893.00/9–144
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
No. 2921
Chungking, September 1,
1944.
[Received September 16.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a
report (no. 4.) “Kuomintang and Japanese Views of Effectiveness of Communist
Forces” prepared by Mr. John S. Service, Second Secretary of Embassy on
detail to General Stilwell’s Headquarters, who is now in Yenan, Shensi (seat
of the Chinese Communist regime). Attached to Mr. Service’s report is a
memorandum containing notes of a conversation between Mr. Guenther Stein,
British correspondent, and General Ho Ying-chin,50 Chief of the Chinese General Staff, and excerpts51 from three
Japanese-controlled publications.
General Ho’s interview with Mr. Stein indicates that there has been very
little, if any, change in the attitude which he has maintained toward the
Chinese Communists during the past five years. His attitude and views
doubtless reflect those entertained by the Generalissimo and other high
Kuomintang leaders who distrust Communist motives and fear the steady growth
of Chinese Communist influence and power in north China and wonder where it
will lead in the future.
There is little doubt but that in his interview with Mr. Stein, General Ho
has deliberately minimized Communist military power and achievements in
north China. His motive is not clear, although there is a strong presumption
that he wished to depreciate Chinese Communist military strength and
capabilities because of fear that if they become generally known pressure
for the arming by the Allies of the
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Communist forces will grow. That the National Government at Chungking
will do everything in its power to prevent the arming of the Chinese
Communists is almost certain; for it fears that eventually such arms would
be turned against it in a bloody civil war for control of China.
While General Ho’s estimate of Communist military capabilities and strength,
as given to Mr. Stein, appears to be misleading, acceptance of Chinese
Communist claims of their military power and achievements, without a
thorough check, would not seem wise or desirable. Recent Chinese Communist
claims of military achievements against Japan seem to have been exaggerated,
and it may be that they have exaggerated their military potentialities. In
view of the utter inaccuracy of Japanese reports and the Japanese propensity
to utilize propaganda to exacerbate Kuomintang–Communist relations, it is
believed that Japanese reports in regard to their operations against the
Communists should be treated with great reserve.
The Communists have unquestionably been successful in establishing bases of
resistance behind the Japanese lines, especially in north China, and they
have in this way prevented large areas from coming under complete enemy
domination. They have also contained some Japanese troops in north and
central China. But they have been unable to deny the Japanese the use of the
cities and lines of communications and important natural resources of the
occupied areas. With one or two possible exceptions they appear to have
avoided meeting the Japanese in frontal clashes, confining themselves in the
main to occasional attacks against small elements of the enemy. In reviewing
the battles of the past seven years in China, it would seem safe to say that
Communist participation has been on a relatively minor scale. The
Communist[s] have fought no battles comparable in scope and intensity to
those of the Shanghai, Hsuchow, Hankow, and Changsha campaigns; and, their
claims to the contrary notwithstanding, they appear to have contained but a
minor proportion of the Japanese military forces operating in China.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Service)
No. 4
[Yenan,] July 31, 1944.
Subject: Kuomintang and Japanese Views of Effectiveness
of Communist Forces.
To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech., USAF–CBI, APO
879.
1. I enclose, as being of general interest on the subject of
Kuomintang–Communist relations, notes of an interview given to Guenther
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Stein, correspondent of
the Christian Science Monitor and other papers,
by General Ho Ying-chin on May 16, 1944.
General Ho expresses, in a most extreme form, the contentions of the
reactionary anti-Communist elements of the Kuomintang regarding the
Communist armies: that they are of insignificant size; that they are not
fighting the Japanese but only the Kuomintang; that they are not
supported by the people; that they are losing ground and hold no
important areas in the occupied zones; and that they should be reduced
in numbers and all guerrilla and partisan units dissolved.
2. The question of whether the Communist armies are opposing the Japanese
does not, in my estimation, need argument. Reports which we have
received from time to time from foreigners who have come through the
guerrilla areas and recently from the Communist commanders here in Yenan
are so detailed and complete that I am prepared to accept, even before
personal field observation, the gist of the Communist statements that,
subject to their limitations of supply, they are holding important
territory in the rear of the Japanese lines and actively resisting
Japanese attempts to consolidate their control over large areas of North
and East China. If this were not true, there would be no need for the
well-known elaborate systems of Japanese defenses of, for instance, the
main railway lines.
As has been noted in Chungking, Communists claims of fighting with the
Japanese are in general supported by Japanese news broadcasts. The
Communists here in Yenan have also collected a mass of material from
Japanese sources regarding their warfare against the Communists. While I
have had no opportunity of checking these translations, I enclose a few
excerpts of clippings from Japanese publications as indicating the
Japanese respect for the Communists as an active fighting and political
force in North China. These are also an interesting contrast to the
expressed views of such Kuomintang leaders as Ho Ying-chin.
3. For General Ho to have made such categorical statements to an
intelligent, well-informed correspondent with considerable China
background, on the eve of his departure for Communist territory where he
would have opportunity of checking at least a part of the statements, is
not explainable except as an indication that General Ho actually
believed in their truth. But whether or not General Ho really believes
what he is quoted as saying, his interview must cause concern as
illuminating the difficulties which will be met in trying to bring about
any effective coordination between Central Government and Communist
military forces as long as men holding the views of General Ho are in
authority.
General Ho vigorously rejects the whole concept of guerrilla warfare—the
form at which the Communists are most skilled and which
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would seem most suitable to the conditions
and terrain behind most of the enemy lines in North China. He wishes to
reduce the numbers of the Communist forces already fighting the
Japanese. Finally, he indicates that the Central Government will try its
old tactics of separating them from their own bases—which will reduce
their effectiveness since they not immediately have good knowledge of
the country and the close relations with the people necessary for
successful guerrilla operations. And he implies that their command will
be broken up.
The Communist leaders (note especially the interviews with Chu Teh and
Mao Tse-tung transmitted as enclosures to my report no. 3 of July
30)52 have stated their desire to have their forces, the 18th Group
and the New 4th Armies, incorporated into and coordinated with the
National Army. They indicate clearly, however, their belief that these
forces, at least in the immediate future, will be most useful for
guerrilla operations behind the lines, that there must therefore be a
continuance of present Communist methods of close political liaison with
the people, that they will not agree to any substantial reduction of
these forces, and that they will not give up their leadership of these
armies.
This diametrical opposition of views can be expected to continue to cause
trouble even if, as the Communists suggest, there is set up an Allied
supreme command in the China theater.
4. It is requested that the attached copies of this report be transmitted
to the American Ambassador at Chungking, and to Headquarters, USAF-CBI,
New Delhi for the information of Mr. Davies.
Approved for transmission:
David D. Barrett, Colonel, G. S. C.
