740.0011 PW/10–1144
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 1.]
Subject: Strength, Distribution, and Arms of Communist Forces.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch no. 3051, dated October 11, 1944,23 “Summary of Situation Behind the Enemy Lines in North China”, and to enclose24 a copy of a report, no. 17, dated August 30, 1944, prepared by Mr. John S. Service, Second Secretary of Embassy on detail to General Stilwell’s staff, and who is now in Yenan attached to the U.S. Army Observer Section there, in which he transmits his notes on a portion of a lecture on the growth and organization of the Chinese Communist forces given by General Yeh Chien-ying to the Section on August 4, 1944.
Summary of Enclosure. The table (attached to the enclosure) shows a relatively large concentration of Communist troops in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area; the strength of the forces shown to be in Shantung and the Shansi-Hopei-Honan base is surprising; the smaller strength indicated for the various New Fourth Army bases is to be expected because of their smaller areas, although that Army appears to be relatively weak in the Yangtze Valley-Hang-chow Bay area, and around the cities of Ningpo, Hangchow, Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow, the areas of greatest strategic importance. The field forces are 62% armed, the local forces 50%. The New 4th Army appears to be slightly better armed than the 8th Route. There seems to be a relatively greater development of the militia system in the 8th Route than in the New 4th Army bases. The best equipped 8th Route Army regiment contains roughly half as many men as a Japanese regiment and over two thirds the strength of a Central Government regiment; it has more rifles than a Central Government regiment but something over two-thirds the number carried by a Japanese [Page 636] regiment. In other arms the discrepancy is more marked. Organizational deficiencies of the 8th Route include total lack of special troops, such as artillery and engineers; weak communications; great diversity in organization and strength of units; high operational casualties; lack of training and experience in use of new equipment. Organizational advantages include: high mobility of lightly equipped units; capacity of units to operate independently; co-ordinated centralization of command; high morale—only volunteer recruitment; long experience. Deficiencies in equipment include: lack of ammunition, automatic weapons, no artillery; obsolescence of weapons, lack of standardization; soft steel in bayonets; no anti-gas equipment. Sources of equipment: very small amount from Central Government; had some at the beginning of the war; one third of weapons captured from Japanese; puppets bring in guns; Kuomintang troops abandon them; a large proportion of recruits bring their own arms; small output from Communist run arsenals. End of Summary.
In essaying this information, Mr. Service comments that it is his impression that General Yeh spoke frankly and fairly, and that his summary of the deficiencies in Chinese Communist equipment is, if anything, an understatement. It has been, Mr. Service states, consistently the line of the Communist leaders that they are not ashamed of what they have accomplished with what they have had to do with, although they could have done a great deal more with more.
Respectfully yours,