893.00/15270: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:30 p.m.]
351. 1. We have no information indicating Central Government use of American lend-lease materials against Chinese Communists in [Page 345] past or for equipping Central Government blockade forces (Department’s 239, February 16, 6 p.m.)
2. We regard General Yu’s approach perhaps tentative feeler to obtain American official reaction to possible attack on Communists, as Central Government would scarcely make such approach if it actually intended attack Communists irrespective of other factor. If Hearn had not given negative answer, it is possible Central Government would have assumed American Government would take no positive stand in matter and would [continue?] furnishing lend-lease supplies to Chinese without regard to their possible use.
3. While Yu’s approach is indicative of seriousness of situation, Embassy perceives no reason to revise opinion expressed in final paragraph our 258, February 8, 3 p.m. Following factors militate against civil war: (1) apparent determination of Communists to resist attack; (2) Chinese hope that end of war will find large American trained and equipped Central Government forces strong enough to force Communist capitulation; (3) unfavorable foreign reaction, particularly American (reinforced by General Hearn’s reply); (4) Central Government’s present lack of full support of all provincial elements in event of clash, such elements allegedly favoring status quo as check to increased Chungking control and as insurance their local position and (5) present criticism Chungking policies among many elements. Only factor pointing to possible conflict at present is time element connected with suspicion Soviet interest and aid to Chinese Communists after end European war.
4. Heated discussion of blockade [of] Communists at press conference February 16 between Government spokesmen and foreign correspondents served to indicate to Chinese foreign interest in and knowledge of present situation.