang–Communist relations and admitted
that the Kuomintang was not yet ready to compromise and that there was
hence no immediate hope for the proposed Emergency National Congress and
the reorganization of the Government.
To my query regarding what the Communists would do, he replied: “We will
wait. We have had a long training in patience.” He then suggested that
if there was going to be any direct American pressure on the Kuomintang
it would be delayed until after President’s reelection since, inasmuch
as the President had built Chiang up, he would do nothing to discredit
him—thus perhaps stirring up the “friends of China” and making China
policy a political football—until
[Page 638]
after the election was safely over. Laughingly, he
asked about the President’s chances.
Turning serious, he repeated what he had said before—that the Communists
would risk no friction with the United States and would therefore “keep
in step” with American policy. Laughing again, he asked what American
policy was toward the Kuomintang and Communists.
I suggested that it was really the Japanese who determined the Communist
policy and future, that the more territory the Japanese occupied and the
harder they pushed the Kuomintang, the stronger the Communists became.
He admitted the partial truth of this, saying that the Communists would
“recover any territory lost by the Kuomintang”, and that their forces
had already moved into East Honan from both North and South. He
intimated that the Communists would also go into Southeast China if
Kuomintang control there disintegrated. But, he insisted, the Communists
will not compete with the Kuomintang for territory which it still holds,
and while they recognize that Japanese crushing of the Kuomintang may
mean eventual advantage, the Communists realize that this will be
outweighed by immediate disadvantages to the Allied war against Japan.
The Communists therefore seek cooperation on the basis of democratic
unity, believing that this is the key to successful prosecution of the
war and the resolution of China’s internal political problems.
Mao then asked about Major Casberg’s impressions gained on his recent
trip. I mentioned that he had noted friendly relations and practical
cooperation between the Army and peasant population. His reply was: “Of
course. We wouldn’t be here, or alive today, if we didn’t have the
support of the common people (lao pai hsing).”
From this he went on to develop the theme of the importance to the
Allied victory in France of the support—for intelligence, scouting and
even in sabotage and military operations—of the population, that this
would be lacking in a landing or operations by American forces in
Kuomintang territory, but that it could be provided by the mobilized
population of the Communist areas.
I turned back to the subject of Kuomintang–Communist relations and
suggested the hypothetical possibility that the Kuomintang might
eventually be willing to invite several of the Communist leaders to
accept posts in the Kuomintang Government, perhaps as cabinet ministers.
Without hesitation, he said that this would be useless, that the C–C and
other conservative Kuomintang cliques would still have full control of
the lower government structure, and that Communist participation on this
basis would only help the Kuomintang to deceive the Chinese people and
foreign opinion. Communist participation
[Page 639]
would have to be conditioned on thorough-going
reform and governmental reorganization.
He returned to the idea that the Communists would wait for a period. He
then mentioned Jugoslavia, saying that time had eventually proved the
falseness of Mikhailovitch’s claims to be fighting only the Germans,
that Tito had had to assist general knowledge of Mikhailovitch’s motives
and actions, that the Communists also had a great number of absolute
proofs of Kuomintang complicity with the Japanese and puppets, that they
had so far withheld publication in the hopes of the Kuomintang being
willing to compromise and cooperate, but that if it finally became
certain that the Kuomintang had no such intention, the material would be
published. To my queries as to how the Communists would know when there
was no longer hope for Kuomintang compromise he would make no comment
except: “The time has not yet come: there is still a little hope.”
J[ohn] S[tewart] S[ervice]
[Enclosure 2]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of
Embassy in China (Service)
[Yenan,] October 12, 1944.
General Chou dropped in informally, stayed to lunch, and talked for some
time afterward. Most of the conversation was on general subjects. But
the following points may be of interest.
He analyzed the Generalissimo’s October 10 speech as the most reactionary
and uncompromising that Chiang has made for a long time. The first
point—“China cannot be judged by normal standards because she is a
revolutionary country”—is aimed primarily at domestic critics. The
second and third—“the war cannot be won without China”, and “we still
have ample strength of our own”—are directed at foreign critics. The
fourth point—“talk of disunity and civil war is the attempt of the enemy
and traitors to prevent our victory”—is flung at the Communists. He
pointed out that there was no recognition of foreign aid, no reference
to internal political problems (except the obvious inclusion of the
Communists among the traitors), and no mention of democracy or
government reform.
He thought that the speech marked a new recent hardening of the
Generalissimo’s attitude. He based this on four supporting indications.
(1) Recent reports that a Plenary Session of the Kuomintang’s Central
Executive Committee would be called in the near future—presumably to
discuss reconciliation with the Communists and governmental
reorganization—have now died down. (2) The Generalissimo
[Page 640]
is reported to have made an
attempt—through Wu Teh-chen—to muzzle Sun Fo. (3) Although it was
announced on October 2 that the PPC Investigatory Commission would come
to Yenan within a week, no definite date has yet been set for their
departure from Chungking. (4) There have been several recent instances
of severe internal censorship.
He believed there is no immediate hope for results in the
Kuomintang—Communist negotiations, or for any promising reorganization
of the Government.
He said that the Communists would “wait a month or two” before deciding
their next move. By that time the Presidential election may have
permitted a more definite American policy, and the Japanese drive toward
Kweilin and Liuchow will have either succeeded or failed. If those
cities are lost and the Japanese continue their advance, country-wide
pressure on the Kuomintang for reform will be greatly increased.
He suggested that the Generalissimo’s policy, being continually on a
short-term basis, now depends on the hope that Germany will be defeated
within a month or two, that by that time the United States will be
attacking the Philippines, and that the Japanese drive—and the critical
attention of the Chinese people—will be diverted to the impending events
on the China coast. He thinks that the Ta Kung
Pao editorial about the opening of the “Second Front” (the
landing on the coast) is obviously officially inspired.
To a hypothetical question regarding possible Communist participation on
a very limited basis in the present government, he reiterated the points
in his October 10 speech that governmental reorganization had to be
complete, and that the new government would have to have the authority
to reorganize and control the high military command. He then recalled
the experiences of himself and other opposition figures in accepting
posts under the Kuomintang government which meant no authority but
rather a muzzle. He went on, however, to say that the Communists would
consider any proposal carefully and might not necessarily refuse it,
even though the participation offered was small. He drew the parallel of
the People’s Political Council. The Communists knew that the Council was
intended to be a sham and had no authority, and the seats offered them
were not proportionate to their relative strength. But they accepted
them because it gave them a chance to make their views known and was a
small opening wedge (they hoped) toward cooperative participation in
national affairs. (General Chou’s attitude was quite different from Mao
Tse-tung’s rather snap statement that the Communists would not
participate unless there was a thorough reorganization.)
J[ohn] S[tewart] S[ervice]
