893.00/9–144
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 16.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit copies of two reports (numbers 3 and 7)53 prepared by Mr. John S. Service, Second Secretary of Embassy on detail to General Stilwell’s Headquarters, who is now in Yenan, Shensi (seat of the Chinese Communist regime), with a U. S. Army Observers Section. Enclosed with the reports are memoranda54 of various interviews and conversations by foreign correspondents [Page 537] and Mr. Service with prominent Communist political and military leaders.
As is suggested by Mr. Service (report no. 3, paragraph numbered 2), the memoranda covering these interviews provide a wealth of authoritative and up-to-date material in regard to the views of Chinese Communist leaders on a wide variety of pressing problems and subjects.
Summaries of memoranda:
(a) Remarks of Mao Tse-tung to Guenther Stein, British Correspondent, July 4, 1944.
The Chinese Communist Party has not changed its fundamental policy which is “New Democracy”—carrying out the revolution of national independence, democracy and the people’s livelihood. What China needs most is democracy, not socialism. The Communists are still very far from socialism. China needs to drive out the Japanese, realize democracy on a national scale, and solve the agrarian problem so that capitalism of a progressive character may develop in China. The effort of the Chinese Communists is in line with the interests and policies of the principal powers and the basic resolutions of the Atlantic Charter, the Moscow and Teheran Conferences. The Comintern had no place in the Far East. The policies of the Chinese Communists are carried out among the masses to win their support. There are other groups represented here (Yenan) besides the Communists. The Communist land policy is one of rent concessions by the landlord and guarantee of rent payment by the tenant. It is matter of mutual benefit to adopt proper treatment of capital, both Chinese and foreign, after the war. Three forms of industrialization will exist—state, large-scale private, and handicraft. The Communists are in north Shensi by the trust of the people. In 1937 the Communists gave up for good the right of independence for government and army, but not the right of equal status for the Party which the Kuomintang has never recognized. The Communists hope that their “governments” (Communist bases) will become lower government organs of the National Government. The Eighth Route Army is under the National Military Council. The Communists have authority to lead a part of the Chinese army, specifically in the enemy rear. The north China masses do not want Communist armies reduced. After the war there should be proportional demobilization in a ratio of six Kuomintang soldiers to one Communist soldier. The people should elect village governments and the higher forms of governments should be elected either by direct suffrage or by representatives of the people. The Chinese Communists have received no Russian support. If strong enough they will take up the task of driving the Japanese from Manchuria. China must first recognize Outer Mongolia as a national entity and then organize a sort of United States of China to meet Mongol aspirations. The same is true of Tibet, and the Mohammedans should be given a chance to form their own state. It is not realistic to talk about the status of Hong Kong now. China’s burning task today is the war against Japan, Japan’s affairs should be solved by the Japanese people, but the militarists [Page 538] must be disarmed and the problem of feudalism solved. Colonial countries should have the right of self-rule. There is no likelihood of a complete breakdown of the National Government before the end of the war. If the Kuomintang attacks the Communists they will retreat a little and if it continues to attack the Communists will fight. Chiang Kai-shek would not welcome Allied mediation and probably would not agree to an Allied Command (in China). China needs internal peace and democracy. After the war lack of internal peace will influence international relationships. If there is civil war it will last for a long time.
(b) Remarks of Mao Tso-tung to Maurice Votaw (American Employee of Chinese Ministry of Information and Correspondent) July 18, 1944.
There has been no connection between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. There was a relationship with the Comintern, but this is no longer true. The Communist Party inherits that which is good and rejects that which is bad from the long tradition of China. It accepts anything from abroad that can be good and useful to China. Conditions are not present (in China) for the introduction of Communism. In carrying out its program the Communists still have defects. In the past three years the Communists have conducted a movement in the Party against three faults: subjectivism, sectarianism, and stereotyped expression. Wang Ching-wei Las never sent emissaries to seek Communist cooperation. The Kuomintang has no regular representative in Yenan. The Communists would welcome such a representative. Political workers accompany the Communist armies to raise the morale of the troops, consolidate relations between the officers and the ranks, and consolidate relations between the troops and the people. The Communists have never made an undertaking to give up Communist propaganda, but in spite of this have not carried on much propaganda. The greater part of Communist propaganda is devoted to the fight against Japan and for democracy. The Communist Party has no intention of overthrowing the rule of the Kuomintang. It wishes that the Kuomintang would make progress which would be beneficial to the people, the nation, and the Communist Party. It has some governmental industry but most industry is private. It is necessary to convene the National Congress. Some parts of the 1936 Draft Constitution should be revised. The Communist Party believes in multi-party rule and will be willing to participate in the National Congress. It has criticized the national army and conditions in Kuomintang China and the Communists seriously criticize themselves. They criticize because of the seriousness of the situation for the nation. The Kuomintang must adopt a policy of unity with the people in the fields of politics and economics. Only then can the military situation change. Communist hopes are for unity and democracy. The Communists have and will continue to stick to their promises.
(c) Remarks of Chou En-lai, Member of Standing Committee of Central Executive Committee of Chinese Communist Party to Second Secretary Service, July 27, 1944.
It is apparent that the Kuomintang will not make reasonable concessions in the present Kuomintang–Communist negotiations, that a [Page 539] compromise is impossible and that the Kuomintang has entered into the talks primarily for their propaganda value and to make an impression on foreign opinion, especially American. The Generalissimo and Kuomintang leaders no longer have concrete policies and are mainly drifting and hoping for salvation by favorable developments. The Kuomintang hopes that it will be in a position at the end of the war to liquidate the Communists in summary fashion. The Communists do not welcome this delay in settling Kuomintang–Communist problems, but they do not fear delay because they know that they grow stronger while the Kuomintang becomes weaker. There will be a steady decline in Kuomintang China but probably no sudden break or collapse. The Japanese plan is to cut China in two and open a north–south line of rail communications, drive back to American air bases, strengthen the Japanese inner circle of defense, and weaken the Chinese armies so that they will be unable to undertake a counter-offensive. The Japanese will not try to take Chungking because they need not force the capitulation of the Government and because they do not wish to bring about Kuomintang–Communist reconciliation or the Kuomintang’s replacement by a more active and aggressive regime. Any effective counteroffensive is impossible. Conditions will grow worse and if the Generalissimo does not make an about-face before next year it will be too late. The situation could be saved by the granting of basic democratic rights, the bringing of all anti-Japanese groups into the Government, removal of certain officials, reorganization of the army, elimination of political training schools, the combating of inflation by control of hoarding and speculation and by the increase of production and of revenue. American press comment and criticism is helpful and an even better means of making American influence felt might be through personal contacts with high Chinese officials.
(d) and (e) Remarks of Chu Teh (Commander of the Chinese Communist Armies) to Guenther Stein June 25, 1944, July 8, 1944.
American airmen landing in Communist territories need have no fear. The Communists will be glad to prepare detailed maps for American airmen and could coordinate with an Allied offensive by cutting all railways leading south from north China. If permitted the Communists could penetrate into Kiangsi, Hunan, Fukien, Chekiang and Kwangsi and mobilize the masses in a short time. They would need ammunition. After the Allies reach the Yangtze and could give the Communists supplies directly the Japanese could be attacked from both sides. The Kuomintang is not much interested in fighting the Japanese. The Communists would accept Allied command because the Kuomintang command is bankrupt. If the Kuomintang insists on pursuing present policies cooperation on a military level between the Allies and the Kuomintang is bound to fail. A supreme Allied command is needed in China to achieve the fullest possible coordination between Allied and Chinese forces, the reorganization of all available Chinese strength, and the fullest cooperation among all Chinese armies. The Chinese people would welcome an Allied command and would cooperate with it. The recent defeats in Honan and Hunan arise from a dual policy of fighting internal forces while manoeuvring against the real enemy and at the same time hoping for foreign support and for victory of the Western Powers [Page 540] over Japan without developing China’s own strength. It is this dual policy and lack of reliance upon the people which has brought China to the present dangerous situation.
(f) Remarks of Chu Teh to Maurice Votaw July 15, 1944.
The Communist armies are under the leadership of the Party. The Party Commissar executes the policy of the Party and the unit commander has complete charge of military operations. During the war the 8th Route Army increased to its present size because the people in the war regions desired to fight foreign aggression and because the Communists considered it of vital importance to the Chinese nation and to victory over Japan. The Communists are still willing to obey orders (of the Chinese high command) except those which require Communists to fight against the Communist Party or violate the People’s interests. The Kuomintang troops behind the enemy lines were assigned the fighting of the 8th Route Army as their main task. The Communists have received nothing from the Soviet Union (arms, et cetera). Recruiting for the 8th Route and New 4th Armies is entirely voluntary, and this is true of all units except the People’s Self-Defense Corps to which all able-bodied persons between ages 18 and 45 must belong. The Government cares for men discharged from the army. Communist troops participate in productive work. Their chief needs are light weapons, infantry weapons, anti-tank guns, heavy and light machine guns, explosives and ammunition. With some help from the Allies demobilization and rehabilitation can be worked out and social order maintained.
(g) Remarks of Chu Teh to I. Epstein (foreign correspondent) July 21, 1944.
Japan is attempting to establish a set of continental communications in China, cut off China from her Allies, and push back Allied air bases menacing Japan. Economically, Japan seeks to support the war in China by utilizing China’s resources and has succeeded in doing this in areas where guerrilla activity is not developed. The only feasible strategy at the present time continues to be all-out war against the enemy by use of mobile and guerrilla tactics. Improvement of China’s situation can only come through change of political, economic, and military policies, including abolition of the semi-feudal, semi-fascist political dictatorship and the establishment of a democratic political structure based on the United Front. Continental warfare must depend on American and British seaborne supplies and calls for rapid help to the 8th Route and New 4th Armies so that they can operate southward in coordination with an Allied advance from the south. Communist guerrillas, if properly supplied, could damage more Japanese installations and communications than an equal weight of bombs (dropped from Allied air craft). The Communists can best cooperate with the Allies now by disturbing the enemy in north and central China, by building landing fields, by making arrangements to rescue Allied flyers, by supplying intelligence, and by provisioning Allied submarines. The Communists need Allied arms, ammunition, radio materials, medicines and technical personnel.
[Page 541](h) Remarks of Lin Piao (Communist military commander) to Second Secretary Service July 27, 1944.
Reports from the fighting front indicate that the fighting quality of the Japanese troops in north China has deteriorated considerably in the past two or three years, that Communist operations this year have been very successful, and that a good deal more could have been accomplished if the Communists had had more and better arms. (Mr. Service comments that the Communist leaders had been circumspect in avoiding direct pleas for arms and equipment and that they seemed to avoid giving any impression of begging for such assistance. He also observed that the Communist military leaders had been far more outspoken in their criticism of the National Government than the civilian leaders and that on occasion military officers have been reprimanded for their critical attitude.)
(i) Remarks of Yeh Chien-Ying (Chief of Staff, 18th Group Army) to Mr. Service August 4, 1944.
National Government guerrillas operate in the vicinity of Shanghai and other important cities behind the enemy lines not for the purpose of actively attacking the Japanese but to be in a position to seize the cities as soon as the Japanese collapse in order to prevent their occupation by Communists. National Government underground activity is carried on in Shanghai, but some of the secret organizations have been broken up by the Japanese, whereas the underground work of the Communists is more effective because it is carried on by highly trained, loyal and well indoctrinated local Party members. The Communists will expand into the areas of west Anhwei and east Honan recently occupied by the Japanese. End of Summaries.
The enclosed memoranda seem to be of value in that they define in present-day terms and attitudes, views and policies of high Chinese Communist leaders on a variety of problems and subjects. In their essence, these attitudes, views and policies, as reflected in the enclosed memoranda, do not appear to differ basically from those openly espoused by the Chinese Communists during the past two or three years. Mao Tse-tung, the acknowledged leader of the Chinese Communist Party, insists that the Communists have not changed their fundamental policy of “New Democracy”. He goes farther, perhaps, than he has before in asserting that the Communists are not, at least for the time being, aiming at a Communist state or even a socialist state or even at the overthrow of the Kuomintang. He renounces the Comintern and denies that there has been a relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. He and the other Communist leaders insist, as they have been doing since the start of the Sino-Japanese war, that there must be mobilization of the people if the war is to be won. Mao demands the right of equality of status for the Chinese Communist Party, and he suggests that the Communist armies and governmental organizations will not be relinquished. He asserts that the Chinese Communist Party believes [Page 542] in multi-party rule and will be willing to participate in the National Congress (scheduled to be held one year after the termination of the war). On the whole, Mao’s attitude and views, as set forth in the memoranda, give the appearance of being moderate and reasonable. His method of approach to the various problems posed suggests that he is desirous of seeking the sympathy and support of the democratic powers (as contrasted with the Chinese Communist attitude prior to the German attack on the Soviet Union when the United States and Great Britain were commonly described as the “Anglo-American imperialists”).
Judging from his interview with Mr. Service, Chou En-lai is as cynical and bitter as ever. He appears to have flatly stated that no agreement may be expected to evolve from the current Kuomintang–Communist negotiations. He considers the Kuomintang to be moribund and unable to take effective corrective measures. Like Mao, he feels that the situation might be saved if the Kuomintang would grant basic democratic rights, invite other groups to participate in the government, et cetera, but it is evident that he has little hope of this coming about. The Communists have been expressing similar hopes since 1937.
Generals Chu Teh, Lin Piao and Yeh Chien-ying, all prominent Chinese Communist military officers, are far less reserved in their condemnations of alleged Kuomintang and National Government weaknesses than Messrs. Mao and Chou, who represent Chinese Communist civilian elements. General Chu pledges his hearty support to the American war effort in China and suggests that if given arms the Chinese Communist armies could be very helpful to an Allied military campaign in China. He suggests that the best method of accomplishing such a mission would be the creation of an Allied command in China. In other words, General Chu evidently prefers to deal with an Allied command in the China theater to a Kuomintang command which he dismisses as “bankrupt”.
When read and reconsidered in their entirety, the enclosed memoranda seem to suggest, as from the Communist point of view, that the Kuomintang (and National Government) is in its dying throes; that it will not and cannot take remedial measures to correct the serious situation that has arisen; that it has lost the confidence and support of the people who wish to mobilize under a system of democracy to drive the Japanese from China; that the Chinese Communists have, on the contrary, established a democratic system in the Japanese-occupied areas of north China and effectively mobilized the people; that they have an army which needs arms and ammunition to make it superbly effective; and that in these circumstances it will be to the mutual benefit of the United States and China in the fight against the [Page 543] common enemy for the United States and the Chinese Communists to cooperate in this mission. In short, the Chinese Communists seem to be seeking a means of obtaining United States assistance without control or restriction by the Chinese Government at Chungking. This poses a question which, if it crystallizes, is likely to prove very difficult of solution. For there is ample evidence that the Chinese Government and Kuomintang leaders have no more faith or confidence in the professions and motives of the Chinese Communists than they have hitherto possessed. Unless this distrust of Chinese Communist motives and aims is in some way eliminated, and it is difficult to see how it can be eliminated, the Chinese Government may be expected to exert every effort to prevent American military assistance from being extended to the Chinese Communists.
Respectfully yours,