Subject: Interview with General Chu Teh.
To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech. USAF–CBI, APO 879.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of
Embassy in China (Service)
[Yenan,] September 22, 1944.
The call was at General Chu’s invitation. I have followed the policy of
not requesting personal interviews with the Communist military leaders
so as to avoid overlapping or conflict with the work of Colonel
Barrett.
The General received me most cordially in his residence, remarking that
although I had been in Yenan for two months we had not had a chance for
a real talk and that he hoped we could have a friendly informal
conversation.
Although the appointment was set for 2 p.m., I learned to my surprise
from one of the General’s private staff that I was expected to stay for
supper. The interview thus lasted for about 6 hours. During the meal we
were joined by Mrs. Chu and General Yeh Chien-ying, the Chief of Staff
of the 8th Route Army.
General Chu left most of the initiative in the conversation to me. But
without attempting to get specific answers to definite questions or to
give me any particular message, as Mao Tse-tung had done (see my report
no. 15 of August 2792), it was evident that he wished an opportunity to
re-state Communist views and to learn if possible something of the
American attitude on Chinese problems.
Our conversation was rambling and eventually covered almost every phase
of the war, Kuomintang—Communist relations, the potential Communist
contribution to the war, and American relations with China. Many of the
views the General expressed have already been reported. I therefore
merely note scattered points which may be of interest.
At the beginning of the talk I gave General Chu the reply which had just
been received from General Hurley to General Chu’s invitation to visit
Yenan. At the time he made no comment. But later he showed interest in
learning of Mr. Nelson’s and General Hurley’s missions. He suggested
indirectly that if General Hurley was discussing questions of
Chinese-American military cooperation, a visit to Yenan would have a
good effect in putting pressure on the Generalissimo to be more
cooperative.
He was pessimistic about the present chances for Kuomintang—Communist
cooperation because of the continuing uncompromising attitude of the
Kuomintang. He believed that things would have to get worse before they
could get better—that the Kuomintang would
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have to be pushed even more tightly into a corner
before its leaders would “see the light”.
He likewise did not think there was much chance at present for success of
the proposal to reorganize the Central Government. This is because the
Kuomintang leaders are motivated by selfish knowledge that real
reorganization will mean their loss of power. The Communists will
continue to press for this reorganization. Meanwhile they will wait
because they know it must be inevitable if China is to avoid
collapse.
After a long discussion of the failings of the Kuomintang, the General
agreed with a laugh to my suggestion that if the Communists felt that
way it would be better for the Kuomintang to collapse. However, he said,
the Kuomintang at present is the government, recognized and supported by
the United Nations. The Communists will continue to seek cooperation
with it as long as it continues to make a pretense of fighting, shows
any hope of reform and does not attack the Communists in open civil
war.
He did not think immediate collapse of the Kuomintang likely. At the same
time he did not think that such a collapse would be a disaster. Lung Yun
and the other Provincial groups would continue the fight against Japan,
they would be more willing to cooperate with the Communists, and they
would try to strengthen their own positions by making some democratic
reforms. These groups may take advantage of present conditions to get
greater freedom for themselves, but it is not likely that they will try
to overthrow the Kuomintang. He indicated that Li Chi-sen’s group had
inquired regarding the Communist attitude toward a semi-independent base
which they hoped to set up behind Japanese lines in South China. But he
obviously did not think this would be a movement of any large scale nor
that it would denounce the Central Government.
General Chu characterized the Generalissimo as the combination of a
“Green circle” gangster and petty Shanghai broker. He repeated Mao
Tse-tung’s statements that he had to be treated as a gangster, and he
derided his knowledge and ability in military affairs pointing out
numerous instances where his uninformed interference had been
responsible for military disasters. He suggested that this irresponsible
meddling from above had an effect in robbing Kuomintang commanders of
initiative and active leadership.
Discussing the recent Kuomintang–Communist negotiations, General Chu said
that the Communists will never agree to the disbanding of forces in
being and actively opposing the Japanese. The Communists neither demand
nor expect Kuomintang supplying of all these forces: any part of them
that the Kuomintang will supply will be an improvement over the
situation up to now.
[Page 591]
Discussing military cooperation with the Kuomintang, the General said
that Communists were willing to accept Kuomintang command, but that it
would have to be fair and impartial and sincerely devoted to the single
purpose of fighting the Japanese in the most effective manner. The
Communists, for instance, would not accept orders which needlessly split
up their forces, took them away from areas where they had built up
popular support and hence could be of greatest use, and tried to take
them away from their own commanders. Under present conditions and
present Kuomintang leadership, there is no hope of such broadminded,
disinterested command.
The only Kuomintang general who might be able to carry out whole-hearted
cooperation with the Communists is Wei Li-huang. (This rather
surprisingly high opinion of General Wei, which seems to be generally
held by the Communists, is due to his cooperation with them in Shansi in
1937. They admit that he is not “pro-Communist”, but merely that he is
more broad-minded than the Whampoa clique.)
The only really practical solution of the command problem, General Chu
believed, is an American commander-in-chief of all forces in China
strongly supported by the American government. This commander would have
to be able and willing to use the whiphand over the Kuomintang through
his control of American supplies. The Communists would have confidence
that an American commander would not be fooled by Kuomintang political
maneuvers and would be wise enough to use the Communist forces in the
areas where they are most useful and in the type of operations for which
they are best suited.
Even under these conditions it would be necessary, however, to not mix
the Kuomintang and Communist forces. Each should have its own task and
sphere of operations. (General Chu argued at length to refute my
suggestion of the political and practical difficulties involved.)
Discussing the strategy of the war, the General believed that the
Japanese plan to link up land communications through Kwangsi to French
Indochina. This was to make up for shipping losses, to counter American
plans to land on the South China coast, and to provide an avenue of
withdrawal for the Japanese forces in Malaya, who would be brought back
to strengthen the armies in China. (The Communists continually harp on
this idea that the Japanese plan to withdraw from Malaya and the East
Indies.)
He believed that the Japanese plan to take Kunming, and is sure that they
plan to take Sian.
He argued at length the necessity for an American landing on the China
coast. He attempted to refute my suggestion that it might be easier and
quicker to defeat Japan from the sea by claiming that the shipping and
manpower required would be too great to be practical.
[Page 592]
that every Japanese inhabitant would fight
to the death, that the Japanese navy and air force would be held in
reserve to prevent such a landing by an all-out last-ditch fight, and
that if necessary the Japanese will move to Manchuria and continue the
struggle on the mainland.
He repeated the general Communist view, with which I did not agree, that
we would have to take Hainan, believing this an important air and naval
base which would threaten our communications. (It must be borne in mind
that there is a small Communist force in the interior of Hainan.)
In discussing both the support of an American landing on the South coast
and the present collapse of the Kuomintang in Southeast China, the
General mentioned the possibilities of the Communists mobilizing
guerrillas in the areas around their old bases in South China. (This is
discussed in detail in my report no. 19, August 31, 1944, “Possible
Usefulness of Old Communist Bases in Southeast China.”) General Chu went
on to express the view that only the Communist forces, because of their
basis of popular support, could be of satisfactory assistance to
operations against the Japanese north of the Yangtze.
Talking of the last stages of the war, General Chu was not greatly
alarmed over the possibility that the Kuomintang may hope to use its
advance northward against the Japanese as the opportunity to at the same
time eliminate the Communists. He said that popular support of the
Communists would doom any such plan of the Kuomintang to failure, but
that if the Kuomintang tried it, the Communists would simply go back to
guerrilla warfare—against which the Kuomintang would be even more
helpless than the Japanese. Likewise, General Chu was not greatly
worried about the puppets. He believed that most of them would turn over
to whichever force, Kuomintang or Communists, reached them first. The
Communists attack the puppets now in order to extend their bases,
strengthen themselves, and procure arms. A certain proportion of the
puppet forces, particularly “local” rather than former regular
Kuomintang troops, already are engaged in under-cover cooperation with
the Communists depending on the closeness of Japanese control over
them.
General Chu was pessimistic, however, about the aftermath of the war in
China, especially the problem of demobilizing the Kuomintang armies. He
felt that these large bodies of men, who have been completely severed
from their homes and taken out of productive work, would not easily be
settled down, especially since many commanders and provincial groups
would try to preserve their own strength by maintaining their forces. He
contrasted these conditions with the Communist reliance on local forces
who were not taken far from their homes and were kept at some productive
work. He also emphasized the importance of the Communist pensioning of
wounded
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and disabled soldiers,
and the favorable treatment given to soldiers’ families. (General Chu’s
views on this problem are given in greater detail in enclosure (f) of my report no. 3, July 30, 1944.94)
While discussing American cooperation with the Kuomintang, General Chu
referred to our present working arrangement with Tai Li, showing what
seemed to be fairly detailed knowledge. He suggested that this was
dangerous for the United States because Tai represented the
anti-foreign, anti-democratic forces in the Kuomintang. I remarked that
any interest we had was a purely practical military one of getting
intelligence regarding the Japanese. He thought this very dangerous
because the organization in the Occupied Areas was so closely related to
the other side that more information went out than came in. Chu then
referred to Tai’s internal political activities, and his spy work
against the Communists, and repeated the common Communist report of such
sabotaging activities as poisoning of wells in the Communist areas (the
prevalence of such charges by the Communists is interesting in the light
of the reported desire of Tai Li to use bacteriological warfare “against
the Japanese”). The General also mentioned that he had received a
report, as yet not supported by concrete evidence, that Tai’s agents
planned to carry out some plot in Yenan against the Observer Section and
Communist leaders, possibly involving the use of explosives.
During supper, reference was made to a report that the Generalissimo had
given orders for the execution of the General in command of the Chinese
forces who had given up Chuanhsien, Kwangsi, to the Japanese. General
Yeh Chien-ying, rather surprisingly and uncharacteristically, gave vent
to an outburst of violent profanity against the Generalissimo’s methods
of handling his commanders. Deleted of epithets, the gist of his remarks
was that instead of proper planning and fundamental reforms which could
help the situation, the Generalissimo tried to save his own face by
going into an impotent rage for the blood of a hapless, and helpless,
commander after every defeat. This outburst by General Yeh was
interesting as a breakdown of the reserved and reasoned attitude toward
the Generalissimo which the Communist leaders have generally tried to
maintain. It is also significant of the scorn and bitterness which they
feel toward him. (General Yeh was Director of Studies of the Whampoa
Military Academy at Canton when Chiang Kai-shek was Principal.)
Later I discussed with General Yeh our as yet unfulfilled request for
official reports of Communist military operations. He said that the
reports in the Chieh Fang Jih Pao, although not
issued as communiqués, were in fact official and authoritative and were
the only reports received by the Headquarters.
