893.00/15380
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent)30
I had lunch with the Ambassador30a at his home. There were no other guests. He had heard that I was accompanying the Vice President on his trip to China31 and obviously desired to give me his slant on the China situation and on the Chinese-American relations in anticipation that it would reach the Vice President.
After some talk of the hardships he had experienced during his recent visit in Chungking, with particular reference to inflation, he launched forth into a description of Kuomintang–Communist relations. He believed that the Americans did not understand the real fundamental purposes of the Chinese Communists. The Communists constituted more than simply an internal problem. They were trying to undermine in every way possible, not only the Kuomintang, but the Chinese Government. They were responsible for, and welcomed, much of the current criticism of China appearing in the public press in America. In reply to my comment that difficulties were to be expected [Page 413] from an “opposition” party, he replied that the Communists were not simply opponents of the Kuomintang but were “rebels” against the National Government. He stated that the Communists were in devious ways in league with the Japanese and inferred that they had relations unfavorable to the Chinese Government with Soviet Russia.
The Ambassador next mentioned the current criticism appearing in the American press and periodicals. He realized that it was difficult to control such criticism but said that it was harmful, nevertheless, to Chinese-American relations. I pointed out that American feeling was so fundamentally friendly to China, appreciative of what China had done in its resistance to Japan, and sympathetic toward China’s present difficulties that the current spate of criticism would not be effective in altering that feeling. The Ambassador said that “face” was a very important matter in China and the really harmful effect was in Chungking where difficulties had heightened sensitivity.
The Ambassador said that while in Chungking he had spoken of the American reaction to China’s strict censorship over outgoing dispatches and had advocated relaxation. I said that such a step would be very effective in reducing criticism in the American press.
The Ambassador reverted to the Communist problem, again going over the dangers inherent in what appeared to be American press sympathy for the “rebels”. He referred also to the desire of the American authorities to send a group of military observers to the Communist-controlled areas as ill-advised. I said that it was important that our military officers in China become familiar with conditions in the area because they might have to fight there. He said that they could find about those conditions from Chinese in Chungking. I asked the Ambassador what, if any, plans China had in mind to bring about effective cooperation with the Soviet armies in the event the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan. He said that plans were being made and, with regard to the Communist troops, that effective measures would be taken to isolate the Communist forces from the Soviet Army. He spoke of loyal army units in Inner Mongolia and said that other National Government troops could be effectively utilized for the purpose he had mentioned. (I was amazed to hear of these plans.) I said I had in mind ground-work on preparation for an understanding such as the Anglo-Soviet agreement.32 He said the idea was being given consideration (but I don’t think so).
The Ambassador brought up the subject of postwar reconstruction in China and of American aid. He spoke of the dangers of supporting the wrong elements. I told him that I thought American aid, on a [Page 414] businesslike basis, would be forthcoming, but that it would be forthcoming in order to aid the National Government in improving economic and social conditions and not to aid the Government in suppressing opposition arising from socially dissatisfied groups.
The Ambassador said that there would be a special meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on May 20 or shortly thereafter and I inferred from his remarks that the object of the meeting would be to discuss measures which the Government might take to meet foreign criticism of the undemocratic tendencies in China.
The Ambassador said it would be very helpful to Chinese-American relations if some high official of the American Government (he obviously had the Vice President in mind) could counteract the current criticism of China by emphasizing in public addresses the long-term and fundamental friendship of America and China and stressing the American Government’s confidence in the Chinese Government.
- Substance of this conversation was reported to the Ambassador in China in Department’s telegram No. 642, May 12, 8 p.m.↩
- Wei Tao-ming, Chinese Ambassador.↩
- For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 216 ff.↩
- Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, signed at London, May 26, 1942, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 353.↩