General Yang, who recently headed a “Fortress Inspection Mission” to England,
is reputed to have liberal leanings and, judging from his criticism of Dr.
Sun Fo as a leader of liberals within the Kuomintang, probably considers
himself a rival of the latter for this distinction. So far as is known he
has had no very close contact with any of the more active liberal groups in
Chengtu during his visit here.
General Yang was very critical of the Generalissimo and very pessimistic in
regard to the prospects for the peaceful introduction of democracy into
China, and in regard to the future of Sino-Russian relations. His outline of
the regional characteristics of liberalism in China is of special interest.
Although he was extremely outspoken and emphatic in his criticisms of the
Generalissimo and the Central Government, his general attitude was
relatively objective and was marked by a minimum of the personal bitterness
and recrimination displayed by so many critics of the Government.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Penfield)
Chengtu, September 17,
1944.
I called on General Yang Chieh this morning and during the course of an
hour’s conversation he expressed opinions on various subjects along the
following lines.
Chiang Kai-shek. General Yang said that, having
studied with the Generalissimo, having acted as his Chief of Staff for
several years during the middle and late 1920’s, and having been closely
associated with him for over 20 years, he understood his capabilities
and limitations very well. He very strongly criticized the Generalissimo
from several points of view: (1) He assumes too much responsibility and
attempts to do too much himself (General Yang elaborated at some length
on this familiar theme); (2) He does not understand the importance to
China of a technical war industry; at least a modest war industry could
have been built up years ago if Chiang had been willing to push it; (3)
He does not understand the value of education; China could have by now
had a much greater reserve of technically trained personnel if the
proper steps had been taken in the past; (4) He does not understand
(General Yang repeatedly used this phrase) military strategy or the
value of technical training; his transfers and dispositions of troops
are usually based on political rather than military considerations, and
he thinks that if a soldier is well uniformed and looks well on parade
he is an effective fighting man; and (5) his entire approach is
repressive rather than receptive, an attitude which results, inter alia, in the diversion of money and effort
to non-constructive uses. For instance, General Yang said that there are
five special service operatives assigned to check on his movements and
activities who might much better be spending their time ferreting out
Japanese spies or in other more constructive work.
Democracy. The current talk of democracy in China
is based upon two main factors, (1) the desire for power of various
political and military “outs” who regard “democracy” primarily as a
means of achieving their ends, and (2) the dissatisfaction of large
numbers of people in all walks of life who want an accounting from the
Government. They want to know, for instance, not only what becomes of
the taxes they pay, but what has happened to the millions of dollars
they have “contributed” for the purchase of planes, etc. To these people
“democracy” means a Government which can be questioned without danger of
having one’s head chopped off and which will account to the nation for
its actions and policies.
[Page 579]
At the present time there is absolutely no hope for the peaceful
introduction of democracy into China, principally because Chiang and the
people closest to him are caught in an ever more constrictive circle of
fear; they are congenitally incapable of meeting increasing criticism
with any other means than increasing repression and intolerance. This
tendency will sooner or later inevitably result, General Yang implied,
in violent internal disorder or other fundamental developments. He was
very emphatic in his opinion that no basic improvement can be expected
as long as the present regime is allowed to remain in power. He
characterized such developments as the much publicized personal freedom
law as mere gestures for foreign consumption; he said that there are
still some 30 organizations and classes of officials with the power of
arrest, and that he has noticed no fundamental improvement in the six
weeks since the law came into effect.
Local Characteristics of Dissident Groups. While
asserting that there is contact and cooperation on a nation-wide scale
between groups working for democracy in China, General Yang indicated
that this cooperation could be overemphasized and gave his views on the
characteristics of dissident or potentially dissident groups in various
centers. In the southeast the situation is principally characterized by
confusion; Li Chi-sen and various groups of intellectuals more or less
closely associated with him are sincerely interested in promoting
democracy for the benefit of the people and the nation as a whole; Pai
Chung-hsi and his followers are fundamentally undemocratic and motivated
principally by sectionalism; Yu Han-mou tends to bend with the breeze;
and other groups have their own views and policies. Thus, although all
these groups are united in opposition to the Central Government, they
have various conflicts amongst themselves which result in a situation
which is far from harmonious. In Yunnan opposition to the Central
Government is probably more outspoken and bitter than anywhere else in
China but Yunnanese leaders (General Yang is himself a Yunnanese) can
not be considered as having a very high standard of intelligence. In
Szechwan, however, the war lords are in general much more clever and
realize the importance to their own interests of making some
“democratic” concessions to the people. The Young China Party, while
wielding some influence in educational circles, has fundamentally little
strength, but it is attempting to use the war lords to promote its
own—right wing—version of democracy.
In the Kuomintang itself there is a very distinct liberal group which has
close connections with the Third Party, a group which is relatively
powerful as compared with other “small parties” but which is more of an
underground organization than the other parties and hence is less well
known.
[Page 580]
Sun Fo. Continuing on this subject, I asked
General Yang whether Sun Fo was considered as the leader of the
Kuomintang liberal group. He emphatically denied this and said that real
liberals considered Dr. Sun untrustworthy and without any real
understanding of the principles and issues at stake. He cited the
anti-democratic speeches made by Dr. Sun in Hongkong in 1938 (or 1939?)
as evidence of his insincere and vacillating attitude toward democracy.
As his father’s son, Dr. Sun has a “steel neck” (cannot be done away
with) and the Government, making the best of this situation, permits him
to carry on his present “democratic” activities as a kind of
window-dressing for foreign consumption. Liberal Kuomintang members are
forced to be so discreet in their activities that their real leaders are
not generally known.
Sino-Russian Relation. General Yang expressed the
opinion that the recent change in the Sinkiang Provincial Government
will make no important difference in Sino-Russian relations. He said
that the Generalissimo’s attitude toward Russia is analogous to his
approach to internal questions, that is, his distrust of Russia is such
that even apparently genuinely friendly moves on the part of the Soviets
only serve to increase that distrust. General Yang stated that during
his first mission to Moscow in 1933 he had several conversations with
Molotov80 and
Voroshilov81 which led him to believe that
there was a good chance of building up a common Sino-Russian front which
would have kept Japan in check. But when he telegraphed for authority to
proceed with more definite negotiations the Generalissimo, after
consultation with Whampoa clique members, decided that such a front
would only incite the Japanese to more precipitate aggression and lead
to an undesirable increase in Russian influence in China, and he
therefore telegraphed General Yang to leave Moscow immediately.
