893.00/7–1344: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 1—4:30 p.m.]
1316. Consul Sprouse [at] Kunming reports that movement against Chiang Kai-shek, composed of dissident military leaders (your [our] 907, May 25, 10 a.m.), the Federation of Democratic Parties (Kunming’s despatch 51, July 14) and, it’s now alleged, Chinese Communists, appear to be assuming more serious proportions, and it is stated in Kunming that an effort will be made by this coalition to overthrow Chiang if Japs start a move toward Chungking, which coalition considers likely.
Head of Federation of Democratic Parties contracted [contacted] Sprouse with apparent object of ascertaining what would be American attitude toward movement; would we remain strictly neutral; support Chiang, or seek to mediate. Leader asserted object would be to form coalition government, composed of element named above plus Kuomintang progressives, and to prosecute war against Japs more effectively through reorganization of armies and revitalization of war effort. He considered attitude of United States most important, British attitude of secondary importance, and said that support of Soviet Government assured. He was told that our Government has recognized National Government, that it would be breach of good [Page 492] faith for us to give any encouragement, that any act which would weaken China’s war effort against Japan would be deplored by our Government and people, and that while we are sympathetic to the cause of liberal democratic government, we would be strongly critical of civil war in China whether begun by Kuomintang, Communists or this coalition. Sprouse felt that leader of Federation hoped we would be mediators. Leader admitted that possibility of civil war and consequent opening of doors to Japs were great deterrents to taking positive action. United States press correspondent who recently visited Kweilin tells me another deterrent is question of currency, there being an acute shortage of bank notes, large quantities of which are required to meet present inflated costs.
Sprouse comments that situation has dangerous possibilities not only in regard to war effort against Japan, but also with respect to position our military forces, if civil war should break out.
He says most striking impression he has of political situation, after 1 month in Kunming, is bitter criticism of Chiang by all liberal elements including Kuomintang members, and including Chinese who less than a year ago still believed that Chiang was China’s only leader, but now see no hope for China under Chiang’s leadership. Many well-informed liberals, who do not support the coalition and who do not believe that it can succeed, still voice strong criticism of Chiang.
Embassy is watching this movement with greatest attention and while on basis of Sprouse’s report we must regard it as having reached more serious proportions, we do not believe it has reached stage where open break with Chiang is imminent.
We accept with reserve statement that movement will be supported by Chinese Communists who have consistently maintained that they regard Chiang as the one leader who can and should head war of resistance to Japan. However, Communists might join the movement if it showed signs of success.
Embassy also questions statement that movement will have support of Soviet Government, but it is not to be forgotten that Sino-Soviet relations are not good and that Soviet coldness toward Soong’s projected visit to Moscow (our 1301, July 27, 2 p.m.21) is an indication of Soviet attitude toward Chiang at present time.
We believe that at proper time puppet troops may rejoin the Government, but there is nothing to substantiate allegation made to Sprouse that some puppet commanders would support the coalition.
We would regard with concern any indication that young army officer groups were becoming interested (see our despatch 2118, February 3) but there has as yet been no such indication or allegation.
[Page 493]A difficult situation might develop if the coalition should move into the open in the hope of forcing us to mediate.
Embassy believes that with his extensive Secret Service Chiang must be cognizant of movement against him and must be preparing to deal with it at what he considers proper moment. Our telegrams to Department have indicated that Chiang is known to be deeply concerned over present situation in China as are number of his more intimate supporters in party. Some of them feel that at what Chiang considers proper moment he will act perhaps even by way of an “about face” in effort to recapture control of situation; but he is a stubborn person and it is impossible to forecast what he may do. With his elevation to the Presidency, he has shown tendency to withdraw himself, even more than formerly, from outside contact and comment is made that his intimate friends and advisers are called in less frequently for consultation. He is said to trust no one but himself.
Copy of Sprouse’s report went forward July 29 by courier under cover of my letter same date to Grew.22