Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI

893.01/9–1644: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

Chungking, September 16, 1944—4 p.m.
[Received September 17—2:23 p.m.]

1567. For the Secretary and the President:

1. I called on the Generalissimo accompanied by Atcheson afternoon 15th by appointment, pursuant to your 1196, September 9, 4 p.m., and had friendly conversation of almost hour and half. His attitude was agreeable throughout and he obviously strove to give appearance of being receptive to suggestion and comment and even of ready, or theoretical, concurrence. But I do not feel that there has been any fundamental change in his attitude toward the Communist problem or that he has acquired any realization that it would be practicable or desirable to work for unity in China by other than the means he has pursued through the years of disposing of opposition and recalcitrance. There is reason to believe that in the light of his limited background experience and training, he does not have any realistic conception of either the character or uses of democracy.

As regards suggestion that I talk with the Communist representative Lin Tsu-han, he at first seized upon it as a springboard to ask that as a first essential I impress upon Lin that the Chinese Communists must submit unconditionally to the principle of unified military command under the Generalissimo and to the political control of the National Government. I stated that while I could not of course mediate between the Kuomintang and the Communists, I could appropriately express to Lin the views of the American Government in general in regard to the need of Chinese unity and the achieving wholehearted unity with the Kuomintang both for the sake of defending China from the Japanese and of China’s future. The Generalissimo later raised question whether if proposed conversation with Lin should take place, Communists might not publicize it for their own purposes, perhaps to indicate that American Government was countenancing or supporting them or at least was mediating between them and National Government. I said that of course matter rested with the Generalissimo. I would undertake to talk with Lin only if Chiang so wished, and would await further word from him in the matter.

2. As regards question of coalition war council or similar arrangement, Chiang said he was already considering steps looking to that end but changed immediately to a dissertation on the People’s Political Council now in session. Upon my mentioning that People’s Political Council was purely advisory body he said he assumed that our suggestion did not contemplate change in government structure, something which should not be attempted at this time. I replied that I looked upon participation of minority parties in government as desirable; that a national government is frequently resorted to in times of crisis; but my suggestion did not contemplate immediate reorganization of government but rather setting up of a war council on which civilian and military leaders of other parties or groups would participate to face the problems of the present situation, and to share responsibility. I hoped that in this manner the distrust now so evident between Kmt and Communist [s] could gradually be dissipated and from there on the unification of China could go on to a more satisfactory basis in due course, but the council should in my opinion have both authority and responsibility, responsibility being the sobering element in a council of factions established to meet a crisis. Chiang said again that he was “considering steps” and expressed hope that “time would come” when representatives of parties other than Kuomintang could be taken into the Government.

3. Whether expected early fall of Kweilin will result in crystallization of so-called southeast joint defense movement is unknown. Meantime our impression from Chiang’s remarks is that he is not actually taking any steps to bring the dissident military and other elements into line with the Government except as subordinates to himself who must unquestionably obey his orders. From our various sources we have had no indication that anything constructive is being attempted or accomplished except that the Lim Hi Sen [Li Chi-shen] group in the southeast is reported to have been persuaded not to make an open break with the Government at this time for the sake of China’s interests as a whole and that as the Japanese campaign progresses they may move eastward and in their isolation merely set up some kind of autonomous organization without publicizing it.

Hurley and Nelson were informed of your 1196. Stilwell was absent from Chungking.

Gauss